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Spaces of Solidarity and Spaces 




During 2020, as the coronavirus pandemic spread around the world, we have wit-
nessed countries making unprecedented decisions, restricting international travel 
and closing borders but also chartering flights to bring in migrant workers employed 
in essential sectors. While important (internal) travel restrictions were first imple-
mented by China in late February 2020 on the Chinese New Year holiday, the rele-
vance of borders in relation to controlling the pandemic became internationally 
visible when the United States banned EU citizens from entering the country on 14 
March 2020 as Covid-19 cases and victims sharply rose in Italy and a number of 
other European countries. A sweeping closure of the EU external borders to all non-
 EU citizens was announced on 17 March 2020 – a rare occasion where EU citizen-
ship had a tangible effect on all EU citizens’ livelihoods without being mediated by 
their national citizenship. That closure confirmed that EU citizens and their national 
governments felt they were closer together and in solidarity and interdependence 
under this pandemic although intra-EU border closures followed. Indeed, March 
2020 saw the closure of borders between countries with very long and strong socio- 
economic and political ties such as Canada and the US (a closure that is still effec-
tive at the time of writing in November 2020), or member states of the European 
Union with one another. Regional trade and migration within west Africa were also 
interrupted abruptly when, for instance, Nigeria closed its borders on 23 March 
after recording its first death from the virus. And while it was initially hoped that the 
summer of 2021 will bring not only temporary relief but also a way out of the pan-
demic, it has since become clear that 2020–2021 will be marked with at least selec-
tive border closures and migration and mobility restrictions. The wider impact of 
the pandemic on society and the economy will be long lasting and global.
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The concern that travellers increase the risk of Covid-19 contagion was and still 
is legitimate. At the same time, border closures did not keep ‘everyone’ out, only 
those who were non-citizens or non-permanent residents. In some countries, like 
Canada, exceptions were made for temporary residents who effectively live in the 
country. Many EU countries (including, for instance, Spain, Portugal, Poland, and 
Germany) implemented blanket extensions of stay permits for all foreigners during 
spring 2020 to avoid people losing their legal status under the lockdown (EMN, 
2020a). Similar measures were taken in Canada, Chile, Israel, and New Zealand, 
while Italy implemented a regularisation program with a view of providing status to 
illegally staying aliens working in agriculture and the care sector. Some countries 
implemented different facilitation procedures like allowing for online renewals of 
permits, as in the Netherlands, or automatically renewing the status of people who 
had lost it during the pandemic, as happened in Canada, until the end of 2020, to 
give them more time to gather necessary documents or find a new job or both (ibid.).
The pandemic border closures not only raised important questions about mem-
bership but also left many migrants stranded at destination countries, at origin or 
also, for some, while in transit. People found themselves unable to go back to their 
countries of origin as international transport systems came to a halt. Some (as hap-
pened in Japan for legally staying foreign nationals) were not allowed entry back to 
their country of residence even if they had lived there for the previous ten years 
(Shakuto & Baldari, 2020). Some who were ready to emigrate, had a new job and a 
new life waiting for them at a new country, were left stranded, waiting for borders 
to reopen to foreigners (Triandafyllidou & Nalbandian, 2020). And yet others, those 
more vulnerable, like asylum seekers or migrant low skill workers (e.g. domestic or 
construction workers) found themselves locked up in dormitories (as in Singapore 
or the UAE) or refugee camps (as in Greece) (see Molnar Chap. 3, in this volume). 
By contrast, those migrants engaged in ‘essential’ or ‘key’ work sectors, like health 
and care systems or the agri-food sector benefitted from special arrangements so 
that they could reach destination countries to work and ensure that there was no 
disruption to such essential services that regular residents or citizens rely on 
(Palumbo & Corrado, 2020b; and also Palumbo and Corrado Chap. 8, in this vol-
ume). Other low skilled or semi-skilled migrant workers, however, faced forced 
returns to their country of origin. Qatari authorities deported Nepali citizens back to 
Nepal, while the UAE threatened south Asian countries that future labour migration 
would be jeopardised if they refused to take back their citizens (Shivakoti, 2020). 
Oftentimes departing workers lost salaries not yet paid or had to leave their belong-
ings behind.
States have adopted a mixed ‘citizens first’ approach in terms of public health 
protection and restriction of mobility enforcing territorial border closures. At the 
same time, as the pandemic has unfolded since early 2020, states are providing 
protection to both temporary residents and people with ‘pending’ status (waiting for 
regularisation or visa renewal) to avoid their finding themselves in a situation of 
irregularity under the pandemic emergency. The pandemic border closures have 
indeed raised numerous complex legal, political, and ultimately symbolic questions 
about what community, solidarity, belonging, and civic responsibility mean. The 
A. Triandafyllidou
5
crisis has shown with renewed emphasis that citizenship is a complex and multi- 
faceted concept and reality, and that there are several alternatives of community and 
membership that we need to consider that may not necessarily be tied to the legal 
relationship between the individual and the state expressed in the classical notion of 
national citizenship (Baubock, 2018). The exceptional character of the Covid-19 
emergency has both reinforced the importance of citizenship as a priority marker of 
who belongs and who is to be allowed access to the country or access to emergency 
benefits during the pandemic crisis. At the same time the emergency has pushed the 
boundaries of what I will call ‘effective membership’ further to include everyone 
present in the territory. We may even argue that the pandemic emergency has given 
rise to an alternative mode of membership that could be termed jus domicilii (Stavilă, 
2013) and is based on effective presence in the territory of the state.
This chapter discusses the contradictions that the pandemic has exposed regard-
ing migration at two levels: first at the level of membership and belonging, and 
second at the level of migration governance. Border closures and selective openings 
have raised important questions about the notion of membership, solidarity, and 
responsibility, asking whether this pandemic opens up possibilities for a new under-
standing of citizenship or of membership to a political community that is post- 
national. Second the pandemic has subverted our dominant understandings of 
desired, valued, and unwanted migration as those migrant workers previously con-
sidered ‘disposable’ like farmworkers, domestic and care workers, courier employ-
ees, and platform workers suddenly became ‘frontline’ essential workers, much 
needed, while the previously valued and desired highly skilled migrants have been 
temporarily neglected (Nalbandian & Triandafyllidou, 2020a, b). After posing these 
two sets of questions and highlighting what could be new and innovative answers, 
this chapter presents the contents of the book and how they seek to answer these two 
questions of how we should understand migration and membership in pandemic 
times and how we should (re-)organise the governance of migration during and after 
the pandemic.
1.2  Membership, Responsibility, and Solidarity 
in Pandemic Times
The Covid-19 virus has proven to be truly transnational, moving fast across not only 
national borders but also across ethnic communities, social classes, cities, and small 
towns, ignoring territorial borders and sovereign governments. Despite this transna-
tional character, the virus has pointed to how much countries, governments, and 
even health authorities are interdependent under the emergency, yet states reacted 
initially by prioritising citizens. Weighing their obligations towards solidarity and 
protection of citizens has led to border closures – the most notorious of which was 
US President Donald Trump’s sudden closure of the US border to all EU citizens in 
March 2020. Under pandemic circumstances, citizens have been allowed to return 
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to their own country but ‘others’ – notably temporary residents, their family mem-
bers, international students, and visitors or distant family members of citizens – 
have been banned from entry. The rationale of these decisions has relied on a 
balancing act between a health risk, on one hand, and membership and solidarity, on 
the other. Those who do not belong fully to the nation-state need to stay out, at least 
temporarily. The border closure has also affected those seeking international protec-
tion. Their right to apply for asylum was temporarily de facto suspended in many 
countries such as Canada (for people coming from the US) or Greece (mostly for 
those crossing via Turkey). One might argue that there was a trade-off between the 
reasons that favour admission (solidarity toward citizens, obligations toward refu-
gees, immigration objectives) and the possible health risks that come from admit-
ting people (citizens or others) arriving from abroad. There seemed to be, in other 
words, a cost-benefit analysis where the benefits of protection to refugees was sim-
ply discounted.
The rationale of solidarity and interdependence and the trade-off between pro-
tecting citizens vs assisting aliens under the pandemic emergency merits some fur-
ther discussion though. There are two different facets of this argument; one concerns 
the extent to which citizens have a priority over ‘others’, even if those others are 
temporary residents of the country and hence partly members of the political com-
munity. While in theory the answer to this argument may be straightforward, in 
practice this is less the case as one wonders how one should classify temporary resi-
dents (under different legal statuses) who effectively have strong ties with their 
‘host’ country in the sense that they live, work, pay taxes, contribute to the com-
munity, send their kids to school, and participate in public life even if they do not 
have political rights. The second facet introduced a novel element as it concerns the 
level of civic responsibility that we are entitled to expect from citizens who should 
behave in a way that protects their fellow citizens. But then how do we account for 
temporary residents who make a special civic contribution to the community under 
the emergency situation, notably through working at essential and risky sectors?
The pandemic and related international border restrictions have emphasized the 
existence of different layers of membership within each country. Such membership 
layers distinguishing citizens from residents from aliens are not new and immigra-
tion and enforcement policies have played an important role in (re-)constructing 
imagined communities of ‘aliens’ (Aleinikoff, 1995; Romero, 1998). The pandemic 
has pushed the boundaries of these different layers, blurring and redrawing their 
contours. The emergency has raised important clarification questions: where does 
the boundary between insiders and outsiders effectively lie and who should be in or 
out? For instance, should people with temporary status be given exemptions from 
border restrictions or should they be excluded? What matters most: their effective 
residence or their immigration status? Similarly, should asylum seekers be 
included – in respect of the international right to asylum – or should this right be 
suspended during the pandemic?
We can imagine the effective population of a country as a set of concentric cir-
cles (see also Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002): The inner group includes the citi-
zens, those who belong and who have a clear and stable legal relationship with the 
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state. The citizens are expected to take priority in terms of protection of their right 
to life and health, both as regards their protection through reduced international 
mobility but also through access to the public health or welfare system. At the same 
time, they are expected to show loyalty and solidarity to fellow citizens, which in 
the case of the pandemic emergency may include adhering to the guidelines of the 
authorities or, for instance, restraining from international but also domestic travel 
with a view to avoid spreading the virus. I will return to this argument a little later.
In immigration countries like Canada or Australia or the US, people accepted as 
permanent immigrants (e.g. green card holders in the US, so-called PRs in Canada) 
are treated like citizens for what concerns their socio-economic rights, including for 
instance access to public health or family reunification rights. In other countries 
with significant immigrant populations, like Britain or Germany, this status is called 
‘the right to abode’ and is given to people who were initially temporary migrants but 
acquired long-term resident status. Transnational entities like the European Union 
create an additional layer of belonging as European citizenship gives EU citizens 
who live in another member state equal rights with those of the citizens of that coun-
try (Bauböck, 2019). Such people who are not citizens but who have an enhanced 
residence status have been treated under the pandemic like citizens and the pan-
demic actually has somehow reinforced their belonging to the in-group.
A grey zone between belonging and exclusion has cast its shadow over people 
with temporary status who have been admitted to a country for a specific period, 
whether for study or work, and who are likely to be relatively recent arrivals. These 
have faced significant hardship (Raghuram & Sondhi, 2020) as the permits of some 
expired during the lockdowns while others lost their jobs and hence risked losing 
their status as a result of the pandemic (Wright, 2020). The pandemic though has 
forced countries to consider what Canada has termed the ‘effective residence’ of 
temporary aliens. Hence beyond the issue of citizenship, the pandemic has brought 
to the fore the notion of ‘effective membership’. It forced governments to ask where 
people live habitually, where they send their kids to school, where they pay taxes or 
have health coverage. The pandemic pulled this outer circle of transient members of 
the community into the inner circle of those who effectively live in the country for 
what concerned border restrictions (from which they were exempted). At the same 
time these transient members were internally excluded in some countries as they did 
not have access to emergency unemployment or family benefits (as happened for 
instance for temporary migrants in Germany and for Syrian refugees in Turkey). 
While effective membership may thus still seem tentative, the pandemic has raised 
the question of whether this notion of effective residence can be codified into law. 
For instance, it could include consular protection if found temporarily abroad under 
a sudden border closure, or the right to re-unite with second-degree family members 
such as elderly parents or adult children who may find themselves cut off from 
extended family during the pandemic restrictions.
While for temporary migrants maybe the dilemmas of border restrictions and 
service provisions were easier to solve through an inclusive approach, the dilemmas 
raised by asylum seekers entering a country to seek protection or temporary migrants 
whose status has expired raised more difficult decisions (Jubilut & Silva, 2020; 
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Godoy & Bauder, 2020). In the face of increasing contagions and scarce health 
resources, the balance would clearly tip over prioritising citizens and legal resi-
dents. At the same time legal instruments ensuring a general human rights approach 
like the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) or the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (2012) would call for the inclusion of people with precarious 
status under the protection net of the welfare state and health system. Effectively a 
review of relevant approaches in the EU and OECD countries has revealed that 
states have opted for universal coverage particularly regarding access to health ser-
vices during the pandemic for all people present in their territory regardless of status 
(EMN, 2020a). The approach there was two-pronged: on one hand, special mea-
sures were taken to extend legal status or also regularise those without status and, 
on the other, health coverage was provided for all with concerted efforts for sharing 
information in different languages in most EU and OECD countries (EMN, 
2020a, 8).
In other countries though like the UAE or Singapore (Molho, 2020) such protec-
tions were not afforded to temporary migrant workers who were often locked up in 
their dormitories to prevent contagion when cases were discovered in their com-
munity. Several lost their job and no protection was afforded them; they had to live 
off their savings while waiting for repatriation flights (see also Rajan and Arokkiaraj, 
and Sahin Mencutek Chap. 10, in this volume). In addition, those temporary work-
ers or asylum seekers who work in the informal labour market – as is the case for 
many Syrians in Turkey, Lebanon, or Jordan – the closure of the catering and tour-
ism industries left them without their basic means of subsistence and facing impor-
tant administrative and linguistic barriers in accessing information about health and 
sanitation measures.
Asylum seekers posed important dilemmas to countries with long traditions of 
asylum like EU countries or Canada (George, 2020; Abji et al., 2020; Ellis, 2020). 
For those inside the country, the approach has been inclusive in affording them pro-
tections based on both a human rights perspective and with a view to overall limit-
ing the spread of the virus in the community. However, there were often inhumane 
practices too (Flynn & Welsford, 2020): for example, in Greece asylum seekers in 
the metropolitan area of Athens or the Aegean islands were confined in the reception 
centres when positive cases were discovered. The crowded living conditions in 
these centres did not prevent the virus’s spread within those communities – while 
access to healthcare was also limited or non-existent (Molnar & Braam, 2020) – but 
priority was given to keeping the virus in the camps and avoiding its spread among 
the wider community of citizens outside the camp. The border in those cases was 
recreated within the state, separating those who do not belong from those who 
belong (see Rosińska and Pellerito Chap. 7, in this volume) within the country’s 
territory. Similar approaches were documented in the US too where detention cen-
tres became Covid-19 hotspots (see Boris Chap. 4, in this volume).
Refugee claimants seeking protection by crossing international borders were 
however the most vulnerable and most exposed category where the pandemic 
showed how citizenship is prioritised over an international right to asylum or an 
international respect of human rights. Asylum seekers were pushed back from the 
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Canadian border to the US (Ellis, 2020) and prevented from entering Greece from 
Turkey. While in both cases there are international safe third country agreements in 
place that could legally justify the move, in both cases those pushed back were in 
vulnerable conditions and the countries to which they were pushed back are not 
particularly safe. The Federal Court of Canada in fact ruled on 23 July 2020 that the 
Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) violates the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms by allowing Canada to send refugee claimants back to the 
US.  Despite these challenges, it was clear that the inner political community of 
members could not ‘afford’ to help aliens under the pandemic emergency by allow-
ing them to enter the country. Similar challenges were documented in South Africa 
(Rugunanan, 2020) and in Singapore and Malaysia (Petcharamasree, 2020).
The pandemic crisis has thus had a polarising effect on our understanding and 
practice of membership: while it pushed people with temporary status towards the 
inner circle, it pushed outside those who may have needed protection the most. The 
pandemic has reproduced borders within the territory of the nation-state by creating 
closed refugee camps or migrant dormitories and by assigning different mobility 
rights to citizens/permanent residents and temporary residents. The latter face some 
discretion at the border if an immigration officer questions the necessity of their 
presence in the country or they have to prove through additional pieces of evidence 
that they regularly and effectively reside in the host country.
While many states used their emergency and quarantine laws, and in this sense 
acted lawfully in exercising delegated legislative authority to declare an exception, 
they ended up stripping asylum seekers from their right to seek asylum. While a 
restrictive perspective seeking to evade international obligations in relation to asy-
lum may have been a longer trend, it was exacerbated during the pandemic, leading 
to the situation that Agamben (2005, see Humphreys, 2006) specified: they exer-
cised their power in deciding on the exception and suspended the juridical order 
because of the serious crisis threatening the state and its ‘legitimate’ population. 
Thus, protecting the most basic rights of asylum claimants to seek refuge is annulled. 
Border closures such as between Canada and the US to prevent any asylum claimant 
from entering Canada or on the Greek islands reinforce a sense of national solidarity 
among citizens and permanent residents and a transnational solidarity among sover-
eign states, but leave in limbo, in a space of exception, those who are among the 
most vulnerable populations: notably asylum seekers and irregular migrants seeking 
entry. They fall into this zone of “active abandonment” that is neither inside nor 
outside the polity, it is just there at the border (Pinelli, 2018).
The pandemic has exposed further fissures and dilemmas in our understanding of 
the limits and hierarchies of membership, belonging and solidarity. As it happened 
in Canada, the US, Germany, Italy, Spain, or Poland many of the frontline workers 
in senior care homes, farms, or food processing plants were people with precarious 
status, notably seasonal migrants, asylum seekers waiting for their application to be 
processed, or mere sojourners without the right to work. They performed their ‘citi-
zenship duty’ even if they had no secure legal status and did not belong to the com-
munity. Indeed, this argument sparked a controversy in Quebec, Canada, in June 
2020 when asylum seekers employed in senior care homes – which were hard hit by 
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the pandemic – mobilised, asking to obtain permanent residency status as a recogni-
tion of their contribution to the safety and care of community members (Levitz & 
Kestler d’Amours, 2020). The Prime Minister of the province refused but after fur-
ther negotiations with the federal government, a special path to permanent residency 
was announced by the federal minister, Marco Mendicino, on 14 August 2020. 
Minister Mendicino explained the decision by reflecting on the fact that these asy-
lum seekers put themselves at risk day after day on the pandemic and ‘they demon-
strated a uniquely Canadian quality’ (argued Mendicino) ‘in that they were looking 
out for others and so that is why today is so special’ (Seidle, 2020).
On the other hand, several citizens have been found in breach of their civic duty 
to follow government guidance, for instance, to not travel across regions. Maria (the 
name is fictitious), originating from Sicily and studying in Milan, in early March 
2020 travelled home to Palermo as Lombardy became a ‘red zone’ and moving in or 
out of the region was forbidden. Upon arrival, she visited her grandfather at a 
seniors’ home in the region. Five days later Maria developed symptoms of Covid-19. 
The facility was quarantined and over one hundred people, including staff and 
seniors, were directly affected, some died. Maria did not travel across international 
borders and is a citizen of Italy. But her behaviour was not in line with the notion of 
loyalty and solidarity towards her fellow citizens, even if inadvertently. And, of 
course, she was not the only one. During the fall of 2020 we have witnessed a rise 
of Covid deniers and mask protesters rallying across Europe and North America 
while young people partying without masks have been advocating their right for fun 
since they are less susceptible to suffering severely from the illness.
The pandemic has thus highlighted important contradictions between the status 
of citizen/permanent resident and the ways in which one acts in a civically respon-
sible way, protecting fellow citizens with their behaviour (or indeed exposing them 
to risks). The question that arises and is discussed in some of this book’s chapters is 
the extent to which these new insights can become codified in migration and citizen-
ship law (see for instance Macklin Chap. 2, in this volume). This brings me to the 
second set of questions that the pandemic has raised in relation to migration gover-
nance which I will tackle in the following section.
1.3  Selective Openings and Closures: Essential Work 
and Frontline Migrant Workers
Under the emergency, specific categories of workers (which include migrant work-
ers) have been characterised as ‘essential’ – vital for the economy and the commu-
nity’s well-being (see Macklin, also Gahwi and Walton-Roberts Chap. 6, in this 
volume). These have included medical and paramedical personnel, care workers but 
also farm labourers and people working in the food processing industry. These 
workers have not only been essential but also vulnerable as the sectors they work in 
and the conditions under which they work put them at risk of contracting the virus. 
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As borders closed and immigration came to a halt across Europe and North America, 
farmworkers have been exempted from such restrictions and were even brought to 
destination on chartered flights from Mexico to Canada and from Romania to 
Germany for instance.
Governments in Canada and Germany but also Italy, Spain, and Poland mobil-
ised (see also Palumbo and Corrado Chap. 8, in this volume) to find appropriate 
solutions for bringing in migrant workers for agriculture, including chartered flights 
with few passengers sitting at a safe ‘distance’, assistance to employers for the quar-
antine period in appropriate accommodation, and self-isolation. However, these 
measures had less to do with a new sensitivity about the living or working condi-
tions of these temporary foreign workers. Rather, they were a knee-jerk reaction to 
the fear of the agriculture and food processing sectors’ production chain breaking 
down, leaving supermarkets in short supply and harvests wasted (Nalbandian & 
Triandafyllidou, 2020b). The concern was also to protect the local community from 
contagion and a possible outbreak if a migrant worker tested positive for Covid-19. 
Indeed, the safety measures and monitoring and support only extended through the 
quarantine period. After it was lifted, there was little follow-up or protection for the 
migrant workers (Migrant Workers Alliance for Change, 2020), who were often 
returned to crowded accommodation or given protective equipment when their work 
did not allow for physical distancing. The meat industry in several European coun-
tries, the US, and Canada emerged as a pandemic hotspot (Palumbo & Corrado, 
2020a). Similar challenges were faced by care workers in private homes under the 
pandemic (Caregivers Action Centre, 2020; Marchetti & Boris, 2020) who were 
confronted with restriction of their freedom, laid off without notice, and often risked 
irregular status and expulsion because they were found to be in breach of their stay 
permit through no fault of their own.
These exemptions from border restrictions for essential workers and the related 
challenges that ensued in terms of protection from the virus but also from severe 
exploitation are common across North America and Europe (Palumbo & Corrado, 
2020b; Triandafyllidou & Nalbandian, 2020). The agri-food sector hit the headlines 
in the summer of 2020 because of concerns about the food supply chain but also in 
recognition of the difficult working and living conditions in the sector. Agriculture 
is characterised by demanding working conditions, low prestige, and low pay, where 
work is mainly seasonal and requires a supply-and-demand mechanism that is ultra- 
flexible. Workers must be available on call and can be easily dismissed. At the same 
time, as Corrado and co-authors (2018) have argued, today’s agriculture is charac-
terised by intensive pressures to keep production costs low. Large corporations in 
the retail and agri-food sectors push for low prices to maximise benefits and, given 
the large volume of products that they can absorb, can impose their conditions on 
producers. Producers are faced with irreducible costs, like the increasing need to 
invest in automation, the cost of water and energy for production, and the cost of 
fertiliser, seeds, and feed. Thus, squeezing labour costs through employing migrants 
with precarious status appears almost an inevitable choice, particularly for smaller 
producers. The structure of the network among commercial chains, agro- 
entrepreneurs, intermediaries, and the final consumers pushes for lower prices for 
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fruits and vegetables and with difficult traceability of products (Corrado et  al., 
2018). Employment dynamics in agriculture are thus shaped by several factors that 
include but are not confined to migrant labour. Rather they have more to do with 
agricultural policy, the structure of the agricultural and food processing sectors, and 
the limited controls over oligopolistic tendencies in national markets.
Similar challenges have been registered in the care sector particularly when it 
comes to care for seniors. The demand in European countries remains high; the 
population is aging and its care needs rising but there is as yet no viable plan for 
catering to these needs. The pandemic has exposed labour shortages in the sector 
and vulnerabilities of workers in terms of precarious status (temporary or indeed 
undocumented), difficult and often substandard working conditions, lack of access 
to fundamental rights and support by non-governmental organisations or govern-
ment agencies that already existed (see also Triandafyllidou & Marchetti, 2015; 
Triandafyllidou, 2013). These vulnerabilities have been exacerbated by the pan-
demic and have exposed important care gaps across North America and Europe (see 
Gahwi and Walton Roberts, also Rosińska and Pellerito Chap. 7, in this volume; 
Rogalewski, 2020; EFFAT, 2020).
However, a crisis such as this can tip the balance and put in motion a mechanism 
for change. Several policy initiatives were taken in both the agriculture and care 
sectors in the last few months by different countries in the effort to address these 
challenges. On 15 May 2020, the Canadian government introduced the Agri-food 
Immigration Pilot where migrant workers in agriculture could apply for permanent 
residency. Unfortunately, the programme  – criticised for being inaccessible as it 
requires equivalency of secondary education diploma in Canada and relatively high 
proficiency in English language – foresees only 2750 applicants and family mem-
bers and expires on 14 May 2023. There have been however important policy dis-
cussions on how to improve the pathway of seasonal workers to permanent residency 
and on combining this pilot with the Municipal Nominee pilot that Canada is also 
about to launch, whereby mid-sized cities would be able to invite new immigrants 
(Alboim & Kohl, 2020).
On 14 May 2020, Italy implemented a regularisation programme, addressing 
farmworkers and domestic and care workers in private homes. When the deadline 
expired at the end of August 2020, 207,000 migrant workers and their employers 
had submitted their applications under this programme, of which 176,000 were 
domestic workers (Ministero del Lavoro, 2020). It is estimated that these applicants 
cover only a portion of the undocumented migrant worker population in these sec-
tors, particularly in agriculture where applications were comparatively few (Bonifazi 
& Strozza, 2020). There is no doubt that this will provide for a significant improve-
ment in the livelihoods of a large number of people even though it may not fully 
address the exploitative working conditions that migrant workers in these sectors 
face (Zanfrini, 2020). In contrast to the solutions offered by Italy or Canada, in the 
US the debate is yet to re-emerge even though the US Department of Labor National 
Agricultural Workers’ Survey documents that approximately 47% of the roughly 
2.4 million farmworkers in the US are undocumented. A bill providing two-step 
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access to legal status and then citizenship was introduced in Congress in January 
2019 but has stalled since March of the same year.
The pandemic has kickstarted important policy discussions on how agricultural 
or welfare policy, on one hand, and migration policy, on the other, can work in tan-
dem to address labour market shortages while offering secure status and rights to 
workers. Unlike in the past, current studies have focused on a medium- to long-term 
perspective and on both the economic and social sustainability of the relevant sec-
tors (see also Gahwi and Walton Roberts Chap. 6, in this volume; Fasani & Mazza, 
2020; EMN, 2020b). Reports focusing on migrants in rural areas have been looking 
into regional and sectoral distributions, levels of skills, and employers’ concerns 
(Kalantaryan et al., 2020; Baiocco et al., 2019). The question that arises of course is 
how this initial positive reaction and drive towards innovation and sustainability can 
translate into more lasting changes and whether there is political will to address 
structural issues such as the protection of labour rights and particularly the rights of 
migrant workers. On this front the lessons learnt from the EU refugee emergency of 
2015–2016, the initial positive policy innovations like the emergency resettlement 
quotas and the calls for reforming the Dublin system, have been significantly 
watered down in subsequent years, leading to a much less ambitious EU pact on 
migration and asylum (European Commission, 2020; Beirens, 2020). The pandemic 
though has fuelled a transnational policy debate on how to address imbalances and 
shortages in these sectors, pushing the emphasis away from immigration and into 
the specific employment and service sectors.
The question that arises at both the analytical and policy levels is whether the 
global migration governance institutions and tools at our disposal are fit for this 
purpose. The advantages and limitations of the global governance of migration have 
been extensively discussed for the last 20 years (Betts, 2010; Koser, 2010). However, 
a crisis of forced immobility rather than migration such as the one caused by the 
pandemic is unprecedented. The newest tools in our global governance palette, 
notably the Global Compacts, were designed for a hyper-mobile not an immobile 
world. Nonetheless, several of its key objectives are still relevant and can provide a 
path towards reopening, such as reducing vulnerabilities during migration, strength-
ening consular services, using detention only as a last resort, and providing migrants 
with access to basic services such as healthcare (Newland, 2020). The calls for 
action included in the Global Compact for Migration (2018) on coordinated border 
management, on providing predictable procedures for migration screening and 
assessment in order to refer migrants to appropriate channels for admission, and on 
providing adequate documentation to all migrants are all issues that are still relevant 
as countries prepare to reopen after the pandemic. The situation on the ground for 
returning or stranded migrants is particularly challenging (see also Sahin Mencutek 
and Rajan and Arokkiaraj Chap. 11, in this volume). The need to address this situa-
tion and the limited capacity of origin countries to deal with reduced remittances 
and massive returns remains of course a challenge for both domestic and regional 
migration governance (Shivakoti, 2020).
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1.4  The Contents of this Volume
Contributions to this volume discuss theoretical and policy challenges that the pan-
demic crisis has posed to international migration. The first part of this book focuses 
on the analytical and normative questions that pertain to the management of the 
pandemic emergency and the governance of migration and asylum, while the sec-
ond part focuses on specific categories of migrants that face the most acute chal-
lenges in relation to the pandemic.
In Chap. 2 Audrey Macklin discusses the notion of essential work or essential 
workers. Macklin focuses on those exceptions to the border closures and the ways 
in which they were justified and legitimised. She shows how the category of ‘essen-
tial’ was produced, revised, and represented through the interaction of pandemic- 
driven exigencies and nationally-specific legal, political, and economic constraints. 
To understand how the admission into Canada of certain people was accepted as 
legally, economically, and/or politically essential, argues Macklin, one must take 
account of Canada’s character as a settler society, its economic integration with the 
US, and its growing dependence on migrant workers and international students to 
subsidise food production and higher education for nationals. Her argument how-
ever has a general valence as these different dimensions of being economically, 
politically, or legally essential have dominated policy decisions in many countries 
around the world.
Addressing the pandemic has brought a new interest to the use of technology for 
contact tracing and indirectly hence for surveillance of people’s movements and 
contacts in the interest of public health. Petra Molnar, in Chap. 3, discusses how we 
can learn from previous experiments of bio-surveillance implemented on migrant 
and refugee populations, and also warns against an enthusiastic embrace of such 
technologies. Molnar argues that such technological experiments on people on the 
move (particularly refugees) have been shown to breach privacy and endanger lives. 
Algorithms used to power this technology are vulnerable to the same decision- 
making of concern to humans: discrimination, bias, and error. Unfortunately, little 
regulation exists to govern technological experimentation. Virus-killing robots, cell- 
phone tracking, and artificially intelligent thermal cameras can all be used against 
people crossing borders with far-reaching results and impacts on various human 
rights. The pandemic offers both a risk but also an opportunity to rethink the way in 
which technology can be used to support rather than surveil vulnerable populations 
on the move.
In Chap. 4 Eileen Boris focuses on structures of systemic racism and precarity 
that compound the vulnerability of undocumented, transgender, and gender non- 
conforming individuals and those from racially othered group under the pandemic. 
Women among them have found new difficulties in meeting double obligations: to 
earn a living and care for households, both family requiring daily tending and those 
dependent on remittances sent back to countries of origin. Especially among 
migrants labelled as ‘essential workers’, the lack of protective equipment and labour 
rights has put them on the frontline of exposure. But domestic and home care 
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workers, meat packers, field hands, and others have stepped out of the shadows to 
demand inclusion in social assistance, occupational health and safety laws, and 
other state benefits. They have not relied on the state alone; rather, they have devel-
oped mutual aid and coalitional activism to advance their dignity and improve living 
as well as working conditions. With a focus on the US, for over two centuries a 
major destination for migrants, this chapter historicises the recent hardships and the 
organizing of migrant workers.
Turning to the local level, Chap. 5 by Mireille Paquet, Noémie Benoit, Idil Atak, 
Meghan Joy, Graham Hudson, and John Shields looks at urban centres that have 
been especially hit by the Covid-19 pandemic, with a special focus on non-status 
and precarious migrants. Using official data and published research, this chapter 
explores how city sanctuary policies in Canada have addressed these pandemic 
risks. The chapter highlights the specificities of sanctuary policies in the Canadian 
context and documents that while cities have not rescinded these interventions dur-
ing the pandemic, they also have not built on them when developing services for 
urban residents. The chapter discusses how the pandemic interacts with the multi- 
level governance of migration and migrant integration and explores whether this 
crisis can be a lever for reform, increasing cities’ resources and capacities to imple-
ment and institutionalize policies for non-status and precarious migrants.
In the second part of this volume, Lena Gahwi and Margaret Walton-Roberts 
(Chap. 6) review the impending global care crisis in terms of the quantity of care 
needed for an aging population and the quality of both the care provided and condi-
tions of work for those who provide this care. Through a critical comparative over-
view, this chapter points to the imbalances characterising long-term care provision 
and the type and skill mix of labour, including the degree to which immigrant work-
ers are over-represented in this sector. The chapter offers conceptual reflections on 
elder care as a matter of social justice and ethics in terms of those needing and 
providing care. These ethical and social justice concerns take on a specific global 
dimension as care has been transnationalised through migration and global care 
chains. Looking at different funding models for long-term care and taking into 
account the pressures that the pandemic has put on an already strained system, the 
chapter highlights the gendered and racialised devaluing of migrant labour so essen-
tial to the sector and the importance of effecting crucial reforms.
Chapter 7 by Anna Rosińska and Elizabeth Pellerito focuses on the case of 
domestic and care workers employed in private households and discusses the risks 
and vulnerabilities they face. During the current global pandemic, when the family 
or household has been considered the most basic unit of quarantine, the role of the 
domestic worker – someone who by definition crosses the threshold and enters the 
space of the home  – became problematised quickly. Some tasks like elder care, 
childcare, and personal or disability care have become more important than ever at 
a time when few could access social services in person and institutions like care 
homes were the source of major outbreaks. On the other hand, the ‘outsider’ status 
of these workers – transgressing the boundaries not just of the physical household 
space, but often also of race, immigration status, and class – has meant that some 
service workers were more readily regarded as disease vectors who were too risky 
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to allow into the home and let go with little or no warning. State responses to the 
pandemic in the US have included stay-at-home orders that differentiate between 
essential and non-essential businesses; shifting immigration regulations; and fed-
eral and state relief bills, many of which continue to exclude the sector as a whole 
and undocumented immigrant workers from accessing relief measures. Overall, 
domestic workers were confronted with the impossible choice between isolating 
with the families they worked for so as not to put their own families at risk or losing 
their jobs and forfeiting access to state-provided benefits and relief systems. This 
chapter uses online ethnography of organisations, an online survey for domestic 
workers, and outreach work within the labour and workers’ rights movement to 
analyse the multilevel response of domestic workers’ organisations to address the 
crisis. Organisations, especially worker centers, doubled their efforts to absorb part 
of the pandemic shock. These responses span from initiatives addressed at immedi-
ate financial and material relief for individual workers to continued policy advocacy 
at the federal and state levels for broad-based protections like hazard pay, health and 
safety regulations, or eviction moratoria.
Chapter 8 by Letizia Palumbo and Alessandra Corrado focuses on the much- 
discussed agriculture sector and the shortages and challenges that the pandemic had 
caused already by spring 2020. Border lockdowns have immobilised thousands of 
foreign seasonal workers at their countries of origin, prompting fear of labour short-
ages and food production losses in Europe and North America. While over the last 
30 years migrant farmworkers have become a fundamental component of core sec-
tors such as the agri-food sector, it is only in the current health emergency that these 
have been clearly recognised as essential workers, as the need arises to address food 
security. Palumbo and Corrado investigate the working conditions of migrant farm-
workers alongside national debates and institutional interventions in Italy and Spain 
during the Covid-19 crisis. The chapter provides a critical comparative analysis of 
the legal and policy interventions adopted to address migrants’ condition of vulner-
ability. Both countries count on important contingents of EU and non-EU migrant 
farmworkers, especially in the production of fruit and vegetables. Moreover, they 
present common aspects regarding supply chain dynamics and labour market poli-
cies, but also some specific differences with respect to labour migration and social 
policies. Both countries have adopted actions to address the condition of irregularity 
of migrants during the pandemic. However, despite the enthusiastic and optimistic 
tones from the general public, these interventions reveal shortcomings that signifi-
cantly limit their impact and outcomes. This calls into question the extent to which 
migrant workers are really considered ‘essential’ on a long-term perspective and, 
therefore, to what extent the current pandemic constitutes an opportunity for a new 
national push to enforce labour and migrant rights.
International students are a less discussed but significantly vulnerable population 
under the pandemic emergency. International students were not included in most 
migration debates because they were seen as temporary sojourners, moving for a 
few months or years and then transitioning back, either to the countries from which 
they came or changing their status into workers. However, the coronavirus pan-
demic has exposed both the essential and constitutive nature of international 
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students to higher education. In Chap. 9, Parvati Raghuram and Gunjan Sondhi 
demonstrate that they constitute an important part of export earnings in some of the 
major receiving countries, contribute to subsidising the university sectors and the 
local economy through their expenditure on housing and consumer goods as well as 
their work in selected industries. Crucially, they also play an important part in 
knowledge production and circulation – the core business of higher education. They 
are thus an important part of the very fabric of higher education. These issues have 
come to a head during the pandemic as mobilities are interrupted and education 
reshaped. The coronavirus emergency has starkly exposed this financial dependence 
that higher education sector has on high fee-paying international students. This 
chapter explores the issues that international students have faced and the impact of 
suspended mobilities on the sector and draws out the conceptual implications of 
inserting students into migration research on the pandemic.
One of the most important impacts of the pandemic as regards international 
migration has been that of forcing hundreds of thousands of migrants to return, 
totally unexpectedly and without any preparation. It was not only visitors and tour-
ists who were obliged to return to their place of origin but also internal and interna-
tional migrants who lost their jobs nearly overnight. Migrants’ decisions have been 
marked by deep impasses between staying and return. Against this background, 
Chap. 10 by Zeynep Sahin Mencutek addresses the following questions: how and to 
what extent did the pandemic trigger the returns of migrants? What were the diverg-
ing characteristics of returning compared to other crisis-situations and before pan-
demic times? How do receiving and sending countries respond to returns? How has 
the pandemic influenced migrants’ aspirations about staying and returning? These 
questions enable reconsidering the highly contested concepts of return migration 
scholarship such as voluntary versus forced returns (including deportations and 
removals); sustainable versus unsustainable returns; permanent versus temporary 
returns.
Chapter 11 by S Irudaya Rajan and H. Arokkiaraj further explores the question 
of return migration from the Gulf countries. Most of the affected workers are blue- 
collar, largely employed as temporary workers in construction and allied sectors. As 
per the Ministry of External Affairs (India) statistics, 2.5 million Indians have gone 
abroad for employment in 2019 alone. Among the migrants from India, countries in 
the Gulf have historically been the most-favoured destinations for job roles in the 
construction sector. However, the pandemic crisis halted construction projects in the 
Gulf. Furthermore, a drastic drop in oil prices has affected Gulf oil and non-oil 
economies severely. This has had an adverse effect on Indian construction workers 
in Gulf as they face the threat of unemployment, leading to their voluntary or forced 
return to India. For example, as of December 2020, 61,009 Kerala emigrants, most 
of them in the Gulf, have lost their jobs abroad due to the pandemic, making their 
return inevitable given their already temporary status in these countries. Against this 
background, this chapter examines a broad research question—how is India pre-
pared to handle the changing trends in the Indo-Gulf migration corridor and the 
subsequent return emigration from the Gulf? This chapter highlights the perspec-
tives of individual major sending states, such as Kerala and others, and their 
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responses towards Gulf returnees. Moreover, it provides insights by revisiting the 
existing economic and social security for the return migrants and their families 
within the framework of state welfare schemes, thereby examining rehabilitation 
and re- integration mechanisms for return migrants at the central and state levels 
in India.
Last but not least, Chap. 12 by S Irudaya Rajan and R. B. Bhagat examines the 
effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on internal migrants in India. According to the 
2011 Census, there are over 450 million internal migrants in India, of which a mas-
sive 54 million constitute inter-state migrants. In addition, India also has 85 million 
intra-state (within the state) migrants. These migrants largely consist of casual 
labourers who comprise a huge percentage of the informal sector workforce, in both 
rural and urban areas of India, and are vital to the country’s economy. These work-
ers are also some of the most vulnerable sections of India’s labour force, with inad-
equate coverage in terms of working conditions and social safety nets, and are also 
largely absent from India’s policy discourses. However, the pandemic brought their 
precarity to the focus of the entire nation as, confronted with unemployment and 
destitution during a 54-day national lockdown, many migrants were forced to leave 
their places of work en masse, often in inhospitable conditions, to make their way 
home. This chapter thus highlights the size and extent of internal migration in India 
as well as its distribution across different states in India and how the covid-19 crisis 
and lockdown affected their lives and livelihoods. It particularly looks at the 
responses of central and various state governments – at the destinations, origins, and 
even places of transit where migrants have been stranded – to ensure migrants’ well- 
being. The chapter also analyses the economic impact of the migrant exodus from 
major destinations and how that will affect migration patterns and policy in India in 
the future.
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Chapter 2




The cross-border movement of a virus threw into chaos the cross-border movement 
of everything and everyone else.
The unprecedented conjuncture of border closure and domestic immobilisation 
disrupted conventional patterns of movement and mobility into and within Canada. 
The hierarchy of admissibility according to legal status and national origin has been 
jumbled. Consider that in summer 2020, cars on Canadian streets bearing US 
licence plates were viewed with suspicion and hostility, prompting calls to the 
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to report the illicit presence of Americans.
This chapter uses Canada as a case study to explore two features of Covid-19’s 
impact on bordering. The first concerns  the relationship between the control of 
movement across borders and the control of movement within borders. The corona-
virus pandemic made this salient because of the drastic and unfamiliar restraints 
imposed on individual movement at local and inter-provincial levels. In Spheres of 
Justice, Michael Walzer (1982) famously provided a normative defence of closed 
national borders by, inter alia, predicting that if national borders were open, sub- 
state and local communities would reactively erect barriers to entry to preserve the 
perception of communal membership. This world of a ‘thousand petty fortresses’ 
was contrasted to a national territory characterised by unimpeded mobility. In other 
words, Walzer argued that  the maintenance of free movement within the state is 
underwritten by the presumption of closure at national borders. Covid-induced reg-
ulation both tracks and disrupts this hypothesis.
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The second feature of Canada’s pandemic migration regulation is the reconfigu-
ration of the conventional priorities and preferences for non-citizen entry. Like other 
affluent countries, Canadian migration law facilitates travel and migration by 
nationals from other states of the Global North (and Australia/New Zealand) and 
impedes it for nationals of the Global South. Ideas about the desirable traveller and 
migrant are infused with ideas about class, race, gender, religion, and ability. This 
passport privilege has been temporarily displaced by a different hierarchy based less 
on desirability than on immediate necessity. In Canada and elsewhere, pandemic 
rules have been organised around assessments about whose entry, which labour, and 
which interests are ‘essential,’ replete with online questionnaires to locate appli-
cants in the shifting landscape of pandemic admissiblity (Government of Canada 
2020c) I offer a typology of ‘essential’ that braids together economic, legal, and 
political elements. While this chapter is not comparative, I suspect that that the par-
ticular calculations about who and what is ‘essential’ vary between states, and that 
these variations might link to different conceptions of the place of migration in the 
nation, and national belonging. Canada is a settler-society. It is built literally and 
discursively on a commitment to immigration that, in the first instance, displaced 
Indigenous people and consolidated and expanded colonial power. It provided the 
demographic, economic, and social foundation upon which the state was assembled 
and continues to grow. Other states have a different migration history and trajectory, 
but all face similar challenges around Covid-19.
2.2  The Unexceptional Border
A conventional metaphor for the border depicts it as a filter or screen that slows and 
halts the entry of some, while permitting and expediting the entry of others. In ordi-
nary times, this image is juxtaposed against the situation within state territory, 
where movement is unimpeded and virtually unregulated. The pandemic has eroded 
this distinction between governance of movement at the border and inside the coun-
try. I do not anticipate that the changes wrought by Covid-19 will become perma-
nent, but what has changed irrevocably is the assumption of irrevocability.
As the coronavirus travelled the world passport-free, a predictable reaction of 
states was to target for exclusion travellers from alleged source-countries  – first 
China, then Iran and Italy. We know this exclusion narrative well, replete with 
images of foreign viruses infecting the body politic, and we observed the deplorable 
enthusiasm with which some political leaders fomented and exploited it. The racist 
and stigmatising effects of labelling Covid-19 the ‘Chinese’ or ‘Wuhan’ virus” are 
made no less pernicious by their predictability.
Critics of border closures rightly observed that they would likely fail to halt the 
spread of the virus, partly because these closures inevitably happen after the virus 
has already found its way in – the inverse problem of shutting the barn door after the 
horse has bolted. By around mid-March 2020, it had become evident that the virus 
was everywhere and could not be stopped, only slowed. At that moment, borders 
A. Macklin
25
slammed shut more tightly and more pervasively than many of us had ever seen in 
our lifetimes. But this quantitative intensification of border control masked a shift in 
its qualitative character that was produced by a transformation in the governance of 
movement more generally.
Discriminating against ‘dangerous’ foreigners from certain states – China, Italy, 
Iran – belongs to the banal work of racist border control in the Global North. It has 
a long and ignoble pedigree. Identifying foreigners as vectors of disease and degen-
eration in both physical and moral terms is a familiar trope. One need not reach far 
back to recall, for example, the ‘homosexual Haitian drug user’ as the originary 
villain in the HIV/AIDs origin story. ‘Xenophobia: Covid Edition’ seems to this 
observer like a variation on a familiar theme.1 But this endeavour of excluding the 
foreign menace was superseded under Covid-19 by the project of halting movement 
as such, of which cross-border movement was only one type. Once it was apparent 
that stopping the virus was not viable and the goal shifted to slowing its spread 
(pending a vaccine), any and all movement became undesirable. In this context, 
borders continue to mark critical jurisdictional breaks. Canada does not govern the 
territory of other states, and the actions and inactions of those other states in manag-
ing the pandemic become a source of risk embodied by individual foreign travellers. 
But it is less the conduct or character of border-crossers themselves that is at issue, 
than the fact that states exercised no authority over how other states governed their 
residents during the pandemic.
At the same time, the pandemic precipitated unprecedented restraints on move-
ment within the territory of the Canadian state – and this applied to citizens and 
non-citizens alike. From the individual body, to the household, municipalities, prov-
inces and, finally, the state, the universal object of governance became the arrest of 
human movement. Although the risk of contracting Covid-19 was unequally borne 
by racialised and economically disadvantaged people, each person was a potential 
vector and victim of disease, and controlling mobility preoccupied every jurisdic-
tion at every scale of governance. With policing techniques ranging from appeals to 
solidarity to threats of criminal sanction, people were told to stay home, to stay 
away from one another, and to stay put. In ordinary times, the default position for 
state borders is closure, subject to exception; within the state, the default is free 
movement, subject to exception. In Canada, s.6 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms not only protects the right of citizens to enter, but also the free move-
ment of citizens and permanent residents throughout Canada. Yet, under the corona-
virus pandemic, it was all stasis, all the time, everywhere, for everyone. Movement 
was policed by state actors, by neighbours, via cell phone technology and other-
wise; inessential movement was subject to opprobrium, or worse. Borders between 
1 For example, Canada adopted explicitly racist entry policies against Chinese migrants from 1885 
to 1946, and covertly (and more effective) racist policies against Japanese and South Asian 
migrants from the early twentieth to mid-twentieth century. See generally, Sharry Aiken, ‘From 
Slavery to Expulsion: Racism, Canadian Immigration Law and the Unfulfilled Promise of Modern 
Constitutionalism,’ in Vijay Agnew, ed., Interrogating Race and Racism (Toronto: U of T Press, 
2007), 55–111.
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provinces that hitherto only functioned to mark the transition between sub-state 
jurisdictions were activated to impede inter-provincial or inter-regional movement. 
A Newfoundland law barring interprovincial travel withstood constitutional chal-
lenge, though it is under appeal at the time of writing (Taylor, 2020).
Within this regime of pervasive immobilisation inside the state, where citizen-
ship is almost irrelevant, border control appears less distinctive and more like one 
component of an apparatus devoted to halting the circulation of people. The tech-
nology of border control is purpose-designed to maximise coercion and minimise 
accountability, and one should not trivialise its specificity and violence. Having said 
that, it is worth noting how border control under the pandemic was interpolated into 
an infrastructure of mobility control that was not primarily about migration. It was 
primarily about protecting public health – the same objective shared by a suite of 
domestic measures, including quarantine, lockdown, social distancing rules, inter-
nal travel restrictions, mobile app contact tracing, and so on. In this sense, the bor-
der’s function in arresting movement was no longer unique. That is new.
Thanks to Covid-19, a vision of Walzer’s world of a thousand petty fortresses 
came into view, with provinces erecting barriers to non-residents, including former 
residents. People in rural areas grumbled loudly about city dwellers ‘escaping’ to 
their cottages or chalets and bringing the coronavirus with them. Fragile northern 
communities (especially Indigenous) denied access to people from outside the 
region. But Walzer imagined this as a reaction to [more] open borders. That is not 
the explanation for the domestic restraint of movement under the pandemic. There 
is no trade-off between closure at one scale and openness at another. Here, state 
sovereignty is not manifested by preventing entry, but by controlling, confining, and 
surveilling all movement, of which cross-border movement is only the exemplar. 
We cannot know now, and perhaps will not know for a long time, the durability, 
shape, and the trajectory of states’ newly-revived and amplified will and capacity to 
regulate movement that begins not with crossing a border between two states, but 
with crossing a threshold between abode and outside world. The regulatory response 
to Covid-19 reveals the growing capacity of the state to engage in networked and 
coordinated control of human movement. The choice to refrain from exercising con-
trol is not the same as the absence of control. In my view, the measures adopted 
because of Covid-19 undermine the very idea of mobility as free movement and 
bring into view an alternative picture of mobility as permitted movement.
2.3  Essential Connections
2.3.1  Essential Movement
Even in a pandemic, borders cannot be hermetically sealed. While the pandemic 
obviously restricted entry, it also reconfigured the basis for admission in revealing 
ways. Unlike many other states, the Canadian government did not respond to the 
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pandemic by declaring a national emergency and invoking the powers contained in 
the Emergencies Act. Under Canada’s federal system, international border control 
falls under federal jurisdiction, and Emergency Orders issued and renewed monthly 
by Cabinet under the authority of s. 58 of the Quarantine Act regulated cross-border 
movement, overriding or otherwise altering existing provisions of the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The Quarantine Act is narrower in scope than 
the Emergencies Act because it only applies to people or cargo entering or departing 
Canada. It also contains significantly fewer procedural protections and much weaker 
accountability mechanisms than the Emergencies Act. Exercising state power via 
the Quarantine Act rather than the Emergencies Act echoes a similar choice made 
by the federal government after 9/11 to address national security and terrorism 
using the powers granted under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act rather 
than the Anti-Terrorism Act. In both instances, the government opted for regulatory 
instruments that minimised rights protection and accountability. Relatedly, the 
Quarantine Act and IRPA are organised around movement across borders and non- 
citizens respectively, the spaces and subjects that attract least rights protection in 
Canadian law. Reliance on the Quarantine Act and IRPA also have the effect of 
reinforcing a stereotype of foreignness as vector of disease and danger to the body 
politic.
The term ‘essential’ became the stamp on the notional permit that validates 
movement. Technically, the Emergency Orders do not positively authorise ‘essen-
tial’ border crossing. Instead, they prohibit entry for ‘optional’ or ‘discretionary’ 
purposes. The residue that remains is travel for an ‘essential purpose’.
Who or what is essential, and why? For present purposes, I will detach the label 
‘essential’ from ‘services’, ‘work’, or ‘worker’ and instead consider more broadly 
the kinds of reasons that give shape and content to the category ‘essential’, which in 
turn signifies an exception to the default of stasis and exclusion. I propose that entry 
might usefully be classified as legally essential, politically essential, or economi-
cally essential. The legal dimension captures constitutional, international, or legisla-
tive provisions that constrain the power of the state to exclude. While it is true that 
most laws create exceptions for emergencies of various sorts, the existence of an 
initial legal obligation to admit can still exert significant force in policy choices.
Entry is economically essential to a state in respect of those workers who trans-
port otherwise unavailable goods or who provide vital and otherwise unavailable 
forms of labour such as healthcare, sanitation, transportation and delivery, and food 
production and distribution. However, as the Canadian case shows, workers are not 
the only non-citizens considered essential to the Canadian economy.
The category of politically essential entry overlaps with the other two and is 
necessarily contested and contingent. Claims that entry is legally or economically 
essential will be leveraged by interested parties (employers, institutions etc.) to per-
suade politicians to create an exception to the default of closure and exclusion. But 
the political impetus may also be generated from successful public appeals to moral, 
social, or pragmatic considerations.
These proposed categories of essential entry are neither mutually exclusive, nor 
static. They simply provide a rough schema for organising and comparing the 
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diverse responses of various states to the challenges of COVID and trans-border 
movement.
2.3.2  The US and Everywhere Else
Canada’s only land border is with the United States. The Canada-US border is not 
only a barrier, but also a suture stitching together two political units into a deeply 
interdependent economic, social, and political relationship (Salter, 2012). Early on, 
it became obvious that the neither the US federal government, nor most state gov-
ernments, would or could act quickly to contain the spread of Covid-19. Inevitably, 
the per capita infection and fatality rates in the US would (and did) soar relative to 
Canada. Restricting the flow of entrants from the US was both vital from a public 
health perspective and potentially devastating to the Canadian economy. This ten-
sion between sovereign self-interest and unequal economic power plays out across 
the full range of Canada-US relations, and the pandemic provided another occasion 
to observe its effect on migration and border management.
Each month since March 2020, Cabinet has renewed not one, but two Emergency 
Orders under the Quarantine Act that govern cross-border movement. One is for 
foreign nationals entering Canada from the US. The other is for foreign nationals 
entering from all other countries. The salient difference between the two 
Emergency Orders is the default starting point. Foreign nationals from the US are 
prohibited unless their entry is not for an optional or discretionary purpose. Foreign 
nationals from elsewhere are prohibited unless they come within a list of designated 
exceptions and if their entry is not for an optional or discretionary purpose. A non- 
exhaustive list of examples of discretionary or optional travel includes ‘tourism, 
recreation, and entertainment.’ Until October 2020, international students arriving 
directly from the US were admissible if they possessed student permits issued any-
time; international students arriving from anywhere else had to possess student per-
mits issued before 18 March 2020. As discussed below, the government amended 
these rules in mid-October 2020.
The reason for the preferential treatment of the US is straightforward: it is the 
only country with which Canada shares a land border. North American economic 
integration makes the cross-border traffic of goods (including food and health 
equipment) from the US vital to Canadians. US truckers became essential workers 
to Canada, and the Emergency Order enabled them to traverse the border as visitors 
(they were also exempt from the quarantine requirement). Indeed, the same quaran-
tine exemption applied to hundreds of Canadian nurses living in the Windsor, 
Ontario, area who crossed the border daily to work in Detroit hospitals and returned 
home to Windsor.
Travel to Canada for tourism and business travel were prohibited as optional and 
discretionary, although special permits were granted for overland transit through 
Canada from the continental US and Alaska, and vice versa. Well-publicised stories 
of Americans who assured CBSA that they were transiting through Canada but who 
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were actually vacationing in Canada stoked a certain degree of suspicion and ani-
mosity directed at drivers of cars with US licence plates. While mocking Americans 
is something of a national pastime in Canada, there was something undeniably 
novel about casting white, affluent, middle-aged American tourists in the role of 
foreign scofflaws and vectors of contagion. Even more troubling, however, were 
revelations that senior Canadian officials authorised entry of several US business 
executives to Canada during the pandemic with no requirement to quarantine 
(Gatehouse et al., 2020).
2.4  Citizens and Permanent Residents
As states moved to close borders in response to the pandemic in early 2020, 
Canadian citizens outside Canada remained free to re-enter, subject to a 14-day 
quarantine period. Indeed, the Prime Minister of Canada repeatedly urged Canadians 
abroad to return to Canada as soon as possible. Since the right of citizens to enter 
Canada is constitutionally protected under Section 6 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, as well as international law, one might understand access by 
citizens to Canadian territory as legally essential. But it bears noting that citizens 
who exhibit any symptoms of Covid-19 can be refused boarding by airline carriers, 
rendering them de facto excluded. And for over two weeks in late December 2020, 
Canada banned all inbound flights from the UK in response to the revelation of a 
more infectious strain of the virus in the UK (first detected in September 2020). The 
ban applied to all air travellers, regardless of citizenship. The end of the UK ban was 
followed by a requirement that all air travellers seeking entry to Canada from abroad 
test negative for Covid-19 within three days of departure for Canada. Here, bio- 
status trumped citizenship-status when citizens travelled by air, which they must do 
to reach Canada from anywhere but the US.
Why did the Prime Minister exhort Canadians to return in the early days of the 
pandemic? One might read this as a romantic appeal to the Canadian diaspora: in 
times of crisis, one can and should return to the protective embrace of the homeland 
(Mégret, 2020). Of course, patriotism can be mobilised toward a variety of ends. 
The Chinese government blocked Canadian-Chinese dual citizens from leaving 
China (often with Canadian family members) and travelling to Canada. At the same 
time, the Chinese government actively discouraged thousands of Chinese interna-
tional students attending Canadian university from returning to China, ostensibly to 
minimise any risk of reintroducing Covid-19 into China. It seems that Chinese citi-
zens in China behave patriotically by remaining in China, while those abroad 
show their patriotism by remaining outside China.
In general, the call to ‘come home’ tracked the predictable eruption of xenopho-
bia directed at actual or perceived ‘foreigners’ (Purohit & Mukherjee, 2020; Stevens, 
2020). The familiar story is that the non-citizen and the racialised other (in this case, 
people with Asian features) always teeter at the edge of outsider status – and an 
outsider is always vulnerable when bad things happen and people look for someone 
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to blame. Around the world, anti-Asian racism and scapegoating of migrants and 
foreigners escalated.
From a purely pragmatic perspective, the Canadian Prime Minister’s appeal to 
citizens abroad also anticipated the imminent global shutdown of international 
travel. The government wished to avoid the prospect of thousands of Canadian citi-
zens stranded abroad and calling on the Canadian government to repatriate them. 
Even though the Canadian government insistently (though quietly) declares that 
consular assistance in the form of repatriation is dispensed as a matter of discretion, 
not entitlement, Canadians continue to expect it. The political cost of refusing to 
repatriate Canadians would have been enormous, so better to do so before the logis-
tical and financial cost escalated even further.
Permanent residents of Canada do not enjoy a constitutional right to (re)enter 
Canada, but they do enjoy a statutory right under s. 19(2) of IRPA to enter Canada. 
Permanent residents must physically reside in Canada for at least six months a year 
to maintain their status. A purely statutory right can be abridged more easily than a 
constitutional right, but in any case, the orders issued under the Quarantine Act 
preserved permanent residents’ ability to enter Canada on the same terms as citi-
zens. This was true of most countries in the Global North, who recognised that 
exclusion of permanent residents would have been politically untenable. The 
Canadian government also included many permanent residents in repatriation flights 
(Government of Canada, 2020f).
Unsurprisingly, the government also discouraged Canadians from non-essential 
travel outside Canada. In the early days of the pandemic, many Canadians (with the 
support of some provincial premiers) did not heed the advice of public health offi-
cials not to travel south for spring break vacations, and it appears that this expedited 
the coronavirus’s spread in Canada. Thousands of retired Canadians spend the win-
ter in Florida, Arizona, and California, and many others vacation in southern desti-
nations. In October 2020, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau cautioned against travelling 
to the US but added,
If someone chooses to travel, we’re not going to keep them imprisoned in Canada. There is 
freedom of movement in this country. [But] they have to recognize that they’re putting 
themselves at risk. They’re putting loved ones at risk (Muggeridge, 2020).
In light of the various restraints on mobility within Canada, Prime Minister 
Trudeau’s invocation of freedom of movement was striking, if not ironic. But per-
haps more notable were the number of politicians, especially at the provincial level, 
who chose to travel south for warm weather vacations in December 2020, only to 
face a chilly public reception upon their return. Many were demoted, fired, or forced 
to resign (Canadian Press, 2021).
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2.5  Foreign Nationals in Canada
2.5.1  Workers
Canadian immigration law defines foreign nationals as non-citizens who are not 
permanent residents. When the pandemic struck, some foreign nationals who had 
resided in Canada for extended periods on renewable work permits happened to be 
temporarily abroad. Their legal entitlement to enter is even more conditional and 
precarious under immigration law than that of permanent residents, but the govern-
ment ultimately permitted them to return. To understand why, it is worth noting that 
over the past 15 years, Canadian immigration policy has reduced the proportion of 
‘high’ skill economic immigrants admitted directly as permanent residents in favour 
of two-step immigration schemes that require migrants to undergo a period of tem-
porary status before qualifying for permanent residence. Thousands of foreign 
nationals live and work in Canada more or less continuously for years (often with 
families) on a succession of temporary work permits. Many of those on temporary 
work permits are indistinguishable from those admitted as permanent residents in 
the economic class. But legally, the line between temporary and permanent resident 
status means that temporary residents’ continuous, long-term physical presence in 
Canada is legally inconsequential in the sense that it does not accumulate into rec-
ognition as a permanent resident. During the pandemic, however,  prior presence 
sufficed for purposes of admission.
2.5.2  International Students
All major Canadian universities are publicly funded, but governments cover a 
decreasing proportion of actual costs. Historically, the education of international 
students was framed as a form of quasi-international development assistance, in 
which students from the Global South would acquire a university education in 
Canada that they would carry back and apply in their countries of origin. By the turn 
of the twenty-first century, this neo-colonial model of international students as aid 
recipients had evolved into a neo-liberal model of international students as revenue 
stream. Programmes that enable some international students to obtain post- 
graduation work permits incentivise international students to choose Canada as a 
destination in the hopes of finding a pathway to permanent immigration. Today, 
Canadian universities depend heavily on tuition fees charged to international stu-
dents; international student tuition across Canadian universities averages 4.5 times 
the fees charged to domestic students (Statistics Canada, 2020). Even as the pan-
demic pushed post-secondary institutions to facilitate online course instruction for 
the majority of programmes, universities were anxious to maintain international 
student enrolment. They worried that international students would balk at paying 
exorbitant tuition fees without the benefit of also  living in Canada. Thus, 
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universities lobbied the federal government to ensure that international students 
who were willing to leave their home countries could still travel and live in Canada – 
even if they studied online upon arrival.
Universities found themselves in a quandary: the physical presence of interna-
tional students is economically essential to Canadian post-secondary institutions. 
But universities’ own efforts to manage the pandemic by going online refuted the 
claim that physical presence was essential to fulfilment of universities’ pedagogical 
mission. The economic imperative to enable international students to enter Canada 
thus collided with the bar on entry for ‘discretionary’ or ‘optional’ purposes. 
Although the federal government allowed online courses to ‘count’ for purposes of 
activating a study permit, this did not resolve the problem of entry.
Universities only partially succeeded in enabling international students to enter 
in time for the start of the 2020–2021 academic year in September 2020. As with 
holders of temporary work permits, government policy drew on past residence as a 
criterion for designating entry as essential. Returning international students able to 
prove that they had already lived in Canada could enter. This did not address the 
situation of first-year international students, unless their university furnished a sup-
porting letter from the university attesting that ‘the program requires in-person 
attendance…once the [university] is able to resume classroom operations’. The uni-
versity was also required to ‘indicate a target start date for courses that require the 
student to be in Canada’ (Government of Canada, 2020e). International students 
arriving directly from the US could hold student permits issued anytime; interna-
tional students arriving from anywhere else could only hold student permits issued 
before 18 March 2020. But even with a study permit in hand, actual admission 
remained subject to CBSA officers’ exercise of discretion at the port of entry. This 
meant that students could not confidently predict whether they would be admitted 
until they travelled to Canada.
In mid-October 2020, the federal government announced a new programme to 
enable international students to study in Canada. Henceforth, provincial govern-
ments would certify individual Canadian universities with an approved ‘COVID 
readiness plan’ as Designated Learning Institutions (DLI). International students 
possessing study permits for those DLIs could enter and would follow the quaran-
tine protocol arranged by the university (Government of Canada, 2020h). This 
model was the product of assiduous negotiations between the government and 
Canadian post-secondary institutions. Although it arrived too late for the start of the 
2020/21 academic year, it enabled universities to continue offering the ‘in-Canada’ 
experience to international students for whom online study was an unsatisfactory 
substitute for the money.
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2.6  Family Members
Over 20% of Canada’s population was born abroad. Immigration is written into 
Canada’s nation-building narrative as a settler society; historically, family-based 
migration was considered integral to social and demographic reproduction, and not 
(unlike European states) primarily the consequence of decolonization or failed tem-
porary labour migration schemes. Untold numbers of Canadian citizens, as well as 
permanent and foreign nationals in Canada, have close kin who are foreign nation-
als. Even though non- citizens have no currency in the political marketplace, they 
are virtually represented by the millions of naturalised citizens and descendants of 
immigrants. The admission of foreign family members of Canadian  residents 
emerged as a contentious issue during COVID. Foreign family members had no 
legal or economic argument in favour of admission, but the government eventually 
relented, recognizing that their  admission was politically essential, even if not 
legally required.
Emergency Orders under the Quarantine Act prohibit entry for optional or dis-
cretionary purposes, and specifically list tourism, recreation, and entertainment as 
examples. This leaves considerable interpretative latitude in the hands of CBSA 
officials. The government’s initial position on non-optional/non-discretionary 
exceptions to border restrictions was that ‘[t]here are no exemptions to border 
restrictions for compassionate reasons, such as visiting a critically ill loved one or 
attending a funeral’ (Government of Canada, 2020f, 5). Early on, however, the gov-
ernment declared an exemption for immediate family members (intimate partners 
and dependent children) of citizens and permanent residents. These foreign nation-
als could be admitted as visitors if it was ‘for an essential purpose’.
Over the course of several months, media accounts abounded of foreign national 
spouses denied entry to attend the birth of their child, adult children unable to visit 
or care for their ailing elderly parents, and long-term long-distance couples refused 
permission to see one another (Bureau, 2020a, b). Other states wrestled with the 
same issue (Dutch News, 2020). In each of the Canadian cases, CBSA officers 
determined that the foreign national did not qualify as an immediate family member 
or the purpose of travel was inessential or both. In some cases, CBSA officers 
threatened to issue a one-year ban if the foreign national did not surrender their 
attempt to enter Canada (Harris, 2020).
Ad-hoc advocacy sprung up across Canada to press for a wider definition of 
immediate family and for recognition of family reunification as intrinsically essen-
tial. The ‘Faces for Advocacy’ group set up a social media presence under the slogan 
‘Family Reunification, Not Open Borders’, and engaged in a media campaign and 
government lobbying (Faces of Advocacy, 2020). In a subsequent order under the 
Quarantine Act, ‘immediate family’ was broadened to include parents as well as step-
parents and adult children of citizens and permanent residents (Government of 
Canada, 2020f). The government also removed the requirement for foreign national 
family members to establish the essential purpose of their travel, thereby reducing 
border officials’ negative discretion; in effect, family reunification as such was 
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deemed essential for those who fell within the definition of family; who were reunit-
ing in Canada with a citizen or permanent resident; and who would be staying beyond 
the mandatory 14-day quarantine period (Government of Canada, 2020a, b, d). 
Immediate family members of temporary residents were required to obtain an 
advance authorization letter from Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 
which they would present at the port of entry. CBSA border officials retained residual 
discretion to reject them at the port of entry, even with the letter. An indirect indica-
tion of how CBSA border officials had been wielding their discretion is provided by 
a policy guideline clarifying that non- discretionary or non-optional travel could 
indeed include a ‘foreign national coming for the birth of their own child to another 
foreign national with temporary resident status’ (Government of Canada, 2020a).
While the Canadian government recognized admission of some family members 
as politically essential from the outset, successful advocacy reconfigured family 
reunification as intrinsically essential so that family members did not have to dem-
onstrate why reunification was essential. It also expanded the ambit of who counted 
as ‘family’ in the pandemic. Importantly, media attention appeared to play an 
important role and many profiles of separated family members featured people who 
were not habitually the subject of restrictive and arbitrary border enforcement or 
politically active on migration issues.
2.7  Seasonal Agricultural Workers
Canada operates a Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) via bilateral 
agreements between the governments of Canada as destination state and Mexico 
and Jamaica as sending states. Through this programme, the Canadian government 
subsidises the agricultural employers’ labour costs by furnishing migrant workers 
who work in greenhouses, orchards, and other industrial agriculture operations for 
wages and working conditions below what Canadians will accept. Privatised varia-
tions on this model supply Canadian agricultural businesses with temporary migrant 
workers from Guatemala, Philippines, Indonesia, and elsewhere. Most return year 
after year on work permits that tie them to specific employers for a stipulated dura-
tion of up to 10 months. The workers can never transition to permanent residence 
and must perform the annual ritual of returning ‘home’ for some period of time in 
order to affirm their designation as merely temporary.
The work requires long hours of hard physical labour and is poorly paid. Respect 
for occupational health, safety, and employment standards by employers is uneven, 
and exploitative practices by unscrupulous employers are endemic and well- 
documented. The demand for the labour may or may not be temporary, but the visa 
is restricted in duration in order to keep the workers temporary. Because of their 
precarious immigration status (accompanied by the ubiquitous threat of deporta-
tion), they experience wage-theft, overwork, unhealthy and dangerous working con-
ditions, overcrowded and inadequate shelter, poor sanitation, and restricted access 
to food, healthcare, and liberty (MWAC, 2020).
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In the initial iteration of the pandemic travel restrictions, temporary workers who 
did not previously reside in Canada were barred from entry. This encompassed sea-
sonal agricultural workers because, as noted above, the requirement to return home 
annually meant that each entry would be based on a new temporary work permit and 
so they could not claim to reside in Canada. Their exclusion because of Covid-19 
rekindled a familiar discussion about migrant labour. Although frequently deni-
grated as ‘unskilled’ and thus undeserving of permanent residence, employers now 
emphasised the skill, experience, and efficiency of seasonal agricultural workers. 
They reiterated the refrain that Canadians  – even in the face of unprecedented 
unemployment rates – could not and would not do the arduous work. And so, to 
sustain the food supply in Canada, the entry of seasonal agricultural workers was 
facilitated as an exception because their admission was economically essential 
to Canada.
But upgrading the work to essential did not make the workers essential. Rather, 
it exposed the extent to which migrant agricultural labour is essential because the 
workers themselves are dispensable. This is not a paradox: slave labour is essential 
to a slave economy but, and because, enslaved people have no intrinsic worth in that 
economy.
Arriving workers were screened for Covid-19 before departure and employers 
pledged to honour the 14-day quarantine period, ensure housing and working condi-
tions that respected social distancing requirements, and to otherwise respect and 
protect workers’ health. The Jamaican government, recognising the remittances by 
seasonal agricultural workers as economically essential, required Canada-bound 
Jamaican workers to sign a waiver of any liability for contracting Covid-19 while 
employed in Canada (Mojtehedzadeh, 2020). The dependence of sending states on 
remittances, their competitive relationship with other sending states, and their 
weakness relative to destination states often result in tepid protection and advocacy 
by sending states for overseas workers.
Consistent with pre-coronavirus patterns of employer misconduct, many 
Canadian employers did not respect the quarantine period, coerced employees into 
working immediately alongside local workers (who did not live on site and circu-
lated freely), did not provide them with adequate housing, personal protective 
equipment or means of social distancing. After travelling thousand of kilometres 
across international borders, they were, in some cases, physically confined to the 
employer’s  property. Non-compliant workers were threatened with repatriation. 
Government inspectors – who refrained from entering workplaces because of the 
risk – conducted virtual inspections in which they relied on employer reports.
Covid-19 outbreaks on farms and greenhouse operations erupted almost imme-
diately. In surrounding communities and commercial establishments, migrant work-
ers were stigmatised and even refused service (Hennebry et al., 2020). For the first 
six months of the pandemic, the agricultural industry (including meat packing 
plants) and privately-operated long-term care facilities were responsible for the 
overwhelming majority of positive cases and deaths in Canada. In each sphere, the 
common denominator was a work force that was disproportionately racialised, low- 
paid, and populated by migrants lacking secure migration status. A key finding of a 
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study of the differential impact of Covid-19 on non-citizen and racialised people in 
Ontario (Canada’s largest province) found that, as of June 2020, ‘Although immi-
grants, refugees and other newcomers make up just over 25% of the Ontario popula-
tion, they accounted for 43.5% of all Covid-19 cases’ (Guttmann et al., 2020). The 
study did not include seasonal agricultural workers, which would have significantly 
increased the proportion of non-citizen Covid-19 cases.
Civil society organisations focused on migrant and refugee rights have been doc-
umenting conditions faced by  precarious migrants and refugees during the pan-
demic, using mainstream and social media as well as public protests to advance 
long-standing demands to issue migrant workers (across a range of occupations) 
access to permanent resident status (MWAC, 2020). In one well-publicised case, a 
migrant farm worker was fired for speaking to media after he tested positive and a 
roommate died from Covid-19. The agri-business employed hundreds of workers 
under Canada’s seasonable agricultural programme. The employer failed to provide 
safe, clean, and well-provisioned accommodation for workers; by June 2020, over 
190 workers tested positive. With support from a migrant rights organisation, the 
farm worker was able to resist the employer’s attempt to summarily deport him, and 
he filed a complaint against the employer for engaging in reprisal against him. In 
early November 2020, the Ontario Labour Relations Board ruled in favour of the 
worker, awarding him lost wages and damages (Gabriel-Flores, 2020).
Migrant worker organisations drew attention to the essential services these work-
ers provide to a Canadian economy in crisis, and the heightened risk of infection, 
illness, and death they faced because of the nature of the work they perform. Their 
vulnerability was compounded by disregard of their health and safety by employers 
who exploit their precarious immigration status. The government largely deflected 
the issue and, instead, provided tens of millions of dollars to employers to encour-
age them to implement the protective measures they had already pledged and failed 
to provide.
2.8  Asylum Seekers and Refugees
At the bottom of all hierarchies of legal migration are refugees and asylum seekers. 
Admission of asylum seekers is not politically or economically essential to Canada. 
Refugee resettlement is not legally required, and Canada halted resettlement in 
March 2020. It resumed slowly in late August, but Canada did not meet its resettle-
ment targets for 2020.
Canada’s obligations toward asylum seekers qualify their admission as legally 
essential under a proper interpretation of Canada’s obligations under the UN 
Refugee Convention (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020), but 
it is undeniable that Canada (like most other states) seeks to evade those obligations. 
Elsewhere, Sean Rehaag et al. (2020) describe how Canada leveraged the pandemic 
to advance its goal of preventing asylum seekers from reaching Canada and seeking 
refugee protection. In a depressing and distinctive display of Canadian-ness, the 
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government classified the entry of NHL hockey teams (and their entourages) as 
essential, but not the entry of asylum seekers (ibid.; Mohammed, 2020).
In July 2020, the Federal Court of Canada ruled that the Canada-US Safe Third 
Country Agreement (STCA) violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
based on the treatment to which asylum seekers are subject when returned to the US 
under the STCA (Canadian Council for Refugees, 2020). The government appealed 
the decision, and the Federal Court of Appeal overturned the decision in April 2021 
(Canadian Council for Refugees, 2021). The applicants have applied for leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Meanwhile, the border remains closed to 
refugee claimants who do not fall within STCA exceptions. Those who are appre-
hended while crossing irregularly are pushed back to the US.
2.9  Pandemic Pathways to Permanent Residence
Against this generally dismal landscape for migrants and refugees, two develop-
ments stand out. When the pandemic measures began, refugee and migration advo-
cates launched a campaign to urge the federal government to provide access to 
permanent residence for front-line ‘essential workers’ with precarious immigration 
status, including seasonal agricultural workers, other migrant workers, and refugee 
claimants. The Black Lives Matter uprising amplified the racialised character of the 
migrant worker population and the pandemic’s impact on expressions of racism and 
xenophobia. Activists’ calls to action were backed by evidence about the treatment 
of seasonal agricultural workers and temporary workers in meat packing plants. 
Frontline workers in long-term care facilities also received considerable attention, 
especially in Quebec. Many among them were Haitian and African refugee claim-
ants who had entered Canada irregularly from the US post-2016 (because the afore-
mentioned STCA precluded them from entering through regular means) at a Quebec 
location known as Roxham Road. They had long been vilified as ‘illegal’ immi-
grants from various quarters, including the Quebec provincial government, which 
had promoted a number of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant policies since its elec-
tion. But here they were, risking their health by providing services in nursing, secu-
rity, janitorial work, and food preparation.
In mid-August 2020, the federal government announced that refugee claimants 
working in the health sector in direct contact with patients would be granted direct 
access to permanent resident status (Canada, 2020g) The federal immigration min-
ister praised these refugee claimants as demonstrating ‘a uniquely Canadian quality 
in that they were looking out for others’ (Canadian Press, 2020; Kestler-D'Amours, 
2020). There was, of course, a certain irony to rewarding refugee claimants for per-
forming  their ‘Canadian-ness’ by doing work that Canadians would not do. But 
more significant was the exclusion of other services that were also deemed essen-
tial, which also exposed workers to heightened risk of infection, but which did not 
involve direct contact with the sick or elderly. Inside healthcare facilities, these 
included security, cleaning, and food preparation. Workers in other sectors, 
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especially in agriculture, also faced heightened risks that were not inherent to the 
work (unlike healthcare), but largely attributable to employer failure to ensure safe 
working and living conditions. Additionally, precarious migrant workers who were 
not refugee claimants remained ineligible. Soon after the programme’s announce-
ment, it emerged that while the federal government and other provinces were open 
to a wider scope of eligibility, at least for refugee claimants in the health sector, the 
Quebec government strongly opposed it (Gruda, 2020).
This exceptional initiative for refugee claimants appealed to the logic of deserv-
ingness and ‘earned’ citizenship: non-citizens may be put on a path to citizenship as 
a reward for extraordinary sacrifice to the nation. A similar premise underwrote US 
President Barack Obama’s DACA programme, whereby prosecution for irregular 
presence was deferred for people without legal status who served in the US military 
or attended post-secondary education. The Canadian programme’s limitation to 
direct provision of healthcare and the ineligibility of precarious workers who were 
not refugee claimants both invite deeper reflection about the particular confluence 
of forces and discourses that produced it. This unprecedented offer of permanent 
resident status for refugee claimants was both welcomed for those it included and 
contested as arbitrarily restrictive for those it excluded. In December 2020, four 
months after the initial announcement, the government opened the application pro-
cess. The scope of the program was confined to a tiny subset of eligible refugee 
claimants who claimed refugee protection before 13 March 2020, who possess valid 
work permits, and have accumulated a minimum number of hours of employment 
in direct provision of health care (Pilon-Larose, 2020). A journalist estimated that 
the proposed measure would probably benefit no more than a thousand refugee 
claimants (Gruda, 2020).
While the ‘pandemic pathways’ program was restricted to asylum seekers in 
front-line health care, another program introduced in April 2021 offered access to 
permanent resident residence for up to 90,000 migrant workers and international 
students  – but excludes refugee claimants (Government of Canada, 2021a). The 
program opened in May 2021 with a six-month deadline for application. The impact 
of the pandemic on transnational movement meant that Canada could not approach 
its annual target for permanent immigration except by pivoting to temporary 
migrants (workers and international graduates) already in Canada. The program sets 
aside 20,000 spaces for health care workers, 30,000 for essential non-health care 
workers, and 40,000 for recent graduates from Canadian institutions. As of 1 June 
2021, however only 13,000 workers applied for 50,000 spaces, whereas the 40,000 
maximum for international graduates applications was reached (Government of 
Canada, 2021b). The explanation for undersubscription by workers is not a lack of 
eligible candidates. While the program is open to workers designated as ‘low skill,’ 
the complexity of the application process itself, the lack of digital literacy and lan-
guage fluency among many foreign workers (the application must be submitted 
online), the onerous documentary requirements, the expense of obtaining private 
language testing, and the cost of legal assistance in completing the application have 
made the program inaccessible to eligible workers.
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These temporary programs illustrate the capacity of the government to depart 
from entrenched ideas about who is worthy of admission to permanent residence. 
The most optimistic view is that this lesson will survive the pandemic and create 
momentum for establishing a standing policy of prioritizing permanent immigration 
and facilitating access to permanent residence for all temporary workers. The pes-
simistic view is that these initiatives will become another example of short-term, 
ad-hoc policies that sustain Canada’s reputation as a generous and welcoming coun-
try, while conferring material benefits on very few. To put these pandemic pathways 
in perspective, as of December 2020, there were over 80,000 refugee claimants in 
Canada and over a million people on temporary work permits. (Goldring & 
Landolt, 2021).
2.10  Concluding Remarks
The global migration of Covid-19 not only disrupted transborder movement; in 
many (perhaps most) states, stasis and closure became the default norm at and 
within borders. It is too early to predict or theorise the future of mobility as free 
(versus permitted) movement in an era of surveillance, internal borders, and 
lockdowns.
With respect to transborder movement, pandemic restrictions have in turn, gener-
ated exceptions organised around a conception of ‘essential’ that was produced, 
revised, and represented through the interaction of pandemic-driven exigencies and 
nationally-specific articulations of the legal, political, and economic constraints in 
play. It would be imprudent to suggest that these have altered conventional migra-
tion and citizenship hierarchies, but perhaps the pandemic has temporarily jostled 
conventional hierarchies of who (or whose labour) enough to expose those privi-
leges and stereotypes to greater critical scrutiny by a wider public.
To understand how the admission of certain people to Canada was accepted as 
legally, economically, and/or politically essential, one must take account of Canada’s 
character as a ‘country of immigration’, and its particular impact on expanding 
grounds for admission of family members. Canada’s economic integration with the 
US explains its preferential treatment of entry from that country (despite the hazards 
posed by US governance of the pandemic). The exposure of Canada’s dependence 
on migrant workers to subsidise food production and to deliver critical services 
counters the settler-society tendency to promote permanent immigration and settle-
ment. It has also dampened anti-immigrant sentiment, as Canadians recognise the 
vital contribution of those admitted on a temporary basis.
If one describes Canadian policy on Covid-19 admissions as a circle of inclusion, 
the government drew the circle around citizens, permanent residents, and foreign 
nationals who could demonstrate prior physical presence of some duration in 
Canada. In other words, the circle was drawn around functional rather than formal 
residence. Normally, formal temporary status prevails over functional residence 
under immigration law. One can reside in Canada continuously for years and yet 
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remain permanently ‘temporary’ because one holds only a temporary visa. During 
the public health emergency, the ethical significance of the fact that a student or 
worker actually lives in Canada – even if their status is ‘temporary’ – was validated 
in a way that it normally is not. The labour performed by temporary foreign work-
ers, so often devalued as ‘unskilled’ or misrepresented as ‘seasonal’, was newly 
valorised during the pandemic. The acknowledgement that the definition of family 
(basically intimate partners, parents and children,) used for ordinary immigration 
purposes was too narrow to address the urgent need for family members to connect 
with those residing in Canada was also noteworthy. Refugees, however, were mostly 
left behind.
Every autumn, the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship announces 
projected levels of immigration for the next year. On 30 October 2020, the federal 
government announced its plan to increase admissions over the next three years to 
compensate for the shortfall caused by the pandemic and to  facilitate economic 
recovery and future growth (Canada, 2020i). The messaging was positive about 
immigration at a moment when many states have doubled down on xenophobia and 
exclusion  – and that is remarkable in itself. The critical question is whether the 
insights gained because of Covid-19, which carry with them profound potential for 
transforming migration policy, can survive the pandemic.
Each state has its own set of factors that combine to determine whose entry and 
what kind of labour was legally, economically, and politically essential during the 
pandemic. But beyond these pragmatic considerations lie conceptions of the nation 
and identity, and broader attitudes toward immigration society surely matter. These 
may best be revealed and appreciated through comparative analysis. By offering 
Canada as a case study, I hope to open up the possibility for generative comparison.
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Chapter 3
Territorial and Digital Borders 
and Migrant Vulnerability Under 
a Pandemic Crisis
Petra Molnar
3.1  Introduction: The Harmful Ecosystem of Migration 
Management Technologies
We are Black and the border guards hate us. Their computers hate us too. – Adissu, living 
without immigration status in Brussels, Belgium1
Tucked away on a quiet street minutes from a major train station in Brussels, a 
house is at first indistinguishable from its nondescript neighbours. However, inside 
this ‘squat’ lives a bustling community. Made up of climate justice organisers, self- 
described anarchists, and social justice advocates, L’Autre Caserne provides shelter, 
food, and support to undocumented people who find themselves living in the Belgian 
capital. With a massive cardboard clock that reads ‘Revolution Time’ and ‘No One 
is Illegal’ stickers everywhere, the bright three-story building has skylight windows 
and even a salsa dance room, contrasting with the ever-present threat of eviction and 
arrest. On a sunny Sunday afternoon, over 30 undocumented people gathered 
together to share snacks and stories of their migration journeys, while sheltering in 
place during the Covid-19 pandemic.2 Most people present were from Eritrea or 
1 Interviews collected in spring and summer of 2020. All names and identifying features have been 
changed to protect the people who generously shared their stories with us as they appear in Molnar 
(2020). For additional discussion of methodology, see also Benvenisti (2018).
2 These interviews form a part of a year-long study since October 2019 to interrogate the effects of 
migration management technologies on the lives and rights of people on the move and to fore-
ground the lived experiences of these communities. However, the pandemic shifted the mode of 
engagement due to the difficulty of safely conducting on-the-ground research and interviews with 
affected groups. As such, in addition to in-person research which only became possible in the sum-
mer of 2020, this report provides initial analysis and reflections on the need to employ a human 
rights-oriented harm-focused approach to the development, deployment, and regulation of migra-
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Ethiopia, as the previous group of Syrians vacated their rooms a few weeks back, 
moving on and trying their luck with the elusive passage to the UK – a Promised 
Land that seems simultaneously full of opportunity yet unattainable except for a 
lucky few. The UK remains difficult to reach during the coronavirus pandemic, 
where irregular passage on a boat across the English Channel or on the back of a 
lorry all come with the risk of increased surveillance (Meaker, 2020) and potential 
indefinite detention, if apprehended.
Since the coronavirus lockdown started, this community in central Brussels has 
been sheltering in place together for nearly three months but many said they were 
itching to try their luck elsewhere, no matter the cost.
‘I am tired’, says Negasi, a young man in his twenties from Ethiopia. ‘I am tired 
and I want to go to the UK’. Negasi has been in Belgium for two years without 
papers and in Nuremberg, Germany, for five years before that. But this is not 
Negasi’s first time in Belgium: he was deported to Germany once before, after being 
apprehended by the Belgian police for sleeping in a park when he was homeless. 
His fingerprints set off a notification in the EURODAC system (the (European 
Asylum Dactyloscopy Database which records and matches people’s fingerprints 
across the EU) since he had previously filed for asylum in Germany. He said the 
biometric collection process was invasive, but he did not know what do to: ‘How 
can I say no when the police handcuffed me, brought me to the station, and forced 
me to give them my fingerprints?’ He knows of a few friends who even went as far 
as to burn their fingerprints off to avoid detection but Negasi thinks ‘this don’t solve 
the problem’, as lack of identification usually will mean longer detention. As a 
young Black man, Negasi remembers his interactions with the Belgian police viv-
idly during his 30 days in jail before being deported to Germany. ‘They hit and 
kicked me and said “if you’re not happy with this life, go back to your fucking 
country.” They really have no respect for us, not today and not ever’.
Negasi, like many others in the community has had a complicated journey to 
Belgium. When he left Ethiopia, he made his way to Sudan, Chad, and Libya, before 
taking a boat across the Mediterranean in 2014. His journey echoes a similar path 
that brought Amari to Brussels. In his forties and serving as the community’s 
Amharic interpreter, Amari doesn’t remember how long he has been in Belgium 
exactly; he entered Europe through Italy and tried to join his sister in Sweden but 
was returned and made his way to Belgium.
According to Amari, the general feeling is that ‘people think they have better 
chances if they go upwards’, into western and northern Europe. Many try to forget 
the horrors they experienced on their way. Amari was jailed for a year and a half in 
tion management technologies and forms the starting point of a broader multi-year project on these 
issues. The resulting report, ‘Technological Testing Grounds: Migration Management Experiments 
from the Ground Up’ (Molnar 2020), reflects interviews with over 40 refugees, asylum seekers, 
migrants without status, and people on the move that were conducted in Brussels, Belgium, and 
various locations in Greece over the summer and early fall of 2020. Additionally, 35 meetings and 
interviews with civil society organisations, government and private sector representatives, and 
academics were conducted, alongside extensive desk research.
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an underground Libyan bunker because he did not have enough money to pay the 
smugglers to take him across the Mediterranean (Mannocchi, 2019). He eventually 
escaped and joined a friend who was able to secure them both a passage to Italy. His 
face changed immediately when recalling his time in Libya and it was clear that the 
scars of that time remain: ‘It’s incredibly difficult to live in this world right now’. To 
cope, he is helping the ‘squat’ organisers make a 3D model of the detention facility 
from memory, both to document what happened to him and to perhaps help with his 
asylum claim, if he ever has a chance to file one. For now, Amari remains stuck in 
Belgium but has his eye on the UK or ‘whatever country takes me’. He was planning 
to try and catch a lorry to the UK sometime during the following week, aware of the 
risks but unwilling to remain in stasis any longer because of the coronavirus. Amari 
has experienced torture in a Libyan jail yet says ‘living without papers in a racist 
country is another torture. I only need papers to live. I want to study now. I want to 
have a reason to live’.
At multiple points in their journey that landed them in Brussels, this community 
interacted with surveillance technology and biometrics. Kaleb, a married man in his 
thirties who ‘misses [his] beloved wife Liya everyday’ reflected on how violent and 
impersonal the immigration and asylum system is. Twirling his wedding ring during 
the entire time we spoke, Kaleb reflected on feeling ‘like a piece of meat without a 
life, just fingerprints and eye scans’. As Kaleb spoke, the others in the circle nodded: 
‘It is the human touch that keeps us warm – now all around us it’s cold as fuck’. 
Kaleb has not seen his wife in four years.
The group was disturbed by the coldness and dehumanisation of technology. As 
Eshe, a young woman who did not stay long at our meeting put it, ‘their computers 
are making decisions for us’. The use of drones in the Mediterranean and the English 
Channel prompted many people to shake their heads, with Amari making others 
laugh: ‘now we have flying shit instead of more help’. When discussing the use of 
tools like AI lie detectors at the border or drones patrolling the Mediterranean, the 
group discussion got heated: ‘We are Black and the police [border guards] hate us. 
Their computers hate us too’. The threat of police presence and increased surveil-
lance is ever-present in an occupied building full of undocumented people – in fact, 
the police have been coming to the squat repeatedly over the last few weeks as the 
coronavirus lockdowns eased, once to investigate a death from an overdose of a 
young Moroccan man without papers and a few other times because the neighbours 
made a noise complaint.
Many in the community were not aware of what exact technologies they may 
have come in contact with over the course of the many months – and in some cases 
years – of travel. But Kaleb reflected on how he found it ‘weird’ that new tools were 
being used to control migration when instead ‘the world government should work 
on the main problem, like fighting and wars’ – problems that force people to seek a 
better life in the first place.3
3 Sadly, at the time of writing in the fall of 2020, L’Autre Caserne community has been evicted and 
the entire community displaced.
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3.2  Real World Impacts of Technological Experiments 
in Pandemic Times
Adissu, Kaleb, and Eshe’s stories highlight the far-reaching individual impacts of 
migration surveillance technologies, exacerbated in the securitised and bio- 
surveilled world of Covid-19. Their reflections show just how little engagement 
there has been with the experiences of communities at the sharp edges of these 
unregulated technological developments. Each individual perspective is also firmly 
situated in broader ecosystems of migration management and border surveillance 
technologies, encouraging zones of experimentation with little oversight and 
accountability.
People on the move like Adissu are stuck in an ever-growing panopticon of tech-
nological experiments increasingly making their way into migration management. 
A whole host of actors and players operate in the development and deployment of 
migration control technologies, obscuring responsibility and liability, exacerbating 
racism and discrimination, and obfuscating meaningful mechanisms of redress. 
Communities made under-resourced and marginalised such as non-citizens, refu-
gees, and people on the move often have access to less robust human rights protec-
tions and fewer resources with which to defend those rights and thus become 
technological testing grounds.
Now, as governments move toward increasing biosurveillance (Cliffe, 2020) to 
contain Covid-19’s spread, we are seeing a growth in tracking projects and auto-
mated surveillance technology, justified by the need to control the virus (Lewis & 
Mok, 2020). However, if previous use of technology is any indication, refugees and 
people crossing borders will be disproportionately targeted and negatively affected. 
Various proposed tools sound quite far-fetched, such as virus-targeting robots (The 
Current, 2020), cellphone tracking (Romm, 2020), and AI-based thermal cameras 
(Cox, 2020). However, given the robust migration management technology ecosys-
tem that already exists, these Covid-specific tools can all easily be used against 
people crossing borders, with far-reaching human rights impacts. This use of tech-
nology to manage and control migration is also shielded from scrutiny because of 
its emergency nature. The basic protections that exist for more politically powerful 
groups that have access to mechanisms of redress and oversight are often not avail-
able to people crossing borders. The current global digital rights space also does not 
sufficiently engage with migration issues, at best only tokenising the involvement 
from both migrants and groups working with this community.
Ultimately, the primary purpose of the technologies used in migration manage-
ment is to track, identify, and control those crossing borders. The issues around 
emerging technologies in the management of migration are not just about the inher-
ent use of technology but rather about how it is used and by whom, with states and 
private actors setting the stage for what is possible and which priorities matter. The 
data-gathering inherent in the development of these technologies also includes the 
expansion of existing mass-scale databases underpinning these practices to sensi-
tive data, especially biometrics. Such data and technology systems provide an 
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enabling infrastructure for many automated decision-making projects with poten-
tially harmful implications. The development and deployment of migration man-
agement is ultimately about decision-making by powerful actors on communities 
with few resources and mechanisms of redress.
The introduction of new technologies impacts both the processes and outcomes 
associated with decisions that would otherwise be made by administrative tribunals, 
immigration officers, border agents, legal analysts, and other officials responsible 
for the administration of immigration and refugee systems, border enforcement, and 
refugee response management. Border enforcement and immigration and refugee 
decision-making sit at an uncomfortable legal nexus: the impact on the rights and 
interests of individuals is often very significant, even where the degree of deference 
is high and the procedural safeguards are weak. There is also a serious lack of clarity 
surrounding how courts will interpret administrative law principles like natural jus-
tice, procedural fairness, and standard of review where an automated decision sys-
tem is concerned or where an opaque use of technology operates. As such, it is 
concerning that we are already seeing a rise in Covid-specific technologies aimed at 
strengthening border security, aiding in data gathering, and automatic discretionary 
processes and decision-making with little oversight and accountability.
The political economy in which this technological development and deployment 
occurs also cannot be ignored. The unequal distribution of benefits from technologi-
cal development privileges the private sector as the primary actor in charge of devel-
opment, with states and governments wishing to control the flows of migrant 
populations benefiting from these technological experiments. Governments and 
large organisations are the primary agents who benefit from data collection (Okediji, 
2018) and affected groups remain the subject, relegated to the margins. It is there-
fore not surprising that the regulatory and legal space around the use of these tech-
nologies remains murky and underdeveloped, full of discretionary decision-making, 
privatised development, and uncertain legal ramifications.
This chapter draws on data collected during a year-long study with European 
Digital Rights (EDRi) to interrogate the effects of migration management technolo-
gies on the lives and rights of people on the move and to foreground the lived expe-
riences of these communities (see Molnar, 2020). This chapter reflects some of the 
interviews with over 40 refugees, asylum seekers, migrants without status, and 
people on the move conducted in Brussels, Belgium, and various locations in Greece 
over the summer and early fall of 2020.4 The first section canvases some of the 
human rights ramifications of migration- and Covid-tech, followed by an analysis of 
some of the private sector drivers behind this turn to biosurveillance and migration 
management technologies, arguing that this pandemic emergency provides the per-
fect foil to fast-track problematic surveillance and automated digital technologies 
4 All interviews adhered to strict Covid-19 social distancing protocols and negative testing as nec-
essary before entering Lesvos and other areas in Greece; 35 meetings and interviews with civil 
society organisations, government and private sector representatives, and academics were also 
conducted, alongside extensive desk research.
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without taking into account their impacts on the rights and lives of people on 
the move.
3.3  Human Rights Ramifications 
of Migration- and Covid-Tech
Like a piece of meat without a life, just fingerprints and eye scans. – Kaleb, living without 
immigration status in Brussels, Belgium
Technologies such as automated decision-making, biometrics, and unpiloted 
drones are increasingly controlling migration and affecting millions of people on 
the move. This allure of using technological interventions at and around the border 
highlights the very real impacts on people’s rights and lives, exacerbated by a lack 
of meaningful governance and oversight mechanisms of these technological 
experiments.
Even before the pandemic, surveillance and automated decision-making tech-
nologies had been increasingly used in securing border spaces, infringing on peo-
ple’s life and liberty and their freedom of movement. For example, Frontex, the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency, announced an expanded border strategy 
bolstered by a new regulation (Frontex, 2019) which relies on increased staff and 
new technology. An EU-funded project, ROBORDER (n.d.), explicitly ‘aims to cre-
ate a fully functional autonomous border surveillance system with unmanned 
mobile robots including aerial, water surface, underwater and ground vehicles’. The 
EU borders are not the only site of drone technology. In the US, politicians have 
presented similar ‘smart-border’ technologies as a more ‘humane’ alternative to the 
Trump Administration’s calls for a physical wall. Most recently, this includes a part-
nership between the US Customs and Border Protection, Google Cloud AI, and 
Anduril Industries to create a new ‘virtual’ wall of surveillance towers and drones, 
a move that has been endorsed by the Biden Administration (Fang & Biddle, 2020; 
also Bernd, 2021). However, these technologies can have drastic results. For exam-
ple, border control policies that use new surveillance technologies along the 
US-Mexico border have actually doubled migrant deaths (Boyce et al., 2019) and 
pushed migration routes towards more dangerous terrain through the Arizona des-
ert, creating what anthropologist Jason De Leon calls a ‘land of open graves’ (De 
Leon & Wells, 2015). With similar surveillance technology increasingly used on the 
shores of Europe to facilitate interceptions and pushbacks of boats (Forensic 
Architecture, 2020; Heller & Jones, 2014; Keady-Tabbal & Mann, 2020), a similar 
increase of watery graves will likely occur (see Border Violence Monitoring 
Network, n.d.). Given that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has 
reported that due to recent shipwrecks, over 20,000 people have died trying to cross 
the Mediterranean since 2014 (Black, 2020), we can only imagine how many more 
bodies will wash upon the shores of Europe as the situation worsens along the EU’s 
borders. The use of these technologies by border enforcement is only likely to 
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increase in the ‘militarised technological regime’ (Csernatoni, 2018) of border 
spaces, without appropriate public consultation, accountability frameworks, and 
oversight mechanisms. This increased reliance on border securitisation and surveil-
lance through new technologies, as clearly underscored by the EU’s New Migration 
Pact (European Commission, 2020) and its focus on border enforcement and deter-
rence, also works to send a clear message that human lives are expendable to protect 
Europe’s borders.
We should not underestimate the far-reaching impacts of new technologies on 
the lives and rights of people on the move. The right to life and the right liberty, the 
right to be free from discrimination, the right to privacy, and a host of other funda-
mental internationally protected rights are highly relevant to technological experi-
mentation in migration and refugee contexts.5 For example, aspects of training data 
which are mere coincidences in reality may be treated as relevant patterns by a 
machine-learning system, leading to arbitrary, incorrect, or discriminatory out-
comes.6 Given the problematic track record that automated technologies already 
have on race and gender, similar issues likely occur in migration surveillance and 
decision-making. Proxies for discrimination, such as country of origin, can be used 
to make problematic inferences leading to discriminatory outcomes.
Algorithms are vulnerable to the same decision-making concerns that plague 
human decision-makers: transparency, accountability, discrimination, bias, and 
error (Tufekci, 2015). The opaque nature of immigration and refugee decision- 
making creates an environment ripe for algorithmic discrimination. Decisions in 
this system – from whether a refugee’s life story is ‘truthful’ to whether a prospec-
tive immigrant’s marriage is ‘genuine’ – are highly discretionary, and often hinge on 
assessment of a person’s credibility (Satzewich, 2015). To the extent that these tech-
nologies will be used to assess ‘red flags’, ‘risk’ and ‘fraud’, they also raise defini-
tional issues, as it remains unclear what the parameters of these markers will be.
These risks are not merely speculative. Biases at the border have far-reaching 
results if they are embedded in the emerging technologies being used experimen-
tally in migration. For example, in airports in Hungary, Latvia, and Greece, a new 
pilot project by a consortium called iBorderCtrl introduced AI-powered lie detec-
tors at border checkpoints (Picheta, 2018).7 The project claimed that passengers’ 
faces would be monitored for signs of lying, and if the system became more ‘scepti-
cal’ through a series of increasingly complicated questions, the person would be 
selected for further screening by a human officer. Canada and Romania have also 
5 For a fulsome analysis of the applicability of international human rights law and the variety of 
rights engaged in migration management technologies, see Petra Molnar (2019).
6 This is one reason why the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requires the ability 
to demonstrate that the correlations applied in algorithmic decision-making are ‘legitimate justifi-
cations for the automated decisions. See for example Lokke Moerel and Marijn Storm (2018).
7 With Hungary and Greece being some of the crucial entry points for refugee claimants into main-
land Europe, it is perhaps no accident that these locations were chosen as the site of 
experimentation.
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experimented with a similar border-screening ‘emotion-recognition’ project called 
AVATAR (Daniels, 2018; Kendrick, 2019).8
However, it is unclear how these systems will be able to handle cultural differ-
ences in communication or account for trauma and its effects on memory, such as 
when dealing with a traumatised refugee claimant unable to answer questions clear-
ly.9 Refugee claims and immigration applications are filled with nuance and com-
plexity, qualities that may be lost on automated technologies, leading to serious 
breaches of internationally and domestically protected human rights in the form of 
bias, discrimination, privacy breaches, and due process and procedural fairness 
issues, among others. It remains unclear how the right to a fair and impartial 
decision- maker and the right to appeal a decision will be upheld during the use of 
automated decision-making systems.10
The complexity of human migration is not easily reducible to an algorithm. Yet 
states are willing to experiment with these new unregulated technologies in the 
space of migration precisely because it is a discretionary space of opaque decision- 
making. The development and deployment of technologies also reinforce the North–
South power asymmetries and concretise which locations are seen as innovation 
centres, while spaces like conflict zones and refugee camps become sites of experi-
mentation under the guise of ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘empowerment of migrants’ 
through innovation.11 Technological innovations exude the promises of increased 
fairness and efficiency. Moreover, much of migration management is also enacted 
by international organisations such as the UNHCR and IOM. As non-state actors 
operating under various legal and quasi-legal authorities and regulations globally, 
international organisations are ‘arenas for acting out power relationships’ (Evans & 
Wilson, 1992) without being beholden to the responsibilities that states have to 
protect human rights. States that operate through international organisations can 
also ‘launder’ their legal responsibility for acts or omissions that are attributed to 
the organisation (Benvenisti, 2018). With the proliferation of migration control 
technologies, international organisations are overly empowered to administer tech-
nology without having to abide by rights-protecting laws and principles, resulting in 
problems with compliance (See, for example, Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002).
8 Various other pilot projects to introduce facial recognition at the border across the world have 
been explored in a recent report by CIPPIC (see Israel 2020).
9 These issues also of course exist with human decision-makers, and there are increasingly cogent 
critiques about officers misunderstanding how the psychological effects of repeated trauma can 
impacts person’s ability to testify and appear ‘truthful.’ See for example the work of Hilary Evans 
Cameron, Refugee Law’s Fact-Finding Crisis: Truth, Risk, and the Wrong Mistake (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2018).
10 There has been much opposition to the iBorderCTRL project, with a number of civil society 
organisations speaking out. For example, in November 2018, Homo Digitalis filed a petition to the 
Greek Parliament regarding the pilot implementation of the iBorderCtrl project (see 
Chelioudakis 2018).
11 See, for example, initiatives such as ‘Techfugees: Empowering the Displaced Through 
Technology’ https://techfugees.com/, accessed 17 March 2019.
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The appetite for these advances also reveals the fissures of imbalanced power 
relations in society. Technological development does not occur in a vacuum but 
replicates existing power hierarchies and differentials. Technology is not inherently 
democratic, and issues of informed consent and right of refusal are particularly 
salient in humanitarian and forced migration contexts when, for example, refugees 
in Jordan have their irises scanned in order to receive their weekly rations under the 
justification of efficiency, while not being able to refuse biometric registration 
(Staton, 2016). Technologies of migration management also operate in an inher-
ently global context. They reinforce institutions, cultures, policies, and laws, and 
exacerbate the gap between the public and the private sector, where the power to 
design and deploy innovation comes at the expense of oversight and accountability.
Unfortunately, an exceptional crisis moment like a global pandemic seems to be 
accelerating the development of technological interventions in and around the bor-
der without appropriate safeguards and oversights. This push to render people on 
the move as viable testing communities for further surveillance opens up spaces for 
greater justifications for border enforcement and securitisation, particularly in fron-
tier zones with little oversight and accountability, rife for the private sector to fore-
ground profit-making as the priority agenda.
3.4  Politics, Pandemics, and Privatisation 
of Migratory Spaces
Their computers are making decisions for us. – Eshe, living without status in 
Brussels, Belgium
Pandemic responses are political (Khatin, 2020; also, Arundhati, 2020). Refugees 
have long been tied to tropes of bringing disease and illness (The World, 2019), 
underscored by growing xenophobia and racism (UNHCR, 2020). Not only are 
these formulations inaccurate; they also legitimise incursions on human rights 
(Herrera, 2019). If previous use of technology is any indication, refugees and people 
crossing borders will be disproportionately targeted and Covid-tracking technology 
can be easily co-opted to impact communities made marginalised (Lukacs, 2020). 
Making people on the move more trackable and detectable justifies the use of more 
technology and data collection in the name of public health and national security.
Most importantly, technological solutions do not address the root causes of dis-
placement, forced migration, and economic inequality, all of which exacerbate the 
spread of global pandemics like Covid-19 (Molnar & Naranjo, 2020). Coupled with 
extraordinary state powers, the incursion of the private sector’s solutions presented 
to manage both migration and the pandemic leaves open the possibility of grave 
human rights abuses and far-reaching effects on civil liberties, particularly for com-
munities on the margins.
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3.5  Pandemics at the Frontier: Greek Refugee Camps 
in the Age of Surveillance
Certain places serve as the perfect testing grounds for new technologies, places 
where regulation is limited and where an ‘anything goes’ frontier attitude informs 
the development and deployment of surveillance at the expense of humanity. Greece 
is one of these places, a surveillance sandbox at the frontiers of Europe.
Moria, Europe’s largest refugee camp, burned to the ground on 9 September 
2020. I visited Lesvos in the aftermath to document the building on a new contain-
ment centre and begin mapping out how this locale fits into broader narratives of 
technological experimentation. After the fire, thousands of people were sequestered 
on a barren stretch of road (Lavella, 2020) without food or water, tear-gassed (BBC 
News, 2020), and then herded into a new camp hastily built on the grounds of an old 
shooting range on a windswept peninsula (Solomon, 2020). This rocky outcropping 
is the newest site of containment on Europe’s borders, one housing over 9000 peo-
ple displaced during a global pandemic, with no idea when or how they will be able 
to leave.
However, instead of opening the island camps and coming up with a meaningful 
plan for years of inaction, the EU’s new Migration Pact explicitly doubles down on 
containment and border security, opening the door to increasingly draconian tools 
of surveillance using new technologies – including the use of facial recognition – 
not just on adults but also on minors (European Commission, 2020). More and 
more, violent uses of technology work to push European borders farther afield 
(Howden et al., 2019), contributing to policies of border externalisation (Hernàndez, 
2020), making Europe’s migration issues someone else’s problem. These policies 
have direct and dire consequences  – drownings in the Mediterranean (Trilling, 
2020), pushbacks to Libya (Kingsley, 2020) and Turkey, including using floating 
tents (Keady-Tabbal & Mann, 2020), and years-long detention in decrepit camps 
like Moria and other sites on islands like Samos, Chios, and Kos.
Frontier countries like Greece, ‘Europe’s Shield’ (Jamieson et al., 2020), act as 
testing grounds for new technologies and surveillance mechanisms. In October 
2019, new legal rules were adopted as regards the deployment of drones by the 
Hellenic Police (Presidential Decree 98/2019), including the use of drones to moni-
tor migration in border regions. Groups like Homo Digitalis in Greece claim that the 
new rules do not address the challenges arising from the applicable data protection 
legislation and have filed an open letter to the Ministry of Citizen Protection request-
ing more information about the deployment of drones by the Hellenic Police (Homo 
Digitalis, 2020). Drones, along with cameras and various other surveillance tech-
nologies are also being used and tested along the Evros land border with Turkey, in 
an increasing push to militarise migration management (Human Rights 360, 2020; 
also, Kalafatis, 2020; also Gatopoulos & Kantouris, 2021).
In September 2020, Frontex also announced that it was piloting a new aerostat 
maritime surveillance system (Frontex, 2020b), using Greece as a testing ground. 
The current pandemic conditions must also not be discounted, as they will likely 
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expedite and exacerbate the turn to technological solutions at the border. We are 
already seeing the border industry pushing for increased adoption of ‘contactless 
biometrics’ for ‘regular’ travellers as a way of stopping contagion (PR Newswire, 
2020). Frontex in particular has been clear in its messaging to position itself as an 
agency apt at both controlling migration as well as the spread of Covid-19. According 
to a May 2020 press release, ‘if we cannot control the external borders, we cannot 
control the spread of pandemics in Europe. Frontex plays a key role in ensuring 
effective protection of the external borders of the European Union not only against 
cross-border crime but also against health threats’ (Frontex, 2020a). The EU contin-
ues to make its priorities clear: containment, surveillance, and technosolutionism at 
the expense of human rights (Molnar, 2021).
The appetite for migration management technologies remains present in Greece, 
with the Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum co-hosting and supporting the 
World Border Security Congress in the fall of 2021, a gathering of public and pri-
vate actors eager to address ‘threats’ such as ‘ISIS threatens to send 500,000 
migrants to Europe’ and ‘Migrants and refugees streaming into Europe from Africa, 
the Middle East, and South Asia’.12 And as recently as December 2020, tech giant 
Palantir proudly announced a partnership with the Greek government, stating: ‘Our 
partnership with the Greek government was borne out of necessity once the pan-
demic began, and we look forward to broadening it for years to come’ (Business 
Wire, 2020). It is currently unclear what exactly this partnership entails but it bears 
to remember that Palantir is the same company that has been facilitating ICE deten-
tions and deportations at the US-Mexico border (Frenkel, 2018) and has been impli-
cated in a host of other human rights abuses (Hemmadi, 2019; O’Brien, 2020).
The use of technology is never neutral  – it reinscribes the way that powerful 
actors make decisions that affect thousands of people. Along with Big Tech, big 
money is also involved in the management of borders, with private security compa-
nies making major inroads (Privacy International, n.d.) with lucrative contracts pro-
cured by governments for shiny new tech experiments presented as a way to 
strengthen border security. These technological experiments also play up the ‘us’ vs 
‘them’ mentality at the centre of migration management policy. Instead of long- 
term viable redistribution of resources across the EU and timely processing of peo-
ple’s asylum, turning to techno-solutionism (Molnar & Naranjo, 2020) and migration 
surveillance will only exacerbate deterrence mechanisms already so deeply embed-
ded in the EU’s migration strategy.
Various people in our interviews on Lesvos were concerned about proposed 
screening and surveillance mechanisms to keep people contained, tracked, and 
managed and the normalisation of surveillance in the aftermath of the Moria fire. 
Yet no one was clear on exactly how the next few months would shape up, particu-
larly regarding increasingly technological incursions, data collection, and surveil-
lance. However, the planned rollout in 2021 of so-called Multi-Purpose Reception 
and Identification Centres (MPRICs) on the islands of Lesvos, Samos, Leros, Chios, 
12 See provisional programme at https://world-border-congress.com/
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and Kos all seem to indicate a turn to both containment and surveillance, creating 
what are essentially closed prison camps complemented by ‘camera surveillance 
with motion analysis algorithms monitoring the behaviour and movement of centre 
residents’ (Europe Must Act, 2021; Petridi, 2021). Clearly, migration management 
through technology is firmly on the agenda.
Given the far-reaching and high-risk nature of these technological experiments, 
the unique context of migration should be the central consideration when analysing 
which human rights should be taken into consideration when exploring new tech-
nologies, given the very real risks to life, liberty, and security, as well as heightened 
privacy considerations, particularly during an unprecedented global pandemic. Yet 
states can justify technological experiments in migration control precisely because 
migrants are not able to exercise the same rights as citizens and because they are 
seen as a useful tool through which to exercise powers of sovereignty in an increas-
ingly destabilised world.
3.6  Big Tech and Big Profit in the Privatisation 
of Migration Management
Ultimately, the primary purpose of the technologies used in migration management 
is to track, identify, and control those crossing borders – and now doing so in the 
middle of a global health crisis. The issues around emerging technologies in the 
management of migration are not just about the inherent use of technology but 
rather about how it is used and by whom, with states and private actors setting the 
stage for what is possible and which priorities matter. The data-gathering inherent 
in the development of these technologies also includes the expansion of existing 
mass-scale databases that underpin these practices to sensitive data, especially bio-
metrics. Such data and technology systems provide an enabling infrastructure for 
many automated decision-making projects with potentially harmful implications. 
The development and deployment of migration surveillance technologies is ulti-
mately about decision-making by powerful actors on communities with few 
resources and mechanisms of redress, which becomes justified by the state of emer-
gency such as a global pandemic.
Politics also cannot be discounted, as migration management is inherently a 
political exercise. Migration data is already being politicised to support greater 
interventions in defence of threatened national sovereignty (Scheel & Ustek-Spilda, 
2018), reinforcing politics of exclusion. The state’s ultimate power to decide who 
may enter and under what conditions (ibid.) is bolstered by ongoing beliefs in tech-
nological impartiality. However, there is an inherent tension between the claimed 
prerogative of nation-states over sovereignty and the malleable nature of technol-
ogy. In its fluidity, technology is inherently oppositional to borders, and by exten-
sion sovereignty. Indeed, oftentimes it impinges on the very definition of ‘humanness’ 
in the digital era (Zureik & Hindle, 2004). Ultimately, the primary purpose of the 
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technologies used in migration management is to track, identify, and control those 
crossing borders. The unequal distribution of benefits that accrue in technological 
development work to create monopolies of knowledge and consolidate power and 
authority vested in the sovereign state. These monopolies exist because there is no 
unified global regulatory regime governing the use of new technologies, creating 
laboratories for high-risk experiments with profound impacts on people’s lives.
Even before the pandemic, the human body itself increasingly became the 
embodiment of progressively violent and discriminatory border regimes. For exam-
ple, in March 2020, the US announced that it would begin collecting DNA samples 
from hundreds of thousands of migrants apprehended along the US-Mexico border 
(Hauslohner, 2020). This practice will dramatically expand a federal database of 
individual genetic information used by law enforcement.13 Migrant rights groups in 
Mexico have also reported the use of digital technologies to spread misinformation 
that stigmatises migrants as criminals or carriers of diseases (Cadena, 2020), includ-
ing Covid-19. The stigmatisation that coordinated digital misinformation cam-
paigns spurred hostility towards migrants, including the risk of violence against 
them. There are increasing reports of harassment against migrant rights defenders 
and journalists covering migrant caravans in Central America, Mexico, and the US, 
including digital threats, searches of digital devices14 and even electronic surveil-
lance by authorities in the US and Mexico (Jones et al., 2019).
Growing anti-migrant xenophobic sentiment, justification of surveillance and 
online media monitoring under the guise of security and public health, and the rise 
of extreme right and neo-fascist groups or political organisations globally impacts 
how migration management technologies function. From the Proud Boys in the US 
to the autocratic administration of Victor Orban in Hungary to the Maduro regime 
in Venezuela, people on the move and migrants have been linked to threats to 
national sovereignty (The World, 2019) that must be stopped at all costs – and most 
recently explicitly connected to the spread of the Covid-19 virus and characterised 
as ‘vermin’ and ‘biological weapons’ (Cohen, 2018).15. Far-right groups have been 
engaged in violence again migrants around the world, including in the US, mainland 
Europe, and Canada. In border frontiers such as Greece, far-right extremism and 
anti-migrant sentiments reached boiling point, with the island of Lesbos becoming 
an epicentre for extreme right groups across the EU (Fallon, 2020). Most recently, 
ties have been discovered between far-right extremists and companies like Clearview 
13 See Privacy International’s legal submissions, https://privacyinternational.org/legal-action/
submissions.
14 4 See Frontline Defenders, Red TDT, LIS-Justicia en Movimiento & PRAMI-Universidad 
Iberoamericana. Defenders beyond borders: migrant rights defenders under attack in Central 
America, Mexico and the United States. September 2019. Available at: https://www.front-
linedefenders.org/sites/default/files/frontline_defenders_mexico_english_v2.pdf and also Privacy 
International submissions.
15 Europe has also been exporting technology to China to aid in the repression of the Uighurs and 
to assist with surveillance in the Chinese concentration camps in Xingang province (see 
Manancourt 2020).
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AI and Palantir, which are responsible for the development and deployment of facial 
recognition technologies and algorithmic decision-making tools used for the deten-
tion and deportation of migrants (O’Brien, 2020). These groups have also been bla-
tantly calling for the establishment of so-called ‘deportation squads’ using 
algorithms to identify potential targets (ibid.). The implications of Big Tech giants 
and corporate interests in these dangerous anti-migrant narratives is a very troubling 
development, all the more so because public-private partnerships lie at the heart of 
the development and deployment of migration management technologies.
The lack of adequate technical capacity within government and the public sector 
can lead to potentially inappropriate over-reliance on the private sector. Adopting 
emerging and experimental tools without in-house talent capable of understanding, 
evaluating, and managing these technologies is irresponsible and downright danger-
ous, as the companies and corporations hold the balance of power when determin-
ing what technology is developed and deployed, and subsequently procured by 
governments. Private sector actors have an independent responsibility to make sure 
technologies that they develop do not violate international human rights and domes-
tic legislation. Yet much of technological development occurs in so-called black 
boxes, where intellectual property laws and proprietary considerations shield the 
public from fully understanding how the technology operates. Powerful actors can 
easily hide behind intellectual property legislation or various other corporate shields 
to launder their responsibility and create a vacuum of accountability.
These practices also give rise to the Border Industrial Complex (Miller, 2018) – 
the confluence of border policing, militarisation, and financial interest. States are 
seeking to leave people on the move, refugees, and undocumented people in particu-
lar beyond the duties and responsibilities enshrined in law through an overreliance 
on the private sector to ensure technological experimentation occurs outside of sov-
ereign responsibility.16 The growing role of the private sector in the governance of 
new technologies highlights the movement away from state responsibility to create 
governance structures in accordance with domestic and international principles 
under guise of proprietary technology, private interests, and discretion.
Increasingly, private companies are setting the migration control agenda. 
Whether through the automation of immigration and refugee applications, 
AI-powered ‘lie detectors’ at borders, or drone surveillance of refugee boats, the 
private sector is an integral player in the management of migration. States and gov-
ernment departments over-rely on private actors to develop and deploy technologies 
used to control migration. As a result, government liability and accountability are 
watered down and shifted to the private sector, where the legally-enforceable rights 
that allow individuals to challenge governments may not exist (see Statewatch, 
16 See for example the Canadian Government’s procurement for a so-called ‘Artificial Intelligence 
Solution,’ for various immigration processes, directly calling on the private sector to be the driver 
of migration management technologies: Public Works and Government Services Canada, ‘Artificial 
Intelligence Solution (B8607-180311/A),’ Tender Notice (13 April 2018, amended 23 May 2018) 
https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-EE-017-33462, accessed 25 July 
2019; also Molnar and Gill (2018).
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2020). People on the move get caught in the middle, leading to grave human rights 
abuses and infringements on fundamental freedoms. The opaque, private technolo-
gies deployed at border zones to control migration desperately need to be regulated. 
Yet, the creation of legal black holes in migration management technologies is very 
deliberate to allow for the creation of opaque zones of technological experimenta-
tion that would not be allowed to occur in other spaces (among others, Molnar & 
Naranjo, 2020). While we are able to imagine mobilising around extreme issues 
such as the banning of killer robots in armed conflict, the grey spaces of migration 
management technology remain largely uncontested.
3.7  Concluding Remarks: Surveillance Panacea or Safety 
and Health for All?
They really have no respect for us, not today and not ever. – Negasi, living without status in 
Brussels, Belgium
While technology can offer the promise of novel solutions for an unprecedented 
global crisis, Covid-led innovation should not unfairly target refugees and people on 
the move, racialised communities, Indigenous communities, and other marginalised 
groups, or make discriminatory inferences that can lead to detention, family separa-
tion, and other irreparable harms. While often presented with a lot of promise, too 
often technological tools easily become tools of oppression and surveillance, deny-
ing people agency and dignity, and contributing to a global climate that is increas-
ingly more hostile to people on the move. The pandemic is already being used to 
curtail access to people living in informal settlements or securitised refugee camps 
on Greek islands and detention centres for undocumented populations across Europe 
and throughout the world. However, instead of increased tracking and surveillance, 
a redistribution of resources, dignified living conditions, and access to medical care 
are paramount to stopping the spread of the pandemic.
As this chapter has highlighted, drawing on conversations with people on the 
move in Belgium and Greece, affected communities must be directly involved in 
technological development and discussions around proposed interventions, shaping 
and driving the conversation, not consulted as an afterthought or in a tokenising 
extractive way While conversations around the ethics of AI are taking place, ethics 
do not go far enough. What is needed is a sharper focus on oversight mechanisms 
grounded in fundamental human rights and context-specific accountability that rec-
ognises the particular lived experiences of people on the move and their experiences 
in the time of exception that is a global pandemic in an increasingly securitised and 
surveilled world.
Yet there is also a hopeful promise in the proliferation of new technologies in 
migration management. Policymakers, academia, and the public are being forced to 
reckon with fundamental normative ideas around what constitutes intelligence, how 
to manage and regulate new systems of cognition, and who should be at the table 
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when designing and deploying new tools that can be used to either dismantle or 
reinforce the status quo. Culture, politics, institutions, and technology all iteratively 
shape one another. Ultimately, technology is a social construct (Franklin, 1990), a 
mirror to reflect the positives and negatives inherent in our societies, forcing us to 
rethink ideas of privilege and power in the current global crisis that is reshaping our 
world at every level. It remains to be seen whether the current global push towards 
fervent technological innovation will result in robust global governance, centred on 
the experiences of people on the move, or whether it will further dehumanise people 
on the move as they are increasingly having to contend with the sharp edges of 
harmful technological development in the time of a global health crisis.
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In the midst of surging sickness in Spring 2020, a typical newspaper headline read, 
‘“We’re Ignored Completely.” Amid the Pandemic, Undocumented Immigrants are 
Essential But Exposed’ (Villa, 2020). Migrants who travelled to the United States to 
pick crops, scrub floors, stock warehouses, and tend to elders became ‘heroes’ for 
performing necessary labour  – unless they were surplus bodies crammed into 
prison-like detention waystations before being deported for the crime of arriving 
without proper papers. They were not alone. From detention centres to refugee 
camps, from fields to homes, migrant workers worldwide faced deadly vulnerability 
during the Covid-19 crisis, made more virulent through racism and anti-immigrant 
nationalisms. Countries sought to close their borders to keep out disease. The pan-
demic intensified states of precarity, especially for undocumented, transgender, and 
gender non-conforming individuals and those from racially-othered groups. Women 
among them found new difficulties in meeting double obligations: to earn a living 
and care for households, both for family requiring daily tending and for those 
dependent on remittances sent back to countries of origin. Especially among those 
labelled as ‘essential workers’, the lack of protective equipment and labour rights 
put them on the frontline of exposure. But domestic and home care workers, meat-
packers, fieldhands, and others in the US stepped out of the shadows to demand 
inclusion in social assistance, occupational health and safety laws, and other state 
benefits. They could not rely on the state even as they called for recognition and 
rights. So they developed mutual aid and coalitional activism to advance their dig-
nity and improve living as well as working conditions.
With a focus on the US, for over two centuries a major destination for migrants, 
this chapter historicises the recent hardships and the organising of (im)migrant 
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workers. The Covid-19 spring is not the first time that state and society blamed 
immigrants for public health or economic crisis: these nativist outbreaks include 
anti-Asian uprisings on the West coast in the late nineteenth century, Mexican 
deportations in the early 1930s, immigrant exclusion from the New Deal welfare 
state, and periodic onslaughts since. A historical perspective shows that the policies 
of Donald J. Trump were not an aberration, but part of a national pattern of racial 
differentiation with gendered inflections. Vulnerability, however, is only part of the 
story. Workers remained resilient in the face of the hidden enemy of Covid-19 and 
the all too present assaults by employers and agents of the state, the latter who 
would exploit, detain and/or deport rather than protect those who grow our food and 
assist other people in their activities of daily life. Vulnerability takes on a new mean-
ing with the recognition that we are all in this together.
4.2  Blaming Migrants: The Vulnerable Past
Understandings of whiteness, that designated only Northern Europeans and their 
descendants as fully ‘white,’ led to classifying most migrants as alien, especially if 
they also were poor. In speaking of the ‘Chinese virus’ and the ‘Kung-flu’, President 
Trump set the tone for hate speech toward Asians in the US, against which there 
were over 2100 reported incidents – including physical assaults and workplace dis-
crimination  – between March and July 2020. Asian American citizens were not 
exempt; they heard shouts of ‘Take your disease that’s ruining our country and go 
home’ (Donaghue, 2020). The nation also listened to the President blame migrants 
for a June 2020 spike in cases in the US along the border shared with Mexico – 
despite lowered numbers of crossings (Farley, 2020). Other officials followed, like 
Florida’s Republican Governor Ron DeSantis, pointing to ‘Hispanic’ farmworkers 
as the culprit for the surge in Covid-19 in the Sunshine state (De Loera-Brust, 2020). 
This association of non-whites with disease, the Chinese with a killer virus, and 
Mexicans with viral spread, derived from linking citizenship to whiteness, in which 
even citizens from designated ethnic or racial groups appeared as foreign. In 1944, 
the federal government gained the power to reject on the basis of ‘public health 
threats’ any individual who sought to come into the country. Nearly 80 years later 
the administration would attempt to weaponise that tool against asylum seekers, 
temporary migrants, and long-time denizens alike (Chishti & Pierce, 2020).
In early America, migrant workers disproportionately suffered from cholera and 
other airborne killers. Nativists accused the Irish in the 1830s of bringing infection 
into the US along with themselves. During the first great wave of immigration after 
the Civil War, when 23.5 million people arrived between 1880 and the 1920s, the 
medicalisation of control classified them as spreaders rather than victims of patho-
gens. When their numbers soared at the end of the nineteenth century, Jews were 
cast as carriers of ‘the tailor’s disease’ or tuberculosis. Italians, it was charged, 
sparked a polio outbreak in New York City because of family gatherings and sick-
bed practices (Kraut, 2010; Moloney, 2012, 105–133). Racism and fear of 
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economic competition came together in frenzies of anti-immigrant actions among 
public officials as well as among workingmen fearful of losing their jobs to lower- 
waged ‘coolie’ labour (Mink, 1990; Saxton, 1971). As a North Carolina health offi-
cial testified before Congress in 1914, ‘Asia was the “fountain” of the “most 
destructive pestilence” in recorded history’ (Shah, 2001, 258) – a persistent ‘yellow 
peril’ that the Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan seemed to confirm.
Indeed, the new pandemic was not the first time that the public feared the trans-
port of disease; the idea that plague came from other countries, brought by com-
mercial ships and trains or by people carried by such transport, has a long genealogy 
(Molina, 2006, 86). Authorities claimed that an especially deadly smallpox arrived 
from China; local officials instituted quarantines of passenger ships much like was 
found with cruise liners during the discovery and spread of Covid-19 (Shah, 2001, 
86; Robles, 2020). Embarking at Ellis Island, Southern and Eastern Europeans, con-
sidered at the time as not quite white, feared being sent back; medical inspectors 
scrutinised their bodies for signs of trachoma as well as tuberculosis – the concern 
was that they would become a public charge, dependent on state support, as well as 
a host for microbes (Kraut, 1994). New York’s public health investigators were not 
alone; those in cities worldwide saw in racial difference a vector for infection. A 
tendency toward disease among colonised peoples, European governors contended, 
interfered with imperial projects to modernise those presumed backward and impose 
Western notions of gender, the work ethic, and civic order (Anderson, 2006; Shah, 
2001, 21; Kaplan, 1998; Rafael, 1995).
The deadly 1918 ‘Spanish’ flu brought a rush to judgment. Denver officials, for 
example, blamed the culture of Italians for spreading illness. They charged that 
Italians not only ignored public health pronouncements but continued to visit indis-
posed relatives rather than maintain separation  – an allegation lobbed against 
Latino/as a century later. Disproportionate deaths from the 1918–1919 flu were 
among those immigrants living in crowded conditions who had to go out to work. 
These individuals were already malnourished and, as former peasants, had less pre-
vious exposure to similar viruses. Many were young adults, the demographic profile 
of the majority who died (Kraut, 2010; Reyes-Velarde, 2020).
Similar discourses framed newly-freed Black men and women as germ transmit-
ters to white homes in the South and during the Great Migration to other regions of 
the country. The domestic servant, the belief went, would contaminate the white 
home, especially from syphilis (Hunter, 1997; May, 2011, 165–172; Urban, 2017). 
This unease with the intimate labour of the servant, whether Black women or 
Chinese ‘houseboys’, denied the dangers awaiting the worker who entered domestic 
workplaces where she or he could be exposed to sickness (Urban, 2017). Instead, 
the public fixated on the hazards from racial others: it envisioned laundries as super-
spreaders of tuberculosis and other airborne ailments from the supposed ‘practice of 
Chinese workers preparing clothes for ironing by spraying water from their mouths 
onto the clothes’ (Shah, 2001, 98). Images of sweatshop labour conveying germs to 
unwitting consumers of tenement-made goods encompassed Eastern European 
immigrants, especially Jews, in New York City, no less than Chinese, Filipino/a, and 
other Asian workers on the West coast and, a century later, women in the Global 
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South at the bottom of commodity supply chains who sewed cheap fashion for 
wealthier markets (Shah, 2001, 232–233; Boris, 1994).
Historians Nayan Shah and Natalia Molina have illuminated the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century designation of Chinatowns and barrios as ‘rotten spot[s]’ 
that, as a Los Angeles’s health officer put it, poison ‘the air we breathe and…the 
water we drink’ (Molina, 2006, 1). Doctors and journalists crafted voyeuristic 
accounts of Chinatown as exotic, dissipated, and unnatural. They dwelled on the 
sights and smells, including cloaks and queues of men judged as unmanly. They 
compared those residing in basements and other darkened areas to animals, carriers 
of disease like rats and pigs. Like migrant workers elsewhere crammed into single- 
sex housing, including present-day employer-provided barracks, Chinese men suf-
fered from poor ventilation and inadequate sanitation (Fernandez, 2020; Shah, 
2001; White, 2014). Justification for public health intervention came from assess-
ment of environmental conditions that sensationalised ‘dormitory pens’ without 
adequate ventilation or waste disposal as a product of ‘the moral degradation of 
opium smoking, gambling, and prostitution’ rather than the results of discrimina-
tory housing (Shah, 2001, 52–53). Solutions focused on the worker rather than the 
conditions they found themselves subject to. Thus, an 1854 investigation in San 
Francisco recommended ‘removing from our midst the germs of pestilence’ by 
eliminating Chinese labourers (Shah, 2001, 41). Along with most cities, San 
Francisco had not yet developed an adequate infrastructure for population growth, 
which had much to do with the overflowing of waste (Shah, 2001, 73–76).
Migrants defied norms of respectability. Such understandings hinged on being 
part of heteronormative families. Most Chinese men were ‘bachelors’, lacking the 
wealth to bring a wife into the country to compensate for a scarcity of available mar-
riage partners following barriers enacted by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. 
They practiced what Shah calls queer domesticities, arrangements that included all 
male living groups but also female-headed households networked together (Shah, 
2001, 110). The turn to commercialized sex or same-sex relations brought oppro-
brium and fear of further contagion, including venereal disease and leprosy to be 
passed to white families by domestic servants as well as prostitutes.
Powerful racial labelling encouraged unequal treatment of those castigated as 
health risks. There was a discrimination loop, with health policy based on stereo-
typical distinctions reinforcing racial difference. Los Angeles passed ordinances to 
contain street vending, a means of Chinese livelihood. Other measures forced laun-
derers to petition for remaining in newly-zoned residential areas. Only intervention 
from the Chinese Council and the merchant-run Chinese Six Companies led to a 
temporary reprieve from this burdensome regulation (Molina, 2006, 31–43). In 
seeking office, politicians weaponised ‘discourses of racial hygiene’, as Shah puts 
it. Particularly effective were the xenophobic rants of the Workingmen’s Party of 
California in the period right before Chinese Exclusion (Shah, 2001, 55; 
Saxton, 1971).
Economic health and public health thus became intertwined with the expansion 
of cities. That the Chinese threatened the health of white city dwellers justified lev-
elling Chinatown; that white business interests owned the property that Chinese 
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inhabited meant that Chinatown remained standing as a potent symbol of pestilence 
which the powerful could rely on to foster economic and social discrimination. 
During epidemics, business had multiple interests, acting in contradictory ways; 
some quickly reduced hours while others, like in 2020, resisted shutdowns (Webster, 
2020). The actuality was always far more complex than the rhetoric. Removal meant 
hospitalisation outside of the city. Rather than pay for treating Chinese in public 
hospitals by using a state tax on port arrivals passed for such purposes, those who 
fell ill had to rely on the philanthropy of ‘respectable’ co-ethnics  – the kind of 
mutual aid still compensating for exclusion from public help (Shah, 2001, 43–44).
By the turn of the century, the San Francisco Board of Health began to eliminate 
substandard housing in Chinatown by expanding surveillance to rid the city of ‘nui-
sances’ (Shah, 2001, 96–97). Then it was hit with a bout of bubonic plague in 1900. 
The city quarantined the entire Chinese section of the city, targeting those deemed 
most likely to become infected rather than eliminating rodent carriers of the disease. 
Resembling the reaction of the Trump administration, businessmen and politicians 
worried about the economic consequences of this partial ‘shut-down’ rather than 
about trampling the rights of the Chinese, who in turn resisted inoculation with an 
unproven vaccine and rejected the diagnosis of plague. Recent migrants and settled 
immigrants alike were suspicious of public health pronouncements, believing that 
the authorities were out to poison them through vaccination. The courts sided with 
Chinese merchant plaintiffs in determining that such a district- wide quarantine 
overstepped the police powers of the state, but deaths continued until new elected 
officials undertook effective sanitary management, including demolition of con-
demned buildings, that then led to renewed business confidence. It took 4 years to 
quell the epidemic. By the next one, scientists understood the causes more fully as 
they exhorted the general public to clean their environs to get rid of rats that carried 
this scourge. Nonetheless, the association of disease with the Chinese immigrant 
worker persisted (Shah, 2001, 162–209).
The Chinese Exclusion Act reminds us that racialised immigrant restrictions 
developed to curtail populations, while allowing those with assets, such as mer-
chants, their wives, and children, to enter (Lee, 2003). It further prohibited naturali-
sation or the obtaining of citizenship among those already in the US. The Chinese 
were not the only targets of immigration restriction. From the first naturalisation act 
in 1790 that limited potential citizenship to whites only, US immigration policy 
embedded racialised gendered assumptions. Treatment of the Chinese illustrates 
how these measures interfered with family formation, as with the 1875 Page Law 
that excluded Asian women ‘imported’ for prostitution and the Exclusion Act that 
made exceptions for elites. With the 1917 literacy act and the quota acts of the 
1920s, lawmakers sought to lessen, if not end, the entry of Eastern and Southern 
Europeans, like Italians and Russian Jews – though loopholes existed for citizens to 
bring in domestic servants. While 1920s national quota acts disproportionately 
admitted Northern Europeans, there was no explicit bar to Mexicans or other 
migrants from the Americas. It was believed that they would return home after earn-
ing dollars after a season’s labour (Gardner, 2005; Luibhéid, 2002).
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Like the Chinese, Mexican immigrants, often disproportionately male, faced 
blame for deadly outbreaks due to crowded and filthy living conditions. Declared 
one New Orleans doctor, ‘[E]very individual hailing from Mexico should be 
regarded as potentially pathogenic’ (Molina, 2006, 63). Thought to be temporary 
sojourners even though some families dated their presence to before the annexation 
of California, Mexicans had become a primary labour force in Los Angeles by the 
second decade of the twentieth century. No laws restricted their arrival in contrast to 
Chinese exclusion and the 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement with Japan. California 
‘Cubic Air Acts’ and bars on Japanese land ownership further curtailed Asian migra-
tion (Molina, 2006, 9, 55). Mexicans, it was believed, were not the economic threat 
posed by ‘entrepreneurial’ Japanese farmers, who crossed gender norms by sending 
their women into the fields. Racial science designated Mexicans as physiologically 
suited for stoop labour.
Biopolitics could cut more than one way. On the one hand, authorities attempted 
to improve Mexican health for the benefit of the white community. Border crossing 
at El Paso, Texas, subjected second-class travellers to delousing and vaccination 
(Molina, 2006, 60). Typhus cases near Los Angeles in 1916 led the local health 
department to ‘campaign against filth and lack of personal hygiene’ in Mexican ‘vil-
lages’ and railroad worker camps (Molina, 2006, 61–62). Officials sought to 
‘enforce bodily cleanliness’, including delousing Mexican school children (Molina, 
2006, 64). Despite evidence of substandard workplace housing, the Board of Health 
would fix the behaviour of those subject to company housing, forcing them to 
undergo disinfectant baths under a military-like supervision. New hires had to be 
quarantined to curtail any outbreaks. All of this intervention was to protect the 
larger, white community. While not subject to policing, with Covid-19 exposed 
workers were to self-quarantine for the benefit of the dominant society.
A complaint conveyed to the Mexican consul prefigures worker protest a century 
later. Newly arrived railworkers explained, ‘This wage they set is not enough for the 
nourishment of one person. Health comes from this and these precautions are the 
basis for achieving sanitation…What we need is liberty and the opportunity to 
achieve it. We need a bathroom in each section of camp and that the toilets that are 
now next to the sleeping quarters be moved’. They added, ‘The Mexican race is not 
different form the American race and one should not think that disease takes hold in 
only our bodies. We are all human and they should not apply this procedure [delous-
ing baths] only to Mexicans’ (Molina, 2006, 67). The racialisation of epidemics, 
however, led to selective intervention, so that the porousness of the border tightened 
by using mandatory health inspections. Subsequent ‘clean-up’ campaigns served as 
projects in Americanisation to maintain a low-waged workforce (Molina, 2006, 
71–73). Other quarantines, as against bubonic and pneumonic plague in 1924, 
sealed off neighbourhoods inhabited by Mexicans but let industrial workers leave 
for jobs outside the cordoned area (Molina, 2006, 85).
Los Angeles Anglos began to recognise, as would their counterparts during 
Covid-19, that immigrant workers ‘are here to say…but whether we are to let them 
live here in unhealthy conditions and ruin the appearance of our cities depends on 
[us]’ (Molina, 2006, 75). Nonetheless, urban health centres established to improve 
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Mexican health focused not on prevention of illness but rather on lowering infant 
mortality. Compensating for a supposed inadequacy of Mexican women proved 
easier than raising wages or providing healthful workspaces and homes. But the 
lack of quality services tended to reinforce existing inequalities through differential 
treatment much as the rail workers earlier had complained. Available services at 
best encompassed urban areas and rarely covered waste disposal and water avail-
ability on the periphery or outside of the city. Social workers labelled Mexicans, as 
sociologist Cybelle Fox has documented, ‘an especially dependent and undeserving 
group’ (Fox, 2012, 73).
Such thinking that Mexicans as non-citizens deserved no public relief set the 
stage for mass deportation during the early 1930s. Congress had authorised the 
Border Patrol in 1924 to enforce the National Origins Act of that year (Hernandez, 
2010). When the Great Depression hit, Mexicans turned into undesirable surplus 
people. Of some 2.5 million in 1932, it was estimated that 2 million lacked work 
(Molina, 2006, 126). They became a ‘brown peril’ not only because of their culture 
but also due to perceptions of their biology. Eugenic thinking led officials to seek to 
rid them from the body politic. Despite growth in communicable disease, previously 
available public health clinics were to refuse treatment without payment. Officials 
rejected public aid because it was thought to merely subsidise big agriculture and 
other employers  – and because Mexicans were undeserving ‘diseased’ others 
(Molina, 2006, 118–126, 129; Fox, 2012, 80). Molina concludes, ‘severe financial 
constraints and widely accepted constructions of Mexicans as a large, diseased, 
charity-seeking population combined to make deportations and so-called voluntary 
repatriations a cornerstone of immigration policy’ (Molina, 2006, 136). Los 
Angeles’s charity hospital turned into a site for capture as it cooperated with depor-
tation agents, reinforcing the reluctance of immigrants to seek medical attention 
that appeared again during the 2020 pandemic when undocumented workers stayed 
away from doctors (Chishti & Pierce, 2020).
Public health and other government agents skirted the law, manoeuvring around 
the formal federal hearings that were to be used against those determined to have 
become a public charge within 5  years of arrival. Los Angeles went straight to 
deportation (Fox, 2010, 124–135). The cities of Detroit, Michigan, and Gary, 
Indiana, also sponsored removal, abetted by local social workers, when the auto 
factories and steel mills laid off workers. Nationally, of the 54,000 people deported 
between 1930–1932, 44% were Mexicans, while another 44,000 voluntarily exited, 
euphemistically called repatriation. By 1935, up to 40% of the Mexican population 
had left (Fox, 2010, 127, 182–187). The combination of racial stigmatisation and 
economic crisis pushed migrant workers out of the country even as the numbers 
seeking entrance plummeted, a pattern similar to declines during Trump’s presi-
dency with its active discouragement of immigration and ending of asylum for those 
stuck at the Mexican border (Chishti & Pierce, 2020; Friedman, 2020).
Rather than assist migrant workers, the New Deal built into its overhaul of social 
provision and nationalising of labour standards distinctions between citizens and 
non-citizens, men and women, whites and other racialised groups, and the old and 
young. The vast majority of African American, Mexican American, and immigrant 
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women could neither rely on their men’s access or their own labour histories to be 
covered by unemployment insurance or pensions and found themselves forced to 
accept either low-waged jobs or try to qualify for public assistance. There was no 
mandate to provide any aid to those not citizens in the first place. Citizen migrant 
workers, who moved from state to state, could access New Deal programmes 
through special camps for transients, but after 1935 state residency requirements 
restricted eligibility. Some landowners relied on government relief programmes to 
carry over hirelings until the next season; in this regard they prefigured the behav-
iour of some employers in 2020 who wished to maintain their workforce. Still, dur-
ing the Great Depression, local elites discriminated against Blacks and Mexicans in 
distributing relief. Landlords also replaced Anglo white tenants with African 
Americans and Mexicans, whom they forced to sign away government payments as 
a condition of employment. Such labour practices intensified the racialisation of 
farm labour and lowered standards of living, fanning anti-immigration and anti- 
Black sentiments among white and Anglo workers in the South and Southwest 
(Boris, 2008).
To meet agricultural labour shortages during World War II, the Bracero Program 
emerged as a foreign guestworker programme facilitated through cooperation with 
Mexico. Through its auspices, local landowners would contract fieldhands. It 
brought Mexican nationals to California, Arizona, and southwestern fields and 
Caribbean migrants to the East Coast, including Florida (Hahamovitch, 1997, 
2011). At border stations men underwent invasive screenings; one former ‘bracero’, 
as they were designated, recalled, ‘Supposedly we were flea-bitten and germ- 
ridden’. As historian Deborah Cohen concludes, ‘they crossed at a time when para-
sites signified dirt, disease, and a life without access to running water…they were 
flagged as potential carriers of disease and, in the process, linked to racialized pov-
erty’ (Cohen, 2011, 99). After reauthorisation in 1946, Congress removed such 
guestworkers from social assistance and state protection by privatising their living 
arrangements. The ‘bracero’ without a contract became a ‘wetback’ vulnerable to 
deportation for speaking up, striking, or malingering on the job. When skipping out 
of contracts, they lost the protection of Mexican consuls. These officials served as 
their bargaining agents until 1954 amendments to the Migrant Labor Agreement 
undercut any Mexican control over labour supply and, hence, working conditions. 
Only after a coalition of liberals and trade unions won the end of the programme in 
1964 were agricultural workers able to gain inclusion under the nation’s wage and 
hour law (Boris, 2008).
Other migrants were not as lucky. Household workers remained outside of labour 
laws into the twenty-first century, including the 1970 Occupational Safety and 
Health Act. Home care aides only gained wage and hour protections during the 
Obama administration. Private household workers still have no right to collective 
bargaining (Boris, 2019). The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 
1996, which reformed ‘welfare’, left to the states whether to extend Temporary Aid 
to Needy Families to immigrants, but again barred new arrivals from receiving mon-
ies for 5 years (Mink, 1998, 62–63, 150n28). The accompanying Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 incorporated two significant 
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practices: it required applicants for visas to provide proof of vaccination for com-
municable diseases and mandated that family sponsors certify their ability to sup-
port the entrant least they become a burden on local governments (Fragomen Jr, 
1997; Fujiwara, 2008). The racialised politics of exclusion persisted when it came 
to placing migrants under protective laws.
4.3  Cruel Treatments: Detained Migrants 
and Essential Workers
In keeping with its white nationalism, the Trump administration initially sought to 
seal the nation’s borders from the pandemic as if only non-citizens and visitors 
could carry the virus from abroad. Beginning in late January through March 2020, 
it banned entry of non-citizens from China, then Iran, and finally Europe. It used the 
virus as an opportunity to intensify its anti-immigration stance by ending Temporary 
Protected Status for Haitians, El Salvadorans, and others who had fled to the US in 
the midst of civil unrest in their countries decades before, while it halted granting 
asylum to new seekers. Drawing on the Tariff Act of 1930, the US Customs and 
Border Control closed the border with Canada as well as the one with Mexico, par-
ticularly impacting Central Americans left waiting in Mexico. Announced the 
Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC): ‘The danger to 
the public health that results from the introduction of such persons into congregate 
settings at or near the borders’ justified closure’. The US, however, was hardly 
alone, with nearly 200 other countries imposing restrictions at that time and the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees suspending resettlement of refugees (Chishti & 
Pierce, 2020). In deporting Guatemalans and other Central Americans, through 
some 180 flights from virus ‘hotspots’ in Texas, Arizona, California, and Florida, 
the US exported Covid-19. Eleven of 15 countries from the Americas reported 
deportees arrived testing positive. In moving detainees, it also spread Covid-19 
within the country between detention facilities (Kerwin, 2020, 4–5; International 
Rescue Committee, 2020; Albaladejo, 2020).
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) continued to detain undocu-
mented immigrants, terrorising neighbourhoods through randomised raids even 
after prioritising the round-up of criminals and ‘safety’ risks. As during the Great 
Depression, the government sought to target undesirable immigrants by using health 
services and benefits to identify them. A new public-charge rule made use of public 
benefits a reason to deny immigrants the green card that allows them to legally work 
(Chishti & Pierce, 2020). Treatment for Covid-19 was to be an exemption, but the 
new rule increased the precarity of immigrants who feared to take advantage of 
health and other benefits for children, like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP). Moreover, relief measures in Spring and early Summer 2020 
excluded from tax rebates, unemployment supplements, or other aid some four mil-
lion immigrant workers without legal status but who had individual taxpayer 
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identification numbers (Chishti & Pierce, 2020; Covid-19 Conference Call, 2020). 
They paid into a system without receiving any relief.
The numbers in detention camps grew in contrast to other countries. The United 
Kingdom released one-third of its detainees out of recognition that close quarters 
turned such facilities into petri dishes for viral spread. Italy, Switzerland, and 
Zambia reduced numbers of migrant detainees (Kerwin, 2020, 25–26). The crowded 
and under-resourced US holding stations and detention jails, sometimes packing 
100 men into a room, had few medical personnel. They already had proven conge-
nial for outbreaks of other contagious conditions, like flu and measles. Covid-19 
appeared in them as well, ranging from a public New Jersey ICE detention centre to 
privately-run Texas ones (Chishti & Pierce, 2020; International Rescue Committee, 
2020). ICE delayed testing. It only made available partial results. Yet even these 
showed that half of those tested between April and early June were positive. Since 
facilities only tested symptomatic people, the actual numbers could have been 15 
times greater. While over Spring 2020 numbers of detained individuals in 200 cen-
tres dropped from 29,675 to 24,713, positive tests plateaued and then climbed over 
the summer (Jawetz & Svajlenka, 2020; Kerwin, 2020).
During local surges, detainees remained ‘sitting ducks’, as the American Civil 
Liberties Union referred to them (La Gorce, 2020). By August 2020, ICE counted 
nearly 4000 cases, with one-quarter of those infected still in custody (International 
Rescue Committee, 2020). In August, fuelled by transfers from Florida and Arizona, 
the Farmville, Virginia Detention Center run by the private Immigration Centers of 
America had a 90% infection rate among its nearly 300-person population (Schwenk, 
2020). The Eloy Detention Center in Arizona, for another example, saw a ‘tenfold’ 
rise in cases in a three-week period in June. Not only was social distancing impos-
sible, but sanitiser and soap were in short supply and access to showers irregular. 
Agents went about maskless. Detainees at the La Palma Correctional Center, also in 
Arizona, complained of being ‘forced to clean medical wards and common areas 
without enough protective gear’. Reported a transgender migrant, a group consid-
ered ‘medically vulnerable’ (Castro, 2020) and susceptible to violence at home, 
during migration, and in detention: ‘They have told us that if we feel bad, they will 
send us to a doctor that moment…but it’s a lie…I always feel like I’m between life 
and death’ (Reznick, 2020).
In these circumstances, staff become infected, bringing the virus into surround-
ing communities and to other facilities during inmate transfers. The for-profit 
LaSalle Corporation, with eight centres in southern states, faced charges of with-
holding ‘personal protective equipment [PPE] from staff and detainees, dismissed 
positive Covid-19 tests results, and ignored symptoms’ (Olivares & Washington, 
2020). Yet ICE kept no records of private prison staff, even though in Texas nine out 
of ten centres operated by contractors had cases by early May (Reznick, 2020; 
Kerwin, 2020, 5–7).
A whistleblower complaint from a former employee lodged against a particularly 
notorious centre in Irwin, Georgia, claimed that Spanish-speaking women received 
without their consent hysterectomies from a local gynaecologist, an action likened 
to ‘an Experimental Concentration Camp’. Migrant women subject to forced 
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sterilisation evoked past eugenic practices as well as a gendered punishment for 
daring to cross the border. With 57 women claiming pressure to undergo unneces-
sary treatment or actually suffering such abuse, advocates wanted ‘accountability 
for ICE and the private prison corporation because these are the entities that are 
holding these women’ without concern for their health or safety. With the pandemic, 
their previously ignored mistreatment had a hearing. It came to symbolise abuse of 
human rights and women’s bodily autonomy, a gendered harm previously associ-
ated with other authoritarian confinements (Shen, 2020; Washington & 
Olivares, 2020).
Despite shortage of PPE, desperately needed by medical workers at detention 
camps as well as hospitals and nursing homes, the Trump administration was reluc-
tant to invoke the Defense Production Act of 1950. This Korean War measure autho-
rised the President ‘to direct private companies to prioritize orders from the federal 
government’ (Siripurapu, 2020). He would issue some weak executive orders relat-
ing to hoarding and the production of essential ventilators and N95 masks, made 
after companies like GM already announced such production. In contrast, Trump 
most publicly deployed this authority ‘to order meat processing plants to stay open’ 
despite major outbreaks of Covid-19 in an industry where immigrant workers had 
found a niche (Gangitano, 2020). He would sustain the food supply for meat eaters 
despite risks to its workforce. When Trump acted in late April 2020, at least 20 
workers had died and 5000 had been exposed, though the actual numbers were in 
the thousands (Trumka, 2020). Absenteeism had reached 50% in North Carolina, 
Kansas, and Nebraska plants (Grabell & Yeung, 2020). According to the CDC, the 
credibility of which suffered under Trump administration political interference, 
meat processing outbreaks by early July in facilities reporting cases occurred in 23 
states and 239 plants, amounting to over 16,000 infections, 9% of the workforce, 
with a death rate of .5% (general death rates include more elderly people and thus 
were slightly higher at six times that of the flu). Nearly 90% of the infected were 
racial or ethnic minorities, the vast majority of the workforce to begin with (Tate, 
2020; Waltenburg et al., 2020).
Indeed, the racial division of labour led to Covid-19’s disproportionate impact on 
African Americans, Latina/o/xs, and immigrants. The resulting shutdown forced 
immigrants out of work in large numbers: in California, immigrants had held one 
out of four lost jobs, with undocumented women doing ‘non-essential’ service 
labour accounting for one out of three of the unemployed (Flores et al., 2020). They 
laboured in sectors hard hit by the virus. Immigrants composed some 17% of health-
care workers, while those without work permits crowded into related frontline jobs. 
One 2018 estimate from census data found almost 40% of health support workers to 
be undocumented: ‘from nursing assistants and home health aides to housekeepers, 
receptionists, janitors, and cooks’. Filipino/as made up 30% of immigrant nurses 
and suffered from a disproportionate ‘toll’ from Covid-19 in Canada and Britain as 
well (Tungohan, 2020). At the height of the epidemic in New York City, Corona, 
Queens, a hugely immigrant neighbourhood, generated the greatest number of 
known cases; ‘Hispanic immigrants’ made up 34% of deaths even though they were 
only 29% of the population; Blacks, at 22% of the population, constituted 28% of 
4 Vulnerability and Resilience in the Covid-19 Crisis: Race, Gender, and Belonging
76
the deaths (Persaud, 2020). Percentages from Iowa, Oregon, Florida, and California 
were similar or worse (Jordan & Oppel Jr, 2020). Like a century ago, ‘close- 
knit…family ties’ were blamed for spreading the infection  – along with over-
crowded and poor housing conditions, especially among California’s Latina/o/x 
poor (Cimni & Botts, 2020; Reyes-Velarde, 2020).
Immigrants and refugees for years had composed the packinghouse workforce: 
Bhutanese, Mayans, various Latina/o/x, North Africans, Burmese, Cubans, 
Romanians, and Chinese (Grabell, 2017). They had become essential workers, 
called ‘critical’, but as an undocumented Guatemalan toiling at Koch Foods in 
Mississippi queried, ‘if they have a big need for all of the workers, … why aren’t 
they worried about us?’ Like many other essential workers, meatpackers could not 
practice social distancing. The very organisation of the labour process for maximum 
efficiency got in the way. They worked ‘shoulder to shoulder’ at a fast pace to keep 
the line moving. On top of that, despite the protests of unions weakened by the 
labour law and growth in non-union operations, workers lacked health insurance 
and sick pay, so they went to work sick. To do otherwise risked being fired 
(Grabell, 2020).
Migrant farmworkers faced similar circumstances, especially those packing fruit 
in warehouses. About 50% of hired agricultural workers were undocumented 
(Schloredt, 2020). For the rest, growers had begun to rely on bringing in hands 
through use of H-2A visas. These temporary cards were tied to specific employers 
much like the Bracero Program of old, deployed to mitigate labour shortages with 
guestworkers. The processing of such visas went on ‘as a national security priority’ 
after a short hiatus in March (Jarvis, 2020). Under this system, employers were 
responsible for housing and transporting workers, while paying at least the mini-
mum wage. In fact, recruiters still charged migrants for travel. Workers thus fell into 
debt; their dependency made it more difficult to protest unsafe conditions and wage 
theft, leading some to refer to the H-2A visa as a ‘modern system of indentured 
servitude’ (ibid.).
Social distancing again was impossible. Packed vans delivered workers, mostly 
men, to the fields. Tents and shared housing kept labourers close to each other. 
While Oregon banned bunk beds, growers housed larger cohorts of labourers 
together than allowed under state regulations (ibid.). In Pennsylvania, with over 
4000 seasonal guestworkers, even farm labour camps with permits were over-
crowded; the state issued only recommendations rather than promulgate require-
ments with penalties. The state Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) had stopped doing inspections (Fernandez, 2020). Farmworkers, some 3% 
of the population, accounted for 20% of the cases in Washington state, which had no 
ban on bunkhouses (Jarvis, 2020). In Florida, the area surrounding Immokalee 
turned into a virus epicentre, with a 36% positivity rate by early June when the state 
was just under 6%; its Latino/a/x and Haitian workforce would follow the crops up 
the coast, and few were tested beforehand. Reported a volunteer physician, ‘Workers 
have to get their own masks, so maybe three out of 20 people have masks on and 
there’s pressure not to wear them – it’s not a “tough” thing to do’. Neither did testers 
inquire about contacts or provide instructions on self-isolation, a difficult task when 
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nine people of various ages, some strangers to each other, crowded into a trailer 
built for lower occupancy (Reiley, 2020).
Imprecise record-keeping, that noted place of death but not origin of infection, 
compounded the problem of faraway hospitals, lack of health care, and pressure to 
continue working. The local health department offered exposed workers full accom-
modations: free lodging, with bathrooms and kitchenettes and necessities like hand 
sanitiser and groceries. But it unsurprisingly noted, ‘We can’t pay them or supple-
ment their income…we know people want to provide for their families, often send-
ing money back to support people where they are from’. Pressure from growers 
added to the reluctance of migrants to leave the fields even if they tested positive 
(Reiley, 2020).
Domestic workers faced their own set of pressures during the pandemic. 
Disproportionately immigrants and women of colour compared to other occupa-
tions, some worked legally but resided within mixed-status households, with family 
and roommates undocumented. They needed the income to live here but also to send 
remittances to relatives abroad. Few employers, whether for private residences or 
nursing homes, provided PPE. Not wanting to leave their clients without care, some 
both grappled with possible exposure to pathogens and feared carrying the virus 
between households or from nursing homes which housed their ‘consumer’. ‘I care 
for the elderly because I consider this a noble profession, and not everyone can be a 
caregiver’, explained a 60-year-old migrant from the Philippines who had been in 
the US for about a decade. Yet she worried about infecting the 90-year-old woman 
in her charge. ‘I take a bus to and from work, which is risky in terms of spreading 
germs, but I cannot afford to take Uber’, she confessed (Bapat, 2020).
Other workers, like a 39-year-old Mexican immigrant in northern California, 
found themselves fired. ‘I understand that my clients don’t want me to come to their 
homes because they are worried about being in contact with another human being…
I am worried about the same thing’, she told a reporter in April 2020 (ibid.). After a 
nanny in New York City from Antigua verbalised fear about catching the virus in 
March, she lost her job with ‘no severance pay or nothing’ and was without work 
3 months later. Indeed, in early April 2020 the National Domestic Worker Alliance 
found two-thirds of respondents could not count on clients hiring them back; by 
May the unemployed had risen to 70% (Brooks, 2020; Wolfe, 2020). The same 
percentage of domestic workers in Latin American and the Caribbean, many of 
whom were from Indigenous groups, also suffered from government measures to 
contain the outbreak. Similar to the US, ‘In addition to the spectre of unemploy-
ment, informality, low social protection coverage and the lack of written contracts – 
in many cases – prevent them from accessing the aid established by Governments’, 
reported the International Labour Organization (United Nations, 2020). For those in 
Argentina, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and worldwide, no work also meant no pay. As 
the International Domestic Workers Federation noted, ‘the logic of the quarantine 
assumes the availability of accommodation, means of sustenance, and safety of 
households’, conditions unobtainable by domestic workers, especially migrants 
(IDWF, 2020; Lewis et al., 2020).
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4.4  Resiliency
Despite exclusion from state-sponsored relief during the pandemic, migrant work-
ers – whether labouring in homes, fields, warehouses, or medical facilities – contin-
ued to organise. They confronted their circumstances through strikes, mutual aid, 
and demands on the state as well as employers. Like immigrant workers more than 
a century ago, they banded together to seek recognition and rights, dignity and jus-
tice. Unlike the past, they had new tools of social media to spread grievances and 
publicise protests.
Lack of safety for grocery clerks, bus and truck drivers, fast-food servers, 
Instacart and other delivery app gig workers, sanitation employees, Amazon distri-
bution warehouse packers, and the entire agricultural food chain sparked wildcat 
strikes among US-born and migrant workers alike – but with more peril for those 
here as guestworkers (Brecher, 2020) Fruit packers and pickers struck. In the Yakima 
Valley of Washington State, hundreds of mostly Mexican labourers walked off the 
job demanding hazard pay and safer workplaces. Those at Roche Fruit Company 
won $100 per week extra, what the company called ‘gratitude pay’ in a mystifica-
tion that defined the increase as temporary. These strikes, however, were as much 
about protecting ‘ourselves and our families’. According to Familias Unidas por la 
Justicia, women led these multigenerational and multiracial strikes (Bacon, 2020).
Immigrant communities turned to mutual aid and organised private relief, as the 
San Francisco Chinese had done over a century before. With undocumented work-
ers in restaurants and other service industries especially hard hit by shutdowns and 
cut off from government monies, they depended on local fund drives. Despite the 
best of efforts, these proved inadequate, but so did public monies. The 805 
Undocufund in Santa Barbara and Ventura counties, California, first developed to 
aid immigrant workers during wildfires; it started up again during the pandemic 
when layoffs grew. Despite contributions from citizen workers, some of whom 
donated government stimulus checks as ‘acts of solidarity’, 7000 people were on a 
waitlist by late May 2020. The $75 million appropriated by California’s Governor 
to relieve undocumented people would only reach about one-quarter of them, who 
collectively paid $3 billion in taxes, advocates noted (Osgood, 2020).
Mutual aid reflected the belief that domestic workers should be able to stay home 
when sick or when their family needs them. In the Bay area, Los Angeles, and San 
Diego, various Philippine workers centres distributed ‘care boxes’ full of food and 
other items to help members get by. Other workers centres, like CASA in Maryland, 
Virginia, and Pennsylvania, provided food, raised a solidarity fund, and campaigned 
around rent cancellation (Covid-19 Conference Call, 2020). The National Domestic 
Workers Alliance established a Coronavirus Care fund, with a goal to raise $4 mil-
lion dollars, to distribute emergency assistance of $400. The group administered the 
monies through Alia, its online platform through which employers could contribute 
the equivalent of benefits for paid time off and other uses (Poo, 2020).
Activists in solidarity with migrants called for state protection. Over a hundred 
organizations petitioned Maryland’s Republican Governor Larry Hogan to issue 
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emergency orders for mandatory PPE for farmworkers, poultry and seafood workers 
in June 2020 and continued to pressure for action into the Fall (Marylanders for 
Food & Farm Worker Protection, 2020; Migrant Clinicians Network, 2020). Other 
states, notably Virginia, enacted emergency standards for such vulnerable frontline 
workers, mostly migrants from the Americas. As its Democratic Governor Ralph 
Northam announced, ‘In the face of federal inaction, Virginia has stepped up to pro-
tect workers from Covid-19, creating the nation’s first enforceable workplace safety 
requirements’ (Berkowitz, 2020; Garcia-Navarro & Silva, 2020). Domestic Workers 
mobilised in California to remove the exclusion of domestic workers from the state’s 
occupational health and safety regulations, which was modelled after the federal 
law. Allen, from the Los Angeles Pilipino Worker Center, testified, ‘caregivers like 
me…are on the frontlines, in close contact with people who are most vulnerable’. 
While those employed by nursing homes and hospitals ‘have the right to protective 
equipment, training and information,’ home care workers had no such guarantees. 
Cal/OSHA operates by the exception that individual employers who pay for domes-
tic and household tasks in their own dwellings do not have to abide by its regula-
tions. These workers not only faced infection, but they lacked protection from the 
smoke and soot from wildfires, damage from which their employers expected them 
to clean up (CDWC, 2020). In vetoing a bill to rectify the exclusion, passed over-
whelmingly by the legislature in the midst of wildfires and the pandemic, Governor 
Gavin Newsom, a Democrat, ignored the establishment of a stakeholder commis-
sion to develop regulations for the sector and the educative role of Cal/OSHA. Instead 
he relied on old canards by claiming that the home was not like other workplaces 
and that its inhabitants lacked the ‘expertise to comply’ (Newsom, 2020). Domestic 
workers vowed to continue their struggle for health and safety on the job; they 
gained an amended bill to establish voluntary guidelines in September 2021.
4.5  Concluding Remarks
Migrants to the US, whether undocumented or permitted, found themselves particu-
larly vilified after Donald Trump became president. However, these years were not 
unique in the long history of a country that once referred to itself as ‘a nation of 
nations’ (Marzio, 1976). To generate a genealogy of racialised vulnerability, this 
chapter has explored a set of major responses to migrant workers in the past. It has 
shown that the association of the non-citizen with the racial other and both with 
epidemic infection led to public policies, in the local as well as national realm, that 
reinforced discrimination and enhanced precarity. A century later the nation was 
relying on similar measures of quarantine and exclusion. In the face of new viruses, 
it remained easier to target migrants and undocumented immigrants than force citi-
zens to take public health precautions.
Driving the racialisation of public health were the forces central to the US politi-
cal economy. A nation founded on settler colonialism and racial capitalism, the US 
sorted people by race and then justified inequality through affixing justifying 
4 Vulnerability and Resilience in the Covid-19 Crisis: Race, Gender, and Belonging
80
attributes. Dirt and disease adhered to those deemed as racial others, with whiteness 
associated with cleanliness and thus healthfulness. Low wages, crowded housing, 
and economic, political, and social discrimination often led to poorer health out-
comes, which in turn rationalised blaming migrants – and their race/ethnicity or 
national origins – instead of these precipitating living and working conditions that 
led to bodily harms.
In response to Covid-19, government actions – and inactions – illuminate the 
making of pandemics as a social and not merely biological or scientific phenome-
non. Despite the odds, migrant workers attempted to refocus the discourse by speak-
ing out and walking off. They engaged in self-help when the government refused 
support. In demanding basic health and safety, along with sustainable wages and 
decent working and living conditions, they insisted on recognition and respect. In 
puncturing the hypocrisy behind rhetorics of essential workers as heroes, they 
demanded protection that belonged to all people and not only citizens.
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Chapter 5
Sanctuary Cities and Covid-19: The Case 
of Canada
Mireille Paquet, Noémie Benoit, Idil Atak, Meghan Joy, Graham Hudson, 
and John Shields
5.1  Introduction
Amidst record migration numbers, a growing displacement crisis, and rapid changes 
in national immigration programmes, non-status individuals and those with precari-
ous immigration status are in growing number globally. As with administrative 
immigration categories, states vary when it comes to the labels used to identify 
these populations and in their practices of counting them. In Canada, governments 
do not publish official approximations of the size of this population. Indeed, the 
International Organization for Migration concludes that ‘Canada […] has a signifi-
cant number of irregular migrants, although estimates vary widely, and accurate 
numbers are difficult to establish’ (International Organization for Migration, 2019, 
112). This population includes irregular migrants, individuals who overstayed their 
visa, committed offences affecting their status, or refused refugee claimants as well 
as individuals who lost status due to changes in government policies or actions by 
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their sponsors (e.g. spouses, family members, employers). Despite Canada’s heav-
ily controlled immigration regime, policy changes and current outcomes – including 
an increased reliance on temporary work permits, a quicker pace in policy reforms, 
and growing delays in the treatment of refugee protection claims – also generated 
more precarity when it comes to immigration status (Goldring et al., 2009; Goldring 
& Landolt, 2013; Hari, 2014; Paquet & Larios, 2018; Tungohan et al., 2015).
As with other migrants, non-status migrants and those living with precarious 
status (e.g. students, those on temporary visas and individuals who are depending 
on employers or relatives to keep their status) tend to settle in urban centres. As a 
result, cities have become spaces of policy innovation on how to address the needs 
of these populations. City services are increasingly called upon to function as first 
responders for migrants’ well-being and play a key part in how migrants settle and 
integrate into society (Provine & Varsanyi, 2012; Varsanyi et al., 2012). Sanctuary 
policies are one of these innovative responses (Bauder, 2017). Highly variegated 
across countries and cities, these policies generally aim at providing services to 
individuals without accounting for immigration status and at limiting cooperation 
with immigration enforcement agencies. In Canada, seven municipalities have 
enacted such policies since 2013: Toronto, Hamilton, Vancouver, Ajax, Montreal, 
Edmonton, and London. These relatively novel policies emerged as a result of activ-
ism and government social learning.
Urban centres have been especially hit by the Covid-19 pandemic and this public 
health crisis has generated particular risks for non-status and precarious migrants 
(Bauder & Godoy, 2020). What are the risks faced by these populations and have 
they been addressed by sanctuary policies? More broadly, is there a future for 
Canadian sanctuary policies in the post-Covid-19 recovery? Using existing research 
on the topic and content-related evidence, we highlight the complex position of cit-
ies in responding to public health emergencies in multi-level settings, while point-
ing again to the limited capacities of Canadian cities in providing true sanctuary for 
immigrants without status. We show that the non-status and precarious migrants in 
Canada faced specific risks during the pandemic and that current municipal sanctu-
ary policies should be boosted to respond to the particular vulnerabilities of these 
populations. More broadly, this chapter identifies the obstacles and opportunities for 
the maintenance and expansion of rights for all by Canadian city governments dur-
ing and after periods of ‘crisis’, such as this pandemic.
5.2  Sanctuary Cities
Globally, sanctuary city policies are an expression of municipalities’ claim for an 
extended responsibility in how migrants are received and treated. They also build on 
the activism of a diverse sanctuary movement aimed at creating cultures of hospital-
ity, at empowering non-status migrants (Moffette & Ridgley, 2018; Ridgley, 2008), 
and at challenging the legitimacy of national borders as well as associated immigra-
tion enforcement. Central to both sanctuary policies and activism is the idea that, as 
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a matter of justice and for the greater good of the city, all residents should have 
access to fundamental rights and services, regardless of their immigration status. 
They advance the principle that the mere fact of residing in a city entitles inhabitants 
to certain rights and services.
The ‘sanctuary city’ concept refers to different policies and practices and focuses 
on variable populations in different national contexts (Bauder, 2017). Sanctuary cit-
ies in Canada and the United States seek to protect specifically non-status migrants 
by allowing them to access some municipal programmes and services without fear 
of being arrested, detained, and removed from the country.1 To do so, these policies 
usually include a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach whereby the city does not require 
government workers to ask about an individual’s immigration status and commits 
not to share any personal information pertaining to immigration status with other 
agencies (Paquet, 2017). As part of these policies, cities also experiment with the 
issuance of identification documents – such as municipal IDs – that allow individu-
als to engage with local public institutions (e.g. libraries or transit authorities) and 
to facilitate the conduct of daily activities such as banking or signing a lease (de 
Graauw, 2014). Sanctuary policies, especially in the US include official commit-
ment of non-cooperation with immigration enforcement authorities. In this case, 
police forces and municipal bodies refuse to enter into formal agreements that 
devolve enforcement to them, resist political pressure to engage in indirect migra-
tion control practices, and strongly limit the sharing of information on residents 
with enforcement agencies (Hershkowitz et al., 2020; Ridgley, 2008).
Sanctuary policies are not only occurring in the US. Other similar policies are 
found in European cities; however, these cities possess far less autonomy on polic-
ing matters, limiting their potential regarding law enforcement (Morris, 2020). 
Urban sanctuary initiatives in the United Kingdom, for instance, do not seek to cre-
ate legal shelters from authorities, but rather to transform the public discourse on 
refugees. The goals of British legal sanctuary policies are therefore more discursive, 
attempting to disrupt the distinction between guests and hosts, to foster a culture of 
hospitality, and to consequently encourage undocumented migrants to participate as 
active citizens in their urban community (Bauder, 2017). In other European coun-
tries, however, the term ‘sanctuary’ is rarely used due to its religious connotation 
(Bauder & Gonzalez, 2018). Nevertheless, other solidarity-based policies emerged, 
named otherwise, such as the Barcelona Refugee City Plan in 2015, which reacted 
to the Spanish government’s restrictive policies towards refugees by channelling 
urban solidarity and coordinating to offer programmes of support (Agustín & 
Jørgensen, 2019). Moreover, in the Netherlands, the Amsterdam-Zuid Oost policy 
allows for victims and witnesses of crimes without status to enter police stations 
1 In most European countries, cities of sanctuary involve a general commitment to welcoming 
asylum seekers and refugees. For instance, the UK-based City of Sanctuary movement that 
emerged with the support of the City Council and local organizations in Sheffield in 2007 aims to 
exemplify hospitality toward an empowerment of asylum seekers and more precisely to ‘influence 
policy-makers and public attitudes throughout the country’ in order ‘to build a culture of hospital-
ity for people seeking sanctuary’ (Bagelman, 2013, 49).
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under the assurance that they will be able to leave without facing arrest (Morris, 
2020). Berlin, on its part, provides an anonymous health-insurance card, while 
Zurich dispenses legal identity cards to all its citizens regardless of status (Bauder 
& Weisser, 2019).
Research on sanctuary cities has made a strong normative case and demonstrated 
empirically that these policies have effects on identity formation, leading to migrants 
developing feelings of belonging and new forms of urban citizenship (e.g. Nyers, 
2010; Young, 2011, 2012). According to Nail et al., for instance, Canadian sanctu-
ary cities ‘disrupt the distinctions caused by federal status categories’ to ‘forge a 
unifying identity among all residents of the city’ (2010, 151). In political science 
and urban studies, research has also verified the claims, made by politicians, that 
sanctuary policies could lead to decreased policing and rises in criminality in urban 
areas. While no such study has been conducted in Canada, American studies have 
confirmed that municipal sanctuary policies have either no impact on crime or, in 
some cases, decrease crime (Martínez et  al., 2018; O’Brien et  al., 2019; Wong, 
2017). In addition, these policies contribute to efforts by local governments to chal-
lenge national policies that affect their residing immigrant populations. In its sim-
plest form, this challenge is symbolic: while these residents have not received 
explicit consent from the nation-state to enter and remain within the state, they are 
receiving consent to remain in the cities which are enacting these local policies 
(Varsanyi, 2006, 240). Increasingly, however, legal challenges associated with sanc-
tuary policies provide opportunities to test the jurisdictional space and legal capaci-
ties of cities.
5.3  Sanctuary Cities in Canada
Like in many American states and cities, the sanctuary practices in Canada involved 
churches and communities harbouring in a physical shelter migrants at risk of 
detention and deportation (Lippert, 2004). These early sanctuary practices 
denounced federal decisions deemed unfair toward precarious migrants. They were 
adopted in a context where local anti-poverty advocates identified immigration sta-
tus barriers as a rising concern for addressing poverty (Atak, 2019; Hudson et al., 
2017). McDonald (2009, 67) explains how, from 1994 to 1998, these movements 
led the government to regularise several thousand failed refugee claimants from 
moratorium countries, such as China, Iran, and Algeria who were generally stuck in 
limbo. However, despite these early successes, there have not been any such regula-
risation programmes since 2004. In Toronto, as Bauder notes, ‘the campaign to 
become a sanctuary city was spearheaded by the Solidarity City Network, which 
included a range of community organizations and advocacy groups’ (Hannan & 
Bauder, 2015, 10). In Montreal, self-organised ‘action committees’ of non-status 
migrants and refugees have emerged and asserted themselves as political by organ-
ising against detentions and deportations (Atak, forthcoming; Nyers, 2010). 
Solidarity Across Borders and other groups organised public campaigns against 
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detentions and deportations of non-status migrants. Organisations have been work-
ing to build a support network amongst them. They have pressured the Federal gov-
ernment to regularise non-status migrants (Lowry & Nyers, 2013). Debates on 
access to education and healthcare have helped to frame the topic as a social justice 
issue and sensitise the public and authorities to the plight of this population.
Around the 2010s, some local governments in Canada started to take action in 
the face of unfair treatment and socioeconomic marginalisation of non-status resi-
dents. In 2013, Toronto became the first ‘sanctuary city’ in Canada to enable all 
residents to access municipal services. As Table 5.1 lists, other Canadian cities fol-
lowed suit. By 2019, seven Canadian cities had official sanctuary or access without 
fear policies. These cities are located in different regions of Canada and are of very 
different sizes. These cities diverge when it comes to their total immigrant popula-
tion and the rate of arrivals of newcomers.
Canadian sanctuary policies vary in their scope but have three important charac-
teristics in common. First, they share the objective of providing that all residents 
have access to municipal services (Paquet et al., 2019). In Toronto, the policy is 
justified as a tool to ‘Ensur[e] that Torontonians, regardless of immigration status, 
have access to City services without fear of being asked for proof of status’ (Toronto, 
2015). The City of London similarly states that ‘The purpose of [its] policy is to 
enable London residents with uncertain or no immigration status to access City 
services without fear that the City will ask for and provide information on the immi-
gration status of individuals to other public institutions or orders of government’ 
(City of London, 2018). These services are numerous and rest on the specific 
responsibilities of cities in the Canadian jurisdictional architecture. Generally, 
Canadian cities – which include municipal governments and special purpose bodies 
governing a service funded by municipal governments – have responsibility over 
the built environment, including urban planning, roads, public transit, and waste 
Table 5.1 Canadian local sanctuary policies




Toronto Ontario 2013 Access Toronto 6,471,850





2016 Access to city services without fear for 
residents with uncertain or no immigration 
status
2,691,351
Ajax Ontario 2017 No official title N.D.a
Montreal Québec 2018 Montréal, ville inclusive 4,318,505
Edmonton Alberta 2018 Access to municipal services without fear 1,447,143
London Ontario 2018 Free of fear services for all policy 545,441
Source: (Canada, 2020)
aAccording to the 2016 census, the total population of Ajax was 119,677 (Statistics Canada, 2017). 
Official population data for 2019 has yet to be released
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collection and processing. Cities usually also provide a variety of cultural and rec-
reational facilities and services, including libraries, community centres, and parks. 
Some cities, and especially those that are larger, have been devolved some respon-
sibility over health and social services, such as social housing and shelter provision, 
ambulances and long-term care, public health services, and immigration settlement 
services.
Second, these policies support state actions heavily geared toward providing 
information to potentially affected populations as well as informing and training 
city workers of the policy (Paquet et al., 2019). These policies also aim at clarify-
ing  – for the purpose of the administration and to the benefit of residents  – the 
identification requirements for access to municipal services. Beyond explicit calls to 
remove barriers, several cities aim to realise this commitment through information 
campaigns and public awareness strategies. In some cases, such as Edmonton and 
Vancouver, policies also commit to reinforce existing policies on privacy and infor-
mation collection. Toronto and Montreal stand as exception to this trend as they also 
provide funding to immigrant service groups to develop new interventions as part of 
their policies. Canadian sanctuary cities do not provide residents with municipal 
IDs or other forms of documentation. In general, thus, the implementation of sanc-
tuary policies in Canada focuses more on clarifying access and procedures and less 
on the deployment of new services for residents.
Third, Canadian sanctuary policies do not apply to municipal and regional police 
forces or immigration enforcement activities (Hershkowitz et  al., 2020; Hudson 
et  al., 2017). This reflects the limited jurisdiction and powers of Canadian cities 
within the country’s federal system, as compared to other levels of governments. 
Immigration enforcement is solely the responsibility of the federal government, 
whereas policing is enabled and regulated by provincial and federal authorities. 
Even when they have municipal police forces, Canadian cities have a finite capacity 
to control policing as legislation is provincial and municipalities cannot interfere in 
criminal investigations; though as funders of police services, they may have more 
room to intervene in policy-oriented issues (Sancton, 2015). As a result, cities can-
not coerce police forces to change their policies or actions, including their decisions 
to enquire about immigration status. Similarly, Canadian sanctuary policies offer 
little or no guarantees that collaboration or communication on migration control 
matters between the police and federal enforcement authorities, such as the Canada 
Border Services Agency (CBSA), will stop on cities’ territories. The rare research 
on police practices since the enactment of these policies shows no changes to police 
and enforcements practices of interagency information sharing about immigration 
status (Hershkowitz et al., 2020; Hudson et al., 2017; Moffette & Gardner, 2015). 
Moreover, in the majority of Canadian sanctuary cities, police services have not 
issued a formal response to the access without fear policies. As such, Canadian 
sanctuary policies sadly offer limited protection from immigration enforcement to 
their residents.
The particularities of Canadian sanctuary policies demonstrate the importance of 
taking into account national differences when comparing these state activities. 
Canadian policies go beyond symbolic gesture and expand the realm of local 
M. Paquet et al.
91
government action to all residents, as opposed to all citizens. Yet, they are distinct 
from American policies that also include the delivery of identification documents 
and real changes to on-the-ground enforcement practices. Despite their limitations, 
however, these policies still offer support to non-status and precarious status resi-
dents by ensuring that they can have access to government services. As well, wel-
coming and non-criminalising local narratives are symbolically powerful for all city 
residents. In periods of heightened vulnerability and risks – such as the Covid-19 
pandemic – these services can make a world of difference.
5.4  Pandemic Risks for Non-status and Precarious Migrants 
in Canada
The most visible risks faced by non-status and precarious migrants in Canada dur-
ing the pandemic are related to access to healthcare. Public Health Insurance is free 
and available to Canadian citizens, permanent residents, and some temporary resi-
dents. Others must rely on expensive private insurance or, more often, live without 
insurance and pay out-of-pocket for treatment.2 Three provinces opened up access 
to at least Covid-19-related healthcare, regardless of immigration status: Ontario, 
Quebec, and British Columbia. These three jurisdictions are home to the three larg-
est and most diverse cities in the country, which are all sanctuary cities: Toronto, 
Montreal, and Vancouver. At the time of writing (December 2020), British Columbia 
has withdrawn access to healthcare for all, while Quebec’s policy is confined to 
Covid-19-related testing and care; any other healthcare, including medically neces-
sary or life-threatening care, is not covered through the provincial health plan. 
Ontario remains the only province which has a policy of access to healthcare for all, 
regardless of immigration status. On 20 March 2020, the Ontario Ministry of Health 
announced it would cover the costs of ‘all medically necessary’ hospital services for 
uninsured clients, not limited to Covid-19 treatment (Hudson et al., 2020).3
Racial disparities among the Covid-19 infected population have been widely 
highlighted by both the recent body of literature and mass media, increasingly con-
cerned by the disproportionate toll of the epidemic on communities of colour 
(Carrion et al., 2020; Chowkwanyun & Reed, 2020) Canada makes no exception. 
Aggregated data released by local health authorities outline the spatial 
2 If one cannot pay up front, they will most of the time not be able to receive medical services, 
except in case of emergency (especially if a situation is deemed immediately life-threatening), 
even though the patient would be billed afterwards. There are some reports of non-status persons 
being detained and/or reported to the Canadian Border Service Agency while seeking healthcare 
(Gastaldo et al., 2012; Toronto, 2015). There are a handful of walk-in clinics in major cities like 
Toronto and Montreal that provide free primary care to uninsured migrants, but these count as a 
small fraction of clinics, and care does not include specialist care or diagnostics.
3 The Ontario government also waived the three-month waiting period for returning Canadians and 
new immigrants so they could access provincial public health insurance immediately.
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concentrations of positive cases in low-income, racialised, and migrant-heavy areas 
of Canadian cities. Notably, Ontario’s Public Health authority, exposed that its most 
ethno-culturally diverse neighbourhoods, located primarily in urban areas, are expe-
riencing disproportionately higher rates of Covid-19 and related deaths (Public 
Health Ontario, 2020). More precisely, in Toronto, a correlation was found between 
high coronavirus rates and low income, low levels of education, and racialised pop-
ulations, consequently hitting hardest the section of the town with larger Black 
populations (Bowden & Cain, 2020). Similar findings were reported in Quebec, as 
Montréal-Nord, a prevailing neighbourhood for asylum seekers, became one of the 
crisis’s epicentres (Shields & Alrob, 2020) with the highest number of confirmed 
cases reported in the city, as well as the highest mortality rate as of September 2020 
(Santé Montréal, 2020).
It comes to light that it isn’t the density in terms of population in the affected 
neighbourhoods that influenced the case rate, but rather the density inside house-
holds. Housing overcrowding and consequent proximity has indeed proven to cor-
relate with high Covid-19 infection rates (Almagro et  al., 2020). With the 
increasingly high rents in Canadian urban areas, non-status migrants are among the 
most vulnerable to homelessness since their lack of status hinders their access to 
employment or alternative government support. They are often left with no choice 
but to settle for unsuitable housing without enough bedrooms for the occupants or 
rely on their social networks to obtain informal and, often, overcrowded housing 
(Paradis et al., 2008). Strikingly, it has been noted that immigrants and refugees 
tend to be under-represented in the Canadian emergency shelter system. This was 
found especially true for non-status migrants who worried about arrests and depor-
tation if they accessed such organisations. Yet, the households providing hospitality 
significantly proved to do so while living in critical precarious situations themselves 
(Hiebert et al., 2005) As one would expect, these living situations make it impossi-
ble to socially distance or isolate, even from at-risk members of the household 
(Greenaway et al., 2020).
Another important factor leading to high pandemic vulnerability for these popu-
lations lies in mobility-based risk. Migrants were indeed highly represented in the 
low-paying essential service jobs which continued their activities during lockdowns, 
often in hazardous and crowded conditions (Flood et al., 2020; Greenaway et al., 
2020). Notably, in Quebec, asylum seekers stood out during the crisis, as they vol-
unteered to work on the frontlines in the Residential and Long-term Care Centres, 
(CHSLDs) where 92% of the Covid-related deaths were found (Dalexis & Cénat, 
2020). In the case of Toronto, the hardest-hit neighbourhoods were those where at 
least one-third of working residents commute to other wards and municipalities, 
including York region (which includes the lower-tier municipalities of Vaughan, 
Markham, Richmond Hill, Newmarket, and others). Thus, forced to commute to 
work while higher-income citizens experienced the privilege of remote occupations, 
non-status migrants exposed themselves to greater risk of infection, which they then 
brought back to overcrowded environments. Even when some essential workers 
were laid off, Covid-19 continued to spread due to the increased interactions in the 
households (Almagro et al., 2020).
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Non-status migrants and most precarious migrants are ineligible for income sup-
port programmes created in response to the pandemic, such as the Canadian 
Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) and for general government worker support. 
As a result, they have to continue working. The conditions in which non-status and 
precarious status migrants work is an important factor of risk to Covid-19 (Hennebry 
et al., 2020; Migrant Workers Alliance for Change, 2020). In Quebec, a survey of 
asylum seekers working in essential services such as hospitals, long-term care cen-
tres and the food service during the first Covid-19 wave, most of them living in 
Montreal, reported high infection rates, considerable issues accessing healthcare, 
and problems with employers’ management of sick leave (Table de concertation des 
organismes au service des personnes réfugiées et immigrantes, 2020). Despite 
Montréal being a sanctuary city, these asylum seekers also reported having trouble 
accessing immigrant services and lacking information about supports offered by 
different governments (ibid.). It should be noted that when non-status migrants 
didn’t occupy essential at-risk jobs, they were most likely to work in informal sec-
tors of the economy (e.g. Norwegian Refugee Council, 2020) without any safety net 
when these were brought to a halt due to the pandemic.
However, the exacerbated risks non-status and precarious status migrants face 
during the sanitary crisis are not limited to the infection contingency. For instance, 
the closure of municipal and non-municipal services during the lockdown had con-
siderable impact on the most vulnerable populations. First, research has drawn 
attention to the importance of libraries as a formal and informal information plat-
form for migrants, acting as a meeting point (Caidi et al., 2010) and a community 
builder (Scott, 2011) as well as a provider of workshops, books, and computers 
(Aery & Cheff, 2018). Libraries are often the only internet access available (Hall & 
Wang, 2017), which is crucial for finding employment and housing or conducting 
regularisation processes. Other formal organisations, such as settlement agencies, 
community centres, ethno-cultural (Caidi et al., 2010) and non-profit organisations 
(Shields & Alrob, 2020) also play an important role in migrants’ lives. The crisis put 
these vital but already unstable and precariously-funded sectors under further strain. 
As their public-facing offices were forced to close and many had to reorient towards 
offering an online service, internet inaccessibility turned out to be a major obstacle 
to their use. The lockdown therefore compromised ingrained essential strategies, 
resources, and social networks for non-status migrants.
Raising awareness and imparting knowledge to the population on how to prevent 
the spread of Covid-19 was among the prioritised strategies in crisis mitigation. 
However, access to information was severely restricted for non-status migrants by 
the closures previously mentioned, but also by language barriers and unavailable 
adequate translations (Kluge et al., 2020). Undocumented migrants therefore could 
miss out on basic information about the pandemic and remain unaware of their eli-
gibility to receive Covid-19 testing and treatment despite their lack of status.
As has been shown, the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted and reinforced pre- 
existing inequalities. An active government response was thus needed to ensure the 
protection of the most vulnerable populations throughout the public health crisis. In 
that sense, it could have been expected from sanctuary cities policies – given the 
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nature of their objectives – to act as this required a safety net for migrants without 
status. Current evidence, however, is limited on the actual impact of these policies 
during the first waves of the pandemic. Part of this is due to the reality that Canadian 
cities’ potential capacity to address the crisis was restricted by the scope of their 
jurisdictions and the scarce resources dedicated to their objectives. Indeed, while 
public health authorities have offices dedicated to specific cities, these are not typi-
cally part of municipal jurisdiction. In Canada, the healthcare system remains the 
provincial governments’ responsibility and public health is co-managed by the fed-
eral and provincial governments. Only some cities, and to a limited extent, have 
authority over health and social services. In such cases, further investment in city- 
run shelters and in the immigration settlements services’ digitalisation could be 
undertaken. Fortunately, as mentioned above, some provinces – namely Ontario, 
Quebec, and British Columbia  – have responded accordingly by extending the 
modalities of their healthcare to accommodate those without status for the duration 
of the crisis.
While there is no indication that the principles of sanctuary cities have been 
transgressed during the crisis, it goes without saying that policies ensuring access to 
municipal services have been rendered unenforceable by the lockdown. Sanctuary 
cities should take on the role of conveying vital information about the crisis to mar-
ginalised communities in appropriate translations, ensuring at the same time that 
non-status migrants are aware of provincial policies allowing them to be tested and 
treated without fear of deportation. Replacing urgent needs normally provided by 
municipal services, such as the internet connection offered by libraries, should also 
be among priorities.
Measures such as those described are possible avenues to mitigate pandemic 
risks faced by non-status migrants in Canadian cities. However, at the time of writ-
ing (December 2020), data are insufficient to confirm that any such particular initia-
tives were actually taken by Canadian sanctuary cities during the crisis. Other 
broader measures implemented by municipal governments, such as providing child-
care for essential workers’ children or reducing public transit fares, had, of course, 
a positive impact on non-status migrants by extension, but it appears that very little 
was systematically organised to meet their unique needs. Communities’ agencies 
would have thus been left on their own to respond to emergency issues.
The Covid-19 pandemic poses acute risks for non-status and precarious migrants 
in Canada, like elsewhere in the world. At this point, the most impactful responses 
have come from provincial governments, in the form of policies providing improved 
access to health insurance and care. Canadian cities have implemented policies to 
support their residents in response to these events, but sanctuary policies have not 
been explicitly linked to these efforts. At the same time, despite operational and 
financial pressures, cities have not abolished their sanctuary policies. This means 
that sanctuary policies have the potential to expand in Canada but also highlights the 
need to provide cities with more capacities and resources in order to see this poten-
tial come to fruition.
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5.5  Canadian Sanctuary Cities After COVID-19
The aggravated risks implied for illegalised migrants during the sanitary crisis entail 
the urgent necessity of specific support from authorities. In that sense, one could 
expect sanctuary cities, particularly, to be responsive to their current needs. However, 
while urban initiatives have been implemented around the world to address the vari-
ous vulnerabilities exacerbated by the pandemic, some specifically targeting the 
issues experienced by undocumented migrants, it is not known to date how many 
emergency initiatives were specifically related to sanctuary policies. In the US, 
Chicago notably, which identifies as a Sanctuary City, created an emergency fund, 
offering 1000$US per household excluded from the federal coronavirus relief pay-
ments, including undocumented residents (NBC Chicago, 2020). New Haven, 
which prohibited municipal officers from inquiring immigration status in 2006, 
reinforced their sanctuary policy during the pandemic, extending this prohibition to 
all city employees (McFadden, 2020). Other American disaster relief funds dedi-
cated to undocumented migrants were rather attributed by States, such as California 
(Ho, 2020) and Washington State (Shapiro, 2020). Conversely, as one may antici-
pate, the crisis, also detrimentally affected sanctuary initiatives. For instance, the 
Canadian city of New Westminster suspended their work on the implementation of 
a new Sanctuary City policy in order to redirect the associated staff to an affordable- 
housing project (Mcmanus, 2020). While it didn’t materialise, the then-President of 
the United States, Donald Trump, also threatened to condition coronavirus relief 
funds on compliance to federal immigration law (Burns, 2020). Both events raise 
concerns regarding the fragility of sanctuary policies, especially in times of crisis, 
when they are most needed.
The emergence of sanctuary policies in Canada was the result of years of activ-
ism, of social learning by city governments, and of strategic engagement with policy 
windows (Jeffries & Ridgley, 2020; Moffette & Ridgley, 2018). The large-scale 
social, political, and economic impacts of Covid-19 will generate new opportunities 
for Canadian cities’ involvement in immigration-related matters while also poten-
tially eroding the foundations of sanctuary policies. There is cause for concern that 
budding sanctuary policy development in Canada will be kyboshed if there is a 
return to austerity policy post-pandemic. At the same time, Covid-19 and its inter-
section with deep socio-economic divides have acted as a political disrupter chal-
lenging the neoliberal status quo. There is thus a policy window available for the 
pursuit of progressive change in the direction aligned with sanctuary cities. The 
importance of advocacy rises to the fore in the post-pandemic period. There will be 
struggles regarding the shape of the future. This will require migrant rights groups, 
settlement agencies and their umbrella support organisations, and other progressive 
forces to fight for a solidarity-based, more deeply institutionalised and scaled-up 
sanctuary movement directed at all levels of government in the future. This must be 
aligned with vigorous public advocacy for policies and programmes that support 
open multicultural societies, anti-racism, protection of the most vulnerable migrants, 
and robust social programmes that address structural inequality. This should be 
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aligned with advocacy for improved municipal finance and more stable investment 
for the non-profit sector.
There is a need for sanctuary city activists to imagine what an ideal sanctuary 
city policy and administrative programme could look like in the Canadian context. 
Given provincial legislation that leaves local governments Canada-wide with differ-
ent political systems and policy responsibilities as well as the great diversity of 
Canadian urban environments and populations, this will need to be a flexible policy 
agenda. Local governments across the board are in a difficult position in the 
Canadian landscape. They are closest to the population in the delivery of many 
frontline community and emergency services, often filling gaps or working with 
non-profit agencies to fill gaps. Yet, when these gaps become cavernous, local gov-
ernments cannot cope with the demand because they have the least resources and 
jurisdictional responsibilities. Municipal finance has become additionally precari-
ous during the pandemic as citizens without work struggle with property tax pay-
ments and user fees for services such as public transit have declined considerably. 
Supports for non-status residents become particularly at risk of falling by the way-
side in this context. Municipal governments require additional resources from the 
provinces and the federal government to deliver crucial services. At the same time, 
the outrage over police brutality against Black, Indigenous, and people of colour 
(BIPOC) communities in cities has caused public interest in how municipalities are 
spending the limited tax dollars they have. Municipalities need a much better handle 
on by-law enforcement and policing and the practices of targeting BIPOC individu-
als and communities. These are policy issues that must be dealt with by the munici-
pal council and in public.
The public scrutiny over municipal finance that has come from the call to defund 
the police is an important development away from an enforcement state and creates 
a policy window to fight for a retooled local government that properly invests in 
allocative programmes such as public transit, social housing, public health, and 
ample library and community programmes that meet the unique needs of different 
residents, including non-status migrants. Regarding non-status migrants’ access to 
services, the pandemic has illustrated that the creation of municipal ID cards should 
be considered and that any closure of services should be done carefully with a plan 
for how the most vulnerable populations can continue to access crucial services. 
Municipal and non-profit frontline workers understand the important nature of their 
work for the populations they serve, who are often vulnerable. Local government 
should have assured a way to replace the services shut down by the pandemic. 
Emergency protocols to get services to vulnerable populations are needed in the 
future. Particular attention should have been paid to the transmission of informa-
tion, including accessible translations and targeted locations.
Local governments need, in their urban planning, to understand the service and 
support needs of distinct population groups in different neighbourhoods. In other 
words, cities need to undertake social planning much more diligently and systemati-
cally so that neighbourhoods, apartment buildings, and populations with vulnerable 
residents can receive targeted supports and outreach. This relates to how local gov-
ernments need to have a better handle on the nature and practice of precarious work 
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and the lives and needs of those workers in terms of how they move around and live 
in the city and of their health risks and needs. While they were not without status, 
temporary farmworkers and other essential workers have been hit very hard by the 
pandemic. The conditions of work should have been inspected to assure their pro-
tection, extra measures should have been put in place to prevent their exploitation, 
and they should have been prioritised to receive proper testing and treatment. This 
speaks to the growing and important role of local governments in public health 
information and provision. Local governments require extra public health support 
and funding for prevention and to address crises based on the characters of their 
populations. Furthermore, the crisis has illustrated that local governments need to 
invest in better city-run shelters and in the coordination of these shelters in emer-
gency scenarios. Extra measures should have been taken to address homelessness 
and precarious housing, and local governments need more money to invest in the 
provision of social housing.
We can see from the above pandemic reflections that sanctuary city policies must 
be widespread to include all local government departments and agencies working 
together. These programmes must be institutionalised across departments and agen-
cies, through perhaps a central office that is staffed and funded and situated within 
the city managers’ office, as well as incorporating dedicated staff and funding lines 
in each department and agency. Sanctuary policies must be consistently monitored 
and evaluated and should include emergency protocols for public health and climate 
crises. There is a need for a better collaboration between the provinces, municipali-
ties, and the federal government regarding policy alignment and funding on the 
provision of status, healthcare, income support, social and emergency housing, pub-
lic transit investment, and employment supports.
Moreover, the state needs to work (in an equitable fashion) with other actors in 
society, and in particular with non-profit sector service providers who provide the 
reach into communities where need is greatest. The states, including sanctuary cit-
ies, are dependent upon the non-profit sector to provide core services and supports 
to the public, including vulnerable migrant populations. Non-profits have in fact 
become even more important in recent decades as the neoliberal state has retreated 
from social welfare supports and turned to the non-profit sector to do ever more with 
less state financial assistance (Lowe et al., 2017). Non-profits act as less expensive, 
lean third social support systems and as ‘society’s shock absorbers when a crisis 
hits’ (Speer & Dijkema, 2020). Non-profit service organisations are needed more 
than ever to address human needs, but non-profit providers are themselves in crisis 
due to capacity challenges, declining donations and volunteer labour, revenue loss, 
and instability intensified by the pandemic (The Philantropist, 2020). They may be 
so weakened and under-supported that they will not be in a position to provide the 
necessary levels of support going into the future.
A case in point are food banks as organisations that provide a lifeline to the most 
marginalised in society. The pandemic resulted in enormous increases in demand 
for their services just as their capacity was diminished by the crisis (Fox, 2020). The 
non-profit settlement service sector has also been central in offering supports for 
vulnerable migrants, including housing and legal assistance, language instruction, 
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employment supports, and counselling, among others, generally offered with the 
funding support of government, including sanctuary cities (Praznik & Shields, 
2018). As community-centred organisations, settlement agencies have been built as 
hands-on public-facing agencies. A large share of settlement workers are immi-
grants and direct contact with clients is an important part of the settlement service 
model (Praznik & Shields, 2018). The pandemic has profoundly affected the ability 
of the settlement sector to deliver such services, pushing the settlement sector to be 
resilient and shapeshift into at-distance digital modes as public-facing offices were 
forced to close. The shuttering of most settlement agency offices during the pan-
demic was particularly difficult for the most vulnerable as they were the least able 
to access digital services.
5.6  Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have explored whether and how city sanctuary policies have 
responded to the Covid-19-related risks faced by non-status and precarious migrants. 
In doing so, we have described the specificities and limitations of sanctuary policies 
in Canada; as opposed to American sanctuary policies, Canadian policies are 
focused on access to existing services and information. They also have limited 
impact on immigration enforcement and offer no direct protection to non-status and 
precarious migrants besides assurance that municipal governments will not collect 
or store information about immigration status. These specificities are not the result 
of particular ideologies of city governments but instead reflect the particular posi-
tion of Canadian cities in Canada’s federal regime and their limited resources 
for action.
In Canada, non-status and precarious migrants have faced particular risks and 
have experienced increased vulnerabilities during the pandemic. These include 
access to healthcare, unsafe working conditions, economic insecurity, inadequate 
housing, and limited information. While cities have implemented policies for all of 
their residents, none of the Canadian sanctuary cities have explicitly enacted poli-
cies responding to Covid-19 linked to sanctuary. Moreover, the most impactful 
responses for these populations have, to date, been deployed by provincial 
governments.
Within the jurisdictional spaces of Canadian cities, more can be done to support 
non-status and precarious migrants to face pandemic risks. Cities can start to achieve 
this by: ensuring continued access to the infrastructure that helps migrants gain 
access to information; working on housing through inspections and temporary sup-
port; providing services in multiple language and supporting immigrant-serving 
organisations. Looking into the future, this chapter points to the importance of 
maintaining pressure and momentum to ensure that Canadian sanctuary cities 
remain in place in the post-pandemic recovery but also gain increased capacities. 
Ultimately, the Covid-19 pandemic should serve to reinforce the primary role of 
local governments in attenuating risks for the most vulnerable populations (Bauder 
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& Godoy, 2020; Patuzzi, 2020). And, as with local governments elsewhere in the 
world, this crisis further highlights how these governments can innovate with lim-
ited resources and despite constraining jurisdictional structures.
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The coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated and accentuated an ongoing crisis of 
care. An historic lack of investment in care, especially in areas of elder care, has 
resulted in long-term care (LTC) facilities being the epicentre of the pandemic in 
various nations. This chapter provides some context regarding the care crisis in LTC 
facilities in Ontario, Canada, particularly its relationship with the type and skill mix 
of labour, including the degree to which immigrant workers are represented in this 
sector. Combined with persistent staff shortages, the sustainability of long-term care 
was an international issue of concern prior to the pandemic. Half the nations belong-
ing to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have 
seen population ageing exceed growth in the number of LTC workers (OECD and 
European Union, 2013). When the pandemic arrived, the conditions of those work-
ing and living in LTC facilities became a key issue of public concern in many coun-
tries as Covid-19 infection and mortality rates increased. For example, one-third of 
all coronavirus deaths in France and 75% in Canada (as of November 2020) have 
been in care homes (Walsh & Semeniuk, 2020; National Institute of Ageing, n.d.). 
As with other epidemics, the coronavirus exposed how poor working conditions 
undermine infection control protocols and make workers and residents vulnerable 
to infection. Covid-19 has reinforced arguments about the need to invest in the care 
provided in LTC facilities by also improving conditions of work and enhancing the 
skills composition of workers.
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We begin this chapter with some conceptual reflections on elder care as a matter 
of social justice and ethics in terms of those needing and providing care. We review 
how these ethical and social justice concerns take on a specific global dimension 
because of the transnationalisation of care, or the care provisioning function of 
global care chains. Next, we examine some international comparisons regarding the 
LTC funding models for contextual reference to understand the structural conditions 
within which this globally-sourced workforce is positioned. We then highlight two 
significant contributing factors to the current LTC crisis using Ontario, Canada, as 
an example: first, the role of the private sector and the unsustainable extraction of 
profits from this service and, second, the gendered and racialised devaluing of 
migrant labour so essential to the sector.
6.2  Long-Term Care as a Social Justice Matter
Policy failures in the provision of quality long-term care and the devaluating of the 
labour of those providing care are, at their root, ethical social justice issues. This 
was clearly articulated in a 2002 World Health Organisation-sponsored panel to 
consider ‘ethical choices in long term care: what does Justice require?’ In light of 
the coronavirus pandemic’s impact, it is helpful to revisit that document and its 
argument that ‘[a]ny societal commitment of resources to build institutions needs to 
be accompanied by a commitment to the basic human dignity of those who will use 
them’ (WHO, 2002, ix). The WHO report’s summary observed that the limits of 
how care was being organised were already being reached at that time. The report 
encouraged states to consider ‘alternatives that do not depend on care based exclu-
sively on either affection or market principles’ (ibid., 10). To review the issue, the 
WHO commissioned philosophy and political theorist Martha Nussbaum to con-
sider the ethics underlying long-term care, arguing that ‘the problem of care is a 
complicated logistical problem for any society. It is also, most emphatically, an ethi-
cal problem…’ (ibid., 34).
Nussbaum’s recommendations included building a universal framework to 
underpin the ethics of care that moves away from the social contract model of jus-
tice, since this model assumes all actors are rational bargainers and have the neces-
sary competencies to bargain equally. Her suggested way forward is to first include 
care as a primary good – a basic need that all humans require at some stage of their 
life – and change the idea of primary goods to that of capabilities, as this allows for 
a more accurate comparison of quality of life across diverse contexts. Nussbaum 
argues that such a model results in a process whereby people’s ‘asymmetrical needs 
are treated as part of their human dignity, rather than as large social costs to be 
borne’ (ibid., 63). This echoes Martha Albertson Fineman’s (2008) work on vulner-
ability and the human condition, in that vulnerability is recognised as a universal 
constant of the human condition, one that necessitates models of state responsibility 
and responsiveness.
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An interesting aspect of the 2002 WHO report on the ethics of care reveals an 
early recognition of the significant of what Yeates (2011) later termed the transna-
tionalisation of care, or the global organisation of care-giving: ‘Much of the care-
giving in wealthy and developed countries is being provided by care workers, 
nursing professionals, and others who have migrated from impoverished and devel-
oping countries. While these workers may experience economic benefit, they also 
create gaps in their own families and communities. Arguably, wealthy nations incur 
a debt in this exchange that somehow needs to be repaid. Likewise, it is reasonable 
to ask if the multinational corporations that depend on the natural and human 
resources in developing countries have a responsibility to fill the gaps in caregiving 
they help to create’ (WHO, 2002, x).
The WHO report acknowledged the consequences of this global provisioning of 
care in terms of the problems sending nations face in servicing it, and more impor-
tantly, the responsibilities that should be incurred on the part of receiving nations 
who benefit from it. The reality today is that health and long-term care provision 
have become transnationalised as care (especially elder care) is effectively out-
sourced by wealthy countries through the incorporation of migrant workers whose 
rights and benefits are often constrained through state and labour market restrictions 
(Ormond & Toyota, 2018).
6.3  Global Care Chains and the Transnationalisation 
of Care Work
The reality of this transnationalisation of care has been explored through the idea of 
Global Care Chains: a series of global connections, or a chain, based on the paid and 
unpaid work of caring (Hochschild, 2015; Yeates, 2011). These chains allow for the 
extraction of care based on the exploitation of multiple divisions including gender, 
ethnicity, class, and uneven development. The devaluing of feminised skills is a key 
feature of these global migration processes under these conditions of globalising 
care (Kofman, 2014; Yeates, 2009). Aligned to this, the sovereign practice of grant-
ing or limiting rights (through state and non-state mechanisms) has the effect of 
further stratifying feminised care workers into low-paid precarious positions by 
governing their mobility through various filtering processes (Mezzadra & Neilson, 
2013). High-income nations have seen women move into the workforce without 
states providing social welfare systems to care for children and the elderly (that is, 
the unpaid labour that women traditionally provided) (Browne & Braun, 2008). In 
these wealthier nations, care work has effectively been outsourced: from being the 
responsibility of women within the household, it is now racialised women from 
developing nations who leave their own families to care for others. This care labour 
is both commoditised and devalued, with compensation far below the actual value 
of the care provided. This process has been captured through the concept of ‘global 
care chains’.
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The WHO has referred to migrant women care workers as ‘a cushion for states 
that lack adequate public provision for long-term care, childcare and care for the 
sick’ (WHO, 2017, 9). It identifies a ‘care paradox’, wherein migrant women work 
to fulfil the growing need for care workers in high-income and middle-income 
nations and strengthen weak health systems, while lacking health services them-
selves (Hennebry & Walton-Roberts, 2019). This paradox is highlighted in the chal-
lenging role visible minority and migrant women play as care providers and care 
aides in LTC homes, typically working in low-paid positions deemed ‘low-skilled’ 
while actually performing complex and essential services for vulnerable dependent 
populations (Browne & Braun, 2008).
Internationally, the number of migrant care workers in LTC in core nations is 
growing. In the United States, as of 2011, one in four care workers in LTC were 
migrants – a 5% increase from 2005 (Browne & Braun, 2008; OECD, 2015). In the 
United Kingdom, the number of migrant care workers more than doubled between 
2001 and 2009, from 7% to 18% (Shutes, 2011). Currently, the UK’s social care 
sector faces significant challenges in a post-Brexit context since under the new 
immigration policy rules care workers do not earn enough to qualify for immigra-
tion, yet the sector already relies on over 350,000 migrant workers with 8% of 
vacancies unfilled (Economist, 2020). A similar trend can be found in Canada, with 
research suggesting migrant workers represent up to 50% of LTC caregivers in cer-
tain provinces (Estabrooks et  al., 2014). According to the 2016 census, visible 
minority workers are overrepresented as nursing home employees across all 
Canadian provinces (Multicultural Meanderings, 2019; Turcotte & Savage, 2020).
The demographic shift in who performs care labour in high-income nations is 
evident, and racial as well as gendered intersectional prejudice cannot be disassoci-
ated from the crisis of care in LTC homes and facilities. In OECD nations, 90% of 
LTC workers are women and approximately 45% of them work part-time (OECD, 
2019). What is consistent across the literature is that care work is socially regarded 
as work to which women are naturally predisposed; it is thus essentialised as femi-
nine labour and considered unskilled, which facilitates its devaluation (Browne & 
Braun, 2008; Horton, 2019). Employers can naturalise this labour market segmenta-
tion by reproducing ideas about certain racial and cultural backgrounds making 
migrant workers better at caring for older populations and less likely to complain 
about strenuous or difficult work conditions (Atanackovic & Bourgeault, 2013). 
Employers often believe that migrant workers are more likely to be willing to work 
longer hours and are more flexible with shifts (Ruhs & Anderson, 2013). Immigration 
and employment policies, alongside structural forms of gendered and racial dis-
crimination, create precarious employment conditions for immigrant workers in this 
sector (Robillard et al., 2018). Restrictive immigration status combines with these 
labour market contexts to make it easier to retain immigrants in jobs with working 
conditions non-migrants would not tolerate. Additionally, immigrants might be 
attractive as ‘high-quality workers for low-skilled jobs’, especially in non-regulated 
occupations where skills can be determined by the employer and reflect their inter-
ests, including what they want to pay and how they want people to behave (Ruhs & 
Anderson, 2013). These preconceptions can lead to problematic relationships 
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between employers and workers, with employers limiting workers’ options to 
access greater rights (ibid.). Employers can leverage the precarious status of immi-
grant caregivers to pay lower wages and maintain poor working conditions (Goldring 
& Landolt, 2013). Central to this issue of ethics, then, is assessing and appreciating 
how the role of migrant caregivers within core nations’ systems of elder care provi-
sion might be shaped by the organisation and financing of this sector. We begin with 
consideration of the policy dimensions of LTC and how various states have attempted 
to fund and provide it.
6.4  Financing Long-Term Care and the Rise of Privatisation
Part of the larger debate about the crisis of elder care in high-income nations is how 
LTC should be financed. What is consistent across different nations is the sheer cost 
of LTC.  In the next 30 to 40 years, high-income states will need to double their 
spending in the LTC sector to keep up with ageing populations. High-income 
nations face ageing populations in need of care, yet they often lack the necessary 
workforce to fulfil their needs. In France, for example, the number of individuals 
over 65 is set to rise by 40% by the year 2030 (Chevreul & Berg Brigham, 2013). In 
Canada, those over 65 make up 15.6% of the population, and this demographic is set 
to grow to 23% by 2030 (Government of Canada, 2014). The European Commission 
estimates that the EU will need to increase spending on LTC from 1.8% of GDP to 
3.6% by 2060 (Glinskaya & Feng, 2018).
There are different political interests and approaches to the financing of LTC. In 
Canada, the US, and the UK, there has been growth in private ownership and opera-
tion of LTC facilities. In Alberta, for example, there has been a recent push toward 
selling two publicly-owned LTC homes to cut costs, increase revenues, and open up 
more beds (Vernon, 2020). According to the Ontario Long-Term Care Association, 
59% of LTC facilities in Ontario are privately owned, 25% are non-profit, and 16% 
are public (OLTCA, n.d.). International comparative research has also shown how 
privatisation pressures in the LTC sector have increased across several high-income 
nations as well as revealed the resulting negative influence privatisation has on the 
quality of work and care in the sector (Armstrong & Armstrong, 2019).
Despite the various approaches to funding LTC across the globe, these are gener-
ally unsustainable as the world population continues to age. For example, a recent 
special report on dementia in The Economist used the tagline: ‘Nowhere in the 
world is ready to cope with the global explosion of dementia’ (Economist, 2020, 3). 
Table 6.1 demonstrates the different types of LTC financing being used by various 
states. In Germany, Japan, and South Korea, citizens must ‘opt in’ to mandatory 
insurance schemes to help finance their stay in LTC (The Federal Ministry of 
Health, Germany, 2017). In the case of Germany, insurance covers part of the costs 
for long- term living, the rest is paid for through out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditures 
and sometimes another social program (ibid.). In the German case, LTC is not 
specifically publicly funded and therefore is not means-tested (Nadash et al., 2011). 
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In Japan, LTC is funded by the national government; the insurance premiums paid 
by citizens and access to LTC in Japan are means-tested and dependent on age and 
ability (Glinskaya & Feng, 2018). Similarly, in Korea the system is financed through 
government subsidies, mandatory premium payments by the general population that 
accounts for 60–65% of the cost, and OOP spending by those using the facilities. 
Due to the programme being partially publicly funded, however, it is not means- 
tested and universally covers citizens over 65 (ibid.). In France, LTC is publicly 
funded through taxation and has achieved around 70% coverage. The levels of cov-
erage for the French programme are heavily income-adjusted: those with the lowest 
income do not make any co-payments to receive access to the programme whereas 
those with higher incomes contribute up to 90% in co-payments (Chevreul & Berg 
Brigham, 2013). In the UK, LTC is also publicly funded, however, patients face 
means-testing and some are also required to contribute to co-payments for living in 
the facilities, with a lifetime cap of £72,000 (OECD and European Union, 2013).
In the UK, many LTC facilities are privately owned and managed. Small private 
companies often rely on banks to finance the LTC homes they own, and this type of 
funding is often stricter and more difficult to obtain. However, larger private organ-
isations that own multiple LTC facilities have recently shifted to private equity firm 
investment which, compared to public markets or banks, is more tolerant of high 
levels of debt (Horton, 2019). As a result, private equity firms such as Blackstone or 
Alliance are investing money in poorly-managed and debt-encumbered LTC homes 
that would be deemed risky investments. This need for increased private investment 
is a result of government austerity measures and decreased public ownership and 
funding of LTC facilities. The private companies that own LTC facilities then choose 
to open branches that seek to serve poor and underserved communities to maintain 
their eligibility to receive available public funding (Horton, 2019). These private 
equity firms make a profit through the buying, selling, and investing in real estate 
assets not through the daily business of managing the facilities and the care of 
patients. LTC in the UK is regulated by the state through a quality assurance frame-
work. Facilities are required to register with the Care Quality Commission and fulfil 
the requirements outlined by the commission (OECD and European Union, 2013). 
Thus both public and private facilities are expected to meet the same standards. 
However, the opposing interests of private financial interests and government 
Table 6.1 Global approaches to funding LTC





ai.e., access based on need or only the desire to go into a long term-care facility
Sources: based on information from Glinskaya and Feng (2018), Chevreul and Brigham (2013) 
and OECD and European Union (2013)
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requirements make the operation of LTCs complex, and effective regulatory over-
sight and enforcement necessary, but often insufficient. Research suggests that non- 
profit providers offer higher-quality care than for-profit providers (Barron & 
West, 2017).
Similar LTC issues are faced in Ontario, and these have been further highlighted 
by the current Covid-19 crisis. LTC facilities are run by non-profit organizations, 
private companies, or public municipalities (OLTCA, n.d.). These facilities must be 
licensed and funded by the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care. Facilities can 
be privately run and owned, but the fees of individual residents are publicly funded, 
with some out-of-pocket costs or co-pays (ibid.). Ontario’s provincial government 
has failed to fund LTC appropriately. Between 2011 and 2018, there was a 0.8% 
increase in available beds in public facilities, while the waitlist for beds almost 
doubled in number (see Fig. 6.1) (Gibson, 2019).
Ontario’s current Progressive Conservative government cut funding to LTC facil-
ities before the Covid-19 crisis. On 21 April 2020, the Ontario Health Coalition 
published an update on the pandemic, stating that there had been outbreaks in 155 
LTC homes, with 2687 confirmed cases and at least 341 deaths (Ontario Health 
Coalition, 2020a). A report published by the Ontario Health Coalition on 6 May 
2020, showed that the rate of Covid-19 deaths in private care homes were double 
those in publicly-funded homes (see Fig. 6.2) (Ontario Health Coalition, 2020b). 
Pat Armstrong et al. (2020) assert that Ontario’s push to privatise LTC is in direct 
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Fig. 6.1 Number of LTC beds in Ontario versus number of Ontarians on the wait list. (Source: 
Based on data from ‘Long-Term Care Homes Program: A Review of the Plan to Create 15,000 
New Long-Term Care Beds in Ontario’, Financial Accountability Office of Ontario, 2019)
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Careful analysis of the consequences of privatising LTC provision indicates the 
centrality of legislation that allows for the devaluing and marginalisation of workers 
in the sector. Evidence from Ponder et al. (2020) regarding early 2000s legislation 
by British Columbia’s Liberal government to increase private sector investment in 
LTC has shown that minimising labour costs is central to such measures, which 
allow for strategies like ‘contract flipping’ that resist unionisation and continually 
depress labour costs and restructure work conditions. This significance of labour 
‘flexibility’ led Ponder et al. (2020, 9) to argue that ‘the ability granted to private 
sector actors by Bill 94 to reduce labour costs associated with participating in the 
sectoral bargaining model appears to have been crucial for motivating private invest-
ment in the nursing home sector’. Ponder et al. (ibid.) further highlight key conse-
quences of these structural transformations for workers in the sector in terms of a 
degradation of management-worker relations, lower remuneration and loss of ben-
efits, chronic changes in the working-care environment due to staff shortages and 
turnover (among other issues), and moral distress (in care workers’ inability to 
report their concerns about residents’ welfare).
6.5  ‘Conditions of Work are the Conditions of Care’: 
Ontario and the LTC Crisis During the Pandemic
The preconditions contributing to the crisis in LTC facilities during the coronavirus 
pandemic include a lack of investment in elder care (and, by extension, to the prob-
lematic dependence on the private sector), the underdevelopment of employee skills 
and training, and poor working conditions for those employed in the sector. An 
international research network focused on quality of care provided to those with 
complex medical cases highlighted five key areas for improvement in LTC facilities 
based on the weaknesses exposed by Covid-19 (Hirdes et al., 2020). First, the need 

































Fig. 6.2 Ontario death rates per total LTC beds available, by type of ownership. (Source: Based 
on OLTCA data)
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complex medical conditions but receive less nursing care than residents in hospitals 
and continuing care facilities. Second, the need for collaboration to improve quality 
of care and quality of life through common performance measures, knowledge 
exchange, and transparency in reporting and benchmarking. Third, the chaos and 
lack of information and preparedness in some facilities that emerged during the 
pandemic reveals the importance of improving the evidence base across the sector, 
which entails the use of standardised assessment instruments, real-time reporting 
systems, and better in-house analytical and assessment capacity. Fourth, LTC facili-
ties need to be supported through better pandemic and emergency preparedness 
planning since in some countries (including Canada) LTC homes were not included 
in hospital pandemic planning protocols, procedures for infection control, or PPE 
stock requirements. Fifth, a recommendation to improve LTC employees’ quality of 
work life since staffing is a key factor in some of the most adverse outcomes in LTC 
facilities because of the part-time, precarious, and insecure nature of employment 
for the majority of care workers. Clearly work conditions in the sector are seen as 
centrally important in the overall quality of care provided (Barken and 
Armstrong, 2017).
6.6  Migrant Care Labour in LTC: Status, Skill Mix, 
and Conditions of Work and Care
During the pandemic it became apparent that essential workers in the care sector 
disproportionality included more immigrants  – especially women and often 
racialised workers. Turcotte and Savage (2020) show that between 1996 and 2016, 
the proportion of immigrants in the occupations of nurse aide, orderly, and patient 
service associate rose from 22 to 36%. Across Canada the share of immigrants in 
these occupational groups ranges provincially from 2.9% in Newfoundland and 
Labrador to 51.6% in Alberta, and is more concentrated in Canada’s largest cities, 
ranging from 47.8% in Montreal to 78.7% in Toronto. In terms of gender, the major-
ity (often around 80%) are women, with an overrepresentation of Black, Filipino, 
and South Asian ethno-national communities. Indicatively, Black women represent 
26% of the care aide occupational group but less than 4% of all immigrant workers 
in other occupations. The sector also includes a rather highly educated group of 
workers, especially in the most recently arrived immigrant cohorts, with 45% of the 
most recent immigrants in these occupations having at least a Bachelor’s degree. Of 
those recent immigrants with a university degree working in the sector, 44% had 
completed their studies in a health-related field; of these, two-thirds held nursing 
degrees. Turcotte and Savage (ibid.) report on immigrants in Canada (those granted 
citizenship or permanent residence) so there may, in fact, be a larger number of 
migrant workers in Canada’s care sector when we consider the possible inclusion of 
temporary migrants – among them the more than 640,000 international students and 
55,000 asylum claimants who are granted permission to work. For example, during 
6 Migrant Care Labour, Covid-19, and the Long-Term Care Crisis: Achieving…
114
the pandemic it became evident that asylum seekers in Montreal were working as 
LTC care aides, and they have received public support and calls for their status to be 
converted to permanent residence (Seidle, 2020). In August 2020 the Federal gov-
ernment announced a temporary measure providing a pathway to permanent resi-
dency for asylum claimants who were working in the healthcare sector during the 
Covid-19 pandemic (Government of Canada, 2020).
Working conditions in Ontario LTC facilities are especially dire, with studies 
indicating insufficient training for caregivers, rigid hierarchies within facilities, 
understaffed homes, and poor levels of care (Barken & Armstrong, 2017). Pat 
Armstrong et al. (2020) contend that years of governments deprioritising the sector 
have rendered those in care much more vulnerable to Covid-19.
In Canada residential care for those in need of assistance with daily living 
includes a range of facilities, many of which are assessed and monitored using the 
Continuing Care Reporting System (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 
n.d.). The clinical data standard for CCRS uses a reporting system developed by 
interrai (n.d.), an international research network. There is a range of residential 
facilities, varying from short-term, post-acute care in skilled nursing facilities to 
long-term, chronic care and nursing home institutional settings (see Table 6.2). The 
degree of clinical care provided and the skill mix of workers differs across these 
institutions and can include physicians, nursing staff (registered nurses and regis-
tered practical nurses), other allied health professionals, and personal support work-
ers (PSWs). The latter are unregulated care providers with no defined scope of 
practice, whose role has evolved to include functions formerly provided by regu-
lated health professionals. As the intensity of care needs increases, the mix of work-
ers includes more regulated professionals, but it is clear that PSWs are essential to 
most residential care facilities. Research has indicated that these factors, combined 
with the variation in PSW education and employment standards, has significant 
implications for patient safety and quality of care (Kelly & Bourgeault, 2015; Saari 
et al., 2018). PSWs in this sector are low-paid, overworked, mostly part-time, and 
often piece together two or more jobs across many facilities (Sproule, 2020). The 
pandemic has exposed how migrants, including asylum seekers, are working as 
PSWs in essential fields and how they have been at the forefront of the fight against 
Covid-19 in long-term residential care (LTRC) facilities (Seidle, 2020).
6.7  Bearing Witness to the Crisis in Pandemic Times
For Ontario the reality of the crisis in LTC became news in April 2020 when 
Canadian troops were deployed to five facilities in Greater Toronto to support staff 
and contain patient infection (Raymond, 2020). The Canadian Armed Forces Joint 
Task Force issued a fairly damning report on 20 May 2020 on the conditions found 
in LTC homes during their deployment. Staffing was consistently mentioned as a 
key issue at all five LTC facilities where the military intervened, with 60 mentions 
in the 15-page report; problems with management issues appeared almost as 
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frequently (JTFC, 2020). Issues cited include the misuse of personal protective 
equipment (PPE) by staff due to the lack of PPE available; insufficient staff training; 
a general lack of staff at the facilities; a lack in staff autonomy and agency; a lack of 
clinical skills; and overall failure to make Covid-19 protocols clear to staff (ibid.). 
The report offers examples of facilities employing new workers without providing 
adequate training and leaving workers to fend for themselves within the workplace 
with inadequate ratios and staffing numbers. Employees were often uninformed 
about appropriate safety measures and could not locate PPE supplies within the 
facilities or access them at all (ibid.). Despite its focus on five LTC facilities, the 
report highlights trends that were likely evident across Ontario LTC facilities. None 
of this was news to researchers and labour activists who had long lobbied for 
improved conditions. The province also took over the management of certain long- 
term care facilities (LTCF) that have reached critical levels in curbing Covid-19 
outbreaks (Ministry of Long-Term Care, 2020). For example, Humber River 
Hospital assumed the management of Villa Colombo, a LTCF in North York (ibid.). 
This was done this on a temporary basis as a result of the management’s failure to 
control the spread of Covid-19.
Table 6.2 Types of care facilities, description of care, and workers employed
Type of care 
facility Description of care provided





Housing communities for seniors who are able to care 
for themselves but wish to be around others of the 
same age. Does not necessarily include in-home 
assistance, but individuals can hire home-care 
workers to assist them if needed.
Do not employ medical 
workers or PSWs, but 





Facilities that provide daily assistance to seniors who 
require help with cooking, cleaning, eating or 
personal hygiene, but do not require intensive medical 
care. For individuals needing minimal assistance.
Employ PSWs to offer 
light support to seniors 
living in the facility.
Residential 
care facilities
Living facilities that also provide medical or personal 
assistance to seniors. For those needing moderate 
levels of assistance.
Employ PSWs and 
nurses. Doctors may be 
available but are not 





Communities that provide various levels of living 
assistance, from independent living to more intensive 
medical care and assistance with daily tasks. Seniors 
living in these communities can move between 
different levels of care as they become more 
dependent on others in their daily life.
Employ PSWs and 
nurses. Doctors may be 
available but are not 
employed by every 
facility.
Nursing homes Facilities that provide intensive medical care and 
higher levels of assistance with eating, personal 
hygiene, etc. These are focused on providing care for 
very dependent patients and offer 24/7 assistance.
Employ PSWs and 
nurses. Doctors may be 
available but are not 
employed by every 
facility.
Source: Based on information from the National Caregivers Library and Barken and 
Armstrong (2018)
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These subsequent actions come as part of the government’s response to Covid-19 
outbreaks in LTCFs, including more funding to increase the number of LTC beds by 
8000, temporary wage increases of between $2 and $3 an hour for over 147,000 
PSWs, and mandating employees only work at one LTC facility to reduce the risk 
of the spread of infection (Ontario Government COVID-19 Action Plan, 2020). 
Although increasing the number of beds is positive, the Ford government had previ-
ously cut proposed funding and bed increases (D’Mello, 2020). Moreover, the PSW 
pay increases are only temporary and staff have reported a loss of income as a result 
of the mandatory order to work at only one facility. These decisions are a delayed 
response to previous attempts at reducing support and funding for elder care, which 
proved detrimental to the Covid-19 response at LTCFs in Ontario. These shortcom-
ings have been known to researchers for some time, with studies indicating there 
‘has been a persistence, if not intensification, in job precarity; inadequate staffing 
levels coupled with heavy workloads; routinised, assembly-line types of work; and 
cost-cutting on supplies’ (Lowndes & Struthers, 2017, 1). What is needed is a coher-
ent plan to address understaffing (Ontario Health Coalition, 2020a, b). In a letter 
addressed to Ontario’s LTC facilities, Deputy Minister of Long-Term Care Richard 
Steele writes, ‘while we have all been focused on managing emerging crisis situa-
tions, as the course of the pandemic evolves, it is essential that there is a clear focus 
on returning all homes to a state of staffing stability’ (CBC, 2020). However, the 
claim that LTC facilities in Ontario had staffing stability before this crisis carries 
little merit. Ontario’s labour unions and activists have been reiterating the need to 
appropriately address the issues in LTC. Labour unions claimed the government’s 
chronic underfunding of LTC has resulted in the current crisis and that in response 
‘[t]he government must mandate a permanent standardisation of pay to the top wage 
rates in the sector, full time schedules, improved access to benefits and adequate 
paid leaves for personal support workers’ (Ontario Federation of Labour, 2020). 
Similarly, a CBC news report cited the president of SEIU Healthcare, a healthcare 
workers union, as saying that if the provincial government fails to make LTC staff-
ing a priority, this crisis will not end (Brown, 2020).
Covid-19 has highlighted the care crisis that already existed in Ontario, through-
out Canada, and across high-income nations; a crisis exacerbated by lack of regula-
tion and increased encroachment of private interests. The provision of elder care is 
an issue of social justice and ethics and speaks to basic human rights and needs we 
all have as members of society. Increasingly, core nations have managed this social 
care policy issue by globalising their labour sourcing and incorporating migrant 
women into the sector. Immigration policies that reduce migrants’ rights and inten-
sify their vulnerability, together with increased privatisation and financialisation of 
the long-term care sector that reduces salaries and benefits, undermines the working 
conditions of those in LTC and has created conditions that serve neither those in 
need of care, nor those who provide it. As Armstrong et al. (2020, 7) state ‘the con-
ditions of work are the conditions of care’. The increased involvement of private 
interests is detrimental to LTC. Private companies cut costs to improve their bottom 
line, and the biggest expense is labour. The squeeze on labour has contributed to the 
deterioration of care as fewer workers are employed to deal with complex care 
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needs, with less training and support. In this regard, we agree with Nancy Fraser’s 
(2016, 99) contention that ‘the “crisis of care” is best interpreted as a more or less 
acute expression of the social reproductive contradictions of financialised capital-
ism’. Furthermore, in terms of policy responses, we support and contribute to the 
arguments already made by scholars and activists, that in terms of LTC, the condi-
tions of work are the conditions of care (Block & Dhunna, 2020). Any resolution of 
this social policy issue demands that we satisfy the needs of both the consumers of 
care (patients and their families) and the providers of care, who in many OECD 
nations are disproportionality women and immigrant women of colour.
Ai-Jen Poo (2020), the American labour activist and director of the National 
Domestic Workers Alliance, writes that historically, a zero-sum model has been 
utilised between families and care workers. The cost of care work has become inter-
linked with the ability of families to afford care for their elderly family members 
and that ‘[l]owering costs for families’ necessities depressing wages for workers. 
Raising wages for workers means cutting services for families’ (ibid.). However, as 
Poo and other labour activists highlight, this should not be the case: government 
intervention is necessary to address the issue of LTC financing in a way that best 
supports workers and, as a consequence, clients.
The following recommendations, based on expert opinion and government- 
commissioned reports, address the issues of labour and funding in the LTC sector 
(Armstrong et  al., 2020; Romanow, 2002). First, workers’ compensation in LTC 
facilities must be better regulated, ensuring that workers make a living wage that is 
commensurate with the valuable, difficult, and labour-intensive work they perform. 
Second, LTC workers should be hired into permanent full-time positions to allow 
workers access to employee rights and benefits and minimise the number of care 
workers employed at two or more LTC facilities. Third, care workers who enter the 
country as temporary migrants should be regularised to allow them increased access 
to Canadian and provincial employee rights and minimise their vulnerabilities to 
employer exploitation. Finally, LTC should be deemed a medically necessary crite-
ria under the Canada Health Act, in line with the recommendations proposed by the 
2002 Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada (Romanow Commission).
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Chapter 7
Pandemic Shock Absorbers: Domestic 




This chapter tackles the variety of ways in which worker centres in the United States 
have been at the frontline of the response to domestic workers’ needs, addressing a 
gap in mainstream and otherwise insufficient relief measures provided by the gov-
ernment. Because of these gaps and the sheer level of need faced by these workers 
and their families, these centres did what they were prepared to do: continue the 
service provision, education, organising, and advocacy efforts (Fine, 2006) while 
expanding their efforts in each of these areas of work.
Domestic work, which we understand as part of the larger umbrella of care work 
(building and maintaining human infrastructure) that remains within the household 
(Duffy et al., 2015) – including the work of nannies, personal care assistants, and 
cleaners – is a sector with a disproportionate presence of immigrants and workers of 
colour (Duffy, 2005, 2020). In the US there are more than 2.2 million people who 
are cleaners, personal caregivers including agency-based PCAs, and nannies (Wolfe 
et al., 2020): 91.5% of domestic workers in the US are women (predominantly nan-
nies, 96.8%), while men are slightly more common in home care work, comprising 
While working on this paper we had a chance to share the preliminary findings with the students 
of Elizabeth Pellerito’s ‘Introduction to Labor Studies’ course that gave us one of the impulses to 
work on the topic. Members of the Socio-Cultural Research team at the Centre of Migration 
Research, University of Warsaw, Kamil Matuszczyk and Sabrina Marchetti have read the first draft 
and offered useful comments. We are grateful to Anna Triandafyllidou for the inspiring comments 
and all the editorial work on the volume.
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up to 13.9% in certain categories of home care aides (Wolfe et al., 2020). According 
to official data, around 17% of all workers in the US were born elsewhere – a pro-
portion that exceeds 35% in the domestic sector. Specifically, 69.3% of house clean-
ers are foreign born and 50.8% of them do not have American citizenship (Wolfe 
et  al., 2020). The proportion of immigrant workers is likely underestimated 
(Burnham & Theodore, 2012).
Black and Hispanic workers in the US are much more likely to work in the 
domestic sector than white non-Hispanic workers. White non-Hispanic workers 
comprise 63% of the general workforce, Black non-Hispanic 12%, Hispanic work-
ers of any race 17%, and Asian American/Pacific Islanders 6.3%. However, in 
domestic work these proportions are inflated in the case of non-white and Hispanic 
populations, with white non-Hispanic workers accounting for 42% of domestic 
workers, Black non-Hispanic people 22%, Hispanic persons of any race 29%, and 
Asian American/Pacific Islanders 6.9% (Wolfe et al., 2020).
Accordingly, since many domestic workers are immigrants and people of colour, 
it is important to reframe the COVID-19 pandemic as a syndemic, meaning that it 
encompasses both biological and socioeconomic aspects (Horton, 2020). While the 
Covid-19 crisis has affected domestic workers severely on a global level (ILO, 
2020b), in the US they were affected both as participants in a high-risk labour sector 
and as members of demographic groups particularly impacted by the pandemic. 
Due to structural inequities in access to healthcare and safe and healthy living and 
working conditions, members of ethnic and racial minority groups in the US have 
been disproportionately hit by the virus (Gellat, 2020). These socioeconomic ineq-
uities impact most domestic workers, who tend to have less access to healthcare yet 
find themselves labelled ‘essential workers’ and put on the frontlines of risk. While 
a small part of essential work is ‘teleworkable’, more worrisome are jobs that are 
often more at risk under the pandemic because of direct and bodily contact with 
other people, including domestic and care workers (Marchetti, 2020).
Historically, domestic workers have existed at the margins of the labour market 
and have been excluded from universal labour protections. Prior to the pandemic, 
domestic workers’ organisations had already been addressing the needs of this par-
ticular group of workers, advocating in a variety of ways for their inclusion in labour 
laws and for immigration reform. Because domestic workers in most US states lack 
the right to form unions, their rights have been taken up by worker centres operating 
at the intersection of their marginalisation both as workers and as immigrants. It is 
not enough to address them only as workers or only as immigrants – their intersec-
tional marginalisation requires an intersectional approach (Marchetti et al., forth-
coming). In this chapter, we examine both the ways in which domestic workers 
themselves acted as ‘shock absorbers’ for the immediate crises presented to their 
employers by the pandemic, as well as the ways in which domestic workers used 
their advocacy organizations in order to mitigate the impacts they themselves expe-
rienced. Workers’ organisations in the US have continued the work they were doing 
to support and advocate for these workers prior to the pandemic, while adapting to 
the specific challenges brought about by the pandemic to amplify the voice of care 
and domestic workers.
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Despite the fact that only one-third of the American workforce has been able to 
work from home during the pandemic (BLS, 2019), people were ordered or encour-
aged to shelter in place and self-isolate. Homes thus became even more unusual and 
very ‘sensitive’ workplaces as the basic unit of quarantine. A cleaner, a nanny, or a 
care assistant is a foreign element in the home in non-pandemic times – often cross-
ing class, ethnic, or race boundaries when entering the employer’s household. 
During a period of state-mandated stay-at-home orders, these workers become 
intruders into the safe ‘bubble’ of the private home and another potential ‘vector’ of 
the disease. Accordingly, many employers who had the option of working from 
home (or were laid off) decided they did not need cleaning or care services for their 
children, thus making whole categories of workers expendable with little or no 
warning. It is another moment in the history of the ways in which ‘contamination’ 
and ‘purity’ have been written onto the bodies and work lives of immigrants more 
broadly (Boris, Chap. 4, this volume).
The pandemic created a new urgency in defining who is an ‘essential’ worker; 
like agricultural workers, healthcare workers, and delivery workers, domestic work-
ers have found themselves at the centre of a debate about how and whether their 
labour is valued (cf. Marchetti, 2020). Not coincidentally, these groups have histori-
cally been, and continue to be, disproportionately recruited from immigrants and 
workers of colour. While migrant populations have been affected worldwide by sud-
den restrictions, it should be noted that the immigration situation in the US differs 
from the European context. The US immigrant population is more settled and per-
manent and has a larger number and proportion of undocumented (unauthorised) 
migrants who, by the nature of restrictions, are often less mobile. On the other hand, 
a large proportion of migrants in Europe are mobile within the Free Movement Area 
(Pew, 2019, 2020; IOM, 2019). In the US, despite being a permanent and indispens-
able part of the economy, large numbers of immigrants have been and still are struc-
turally marginalised (Boris, Chap. 4, this volume).
In addition, the relief measures applied by governments have left out many 
domestic workers, their subcategories, and workers of certain backgrounds. In one 
study it turned out that more than half of the white US-born workers and less than 
one-fifth of all other workers reported receiving a stimulus check, the basic form of 
COVID-related relief in the US (Rosińska, 2021). This is true for many European 
countries – for instance live-in workers in Germany and self-employed workers in 
Austria have not been covered by Covid-related protections (Leiblfinger et  al., 
2020). Domestic workers in Italy and Spain did not have access to emergency 
income or special unemployment provisions but were included after grassroots 
pressure in both countries (Marchetti & Jokela, forthcoming). The situation of 
immigrants, especially those who are unauthorised, is the worst – as was the case in 
pre-pandemic times – with only a minority of countries, like Portugal, extending 
benefits such as healthcare to all residents irrespective of their status (ibid.). In 
France, frontline workers could be fast-tracked for citizenship. In the US, as in most 
countries, we did not see the ‘effective membership’ inclusion (cf. Triandafyllidou, 
Chap. 1, this volume), but rather a reinforcement of divisions and rebordering.
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To understand and learn from the response of domestic workers’ organisations to 
the crisis at hand, we will discuss the impact of the pandemic on domestic workers, 
including the relief measures that excluded or included them, and how these filtered 
through their demographic composition. We will present the history of legal exclu-
sions in this sector and domestic workers’ struggle for recognition and analyse how 
their activities during the pandemic are rooted in the long history of this activism. In 
particular, we analyse the worker centre as a site of activism for both domestic 
workers and immigrant workers. We examine how the strategies traditionally used 
by these organisations, including service provision, education, organising and advo-
cacy (cf. Fine, 2006), have continued to be important, and have been adapted and 
amplified to address the needs of the workers during the pandemic in the short and 
long term (cf. Pleyers, 2020). We argue that worker centres skilfully engage the 
controversial terminology of ‘essential’ workers in order to reinvent the connections 
between immigrants’ rights and general workers’ rights to the advantage of domes-
tic workers.
7.2  Methods
Drawing on an online ethnography of organisations and ongoing policy reviews, we 
analyse the multilevel response of domestic workers’ organisations to address the 
crisis. This analysis is embedded in the authors’ respective experiences of research-
ing and collaborating with Massachusetts-based worker centres. Specifically,  we 
draw on Anna Rosińska’s study Intersections of class and ethnicity in paid domestic 
and care work1 within her visiting research at the University of Massachusetts 
Lowell (2018–2020) and Elizabeth Pellerito’s work as the Director of the Labor 
Education Program at the University of Massachusetts Lowell (an extension pro-
gramme that provides education about workers’ rights and organising skills to adult 
workers outside the university system) and as a member of the board of several 
organisations (including the Women’s Institute for Leadership Development, WILD2).
To understand organisations’ responses and measures affecting domestic work-
ers, we engaged in online ethnography (Caliandro, 2018; Pink et al., 2016). This 
entailed ongoing online observation and participation in the period from March to 
November 2020, including attending around 20 online events aimed at training and 
supporting workers at various stages of the pandemic, as well as taking notes and 
documenting the meetings through screenshots. Anna Rosińska was modestly 
involved as a volunteer in distributing the NDWA funds by Matahari in Massachusetts; 
she has also met online with the Brazillian Women’s Group, Dominican Development 
Centre, and Polish workers from Arise Chicago in the course of her research, 
1 This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innova-
tion programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 799195.
2 http://wildlabor.org/
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including during the pandemic. Elizabeth Pellerito co-organised events that were 
attended by members of the Brazilian Workers Center. We were also closely follow-
ing and analysing new policy measures with the help of policy briefings and follow-
ing experts who were guest speakers at the aforementioned events.
The online ethnography pertains primarily to Massachusetts-based organisa-
tions, and the policy review to federal level initiatives; however, in the chapter we 
will discuss selected cases from activism and policy measures at the national level 
as well as activism from several states other than Massachusetts.
7.3  Domestic Workers in the US at the Intersection of Race, 
Class, and Ethnicity
Historically, domestic workers in the US were first recruited from enslaved popula-
tions. After abolition, these roles were re-categorised as domestic servant positions 
and were still very distant from what we understand as gainfully-employed workers; 
they were often occupied by formerly enslaved women and eventually their descen-
dants (Rollins, 1985; Nadasen, 2015; Boris, 2019; Boris & Nadasen, 2008). While 
New Deal-era labour laws brought a wide range of workers under the umbrella of 
the labour protections traditionally provided by unions, domestic work and other 
sectors largely populated by people of colour, African Americans in particular, and 
immigrants were excluded from the start (farm work, other service jobs). The lin-
gering effects of this exclusion, or in many cases actual legal marginalisation of 
these occupations, forms a baseline condition for domestic workers also under the 
pandemic of Covid-19.
The 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the 1938 Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) excluded domestic and several other categories of workers. 
A 1974 amendment brought many (but not all) domestic workers under the umbrella 
of the law’s protections. Under the FLSA, domestic workers who work at least 8 h 
per week are entitled to the standard federal minimum wage and overtime protec-
tions – unless they are employed ‘on a casual basis’ to provide babysitting or com-
panionship services, in which case they may be exempted [§206(f) and §213(a)
(15)], though the definition of ‘companionship’ was considerably narrowed in 2015.
Similarly, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act, 1970) exempts 
employers with fewer than ten employees, employees in the public sector, or those 
who are ‘self-employed’, a designation that has been used as a loophole to exclude 
many categories of independent contractors from key recordkeeping requirements 
that help ensure enforcement. OSHA acts as a federal baseline; individual states 
may pass laws that meet and exceed these standards, including an application of 
these standards to state, county, and municipal employees and other employees in 
the public sector. At this time, 24 states fall solely under federal OSHA jurisdiction 
(OSHA, 2020).
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Because federal law has been generally considered weak and difficult to enforce 
in private households, domestic workers have successfully turned to state-wide pro-
tections, increasingly in the form of Domestic Workers’ Bills of Rights (DWBORs). 
As of February 2021, ten states (New York, Hawaii, California, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Nevada, Oregon, New Mexico, Virginia) and two cities 
(Seattle and Philadelphia) have passed laws that in various ways include all or some 
domestic workers in the general labour regulations (Boris et al., 2015; Wolfe et al., 
2020).3 While the laws are not uniform, they require employers to provide a written 
contract for domestic workers, protect against wage theft, enforce health and safety 
language for home workplaces including recordkeeping and the responsibility to 
post safety information, and perhaps most importantly, provide an avenue for civil 
litigation against employers. Despite the low likelihood of advancing federal stan-
dards under an administration that was hostile to labour but encouraged by the suc-
cesses at the state level, the NDWA proposed the Domestic Workers Bill of Rights 
Act to Congress in 2019, a first attempt to not only include domestic workers under 
general labour regulations but to address the specificity of this sector at the fed-
eral level.
7.4  Being a Domestic Worker in the US Under 
the Pandemic: Impact on the Ground and the Relief 
Measures Excluding Domestic Workers
There are several dimensions of the pandemic’s impact that affect domestic workers 
unevenly. First, Covid-19 is affecting workers as an illness. Because the pandemic 
is actually a syndemic (Horton, 2020) – or, in other words, comprised of concomi-
tant pandemics of the virus, racism, and the economic crisis – workers dispropor-
tionately from racial and ethnic minorities and who work for the lowest wages are 
to be expected to be hit the hardest by the virus (OHCHR, 2020; Clark et al., 2020). 
No data is available on the incidence of the cases among domestic workers, but 
information on the disproportionate number of Hispanic and Black people getting 
sick and dying from Covid-19, and evidence of personal care givers contracting the 
virus and missing from work at large numbers, hint at the possible impact on the 
group (see also Gelatt, 2020).
Secondly, measures such as lockdowns and stay at home orders implemented to 
curb the spread cause, in and of themselves, many workers to lose their jobs. 
Government orders differentiating between essential and non-essential businesses, 
for example, make the work of self-employed cleaners ‘illegal’ for periods of time 
in some states (Wilson & Stimpson, 2020; Gelatt, 2020).
3 The most recent bill was passed in Virginia in February 2021, https://www.facebook.com/
CareInActionUS/photos/a.1945630589063175/2546275405665354/
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Thirdly, there are measures designed to manage the economic impact of the dis-
ease and the lockdowns in the form of Covid-related relief policies. Domestic work-
ers are excluded from some of these regulations as an occupational group, and 
sub-categories of workers are left out because of their status as undocumented 
immigrants, for example (Wilson & Stimpson, 2020). All three factors have a dispa-
rate impact on domestic workers.
Based on available reports and the analysis of our own data, we have identified a 
polarisation into two further variants of vulnerability under the pandemic: some 
workers are vulnerable because they are without a job and other domestic workers 
are vulnerable because they are still on the job.
‘Vulnerable because out of work’ is the type of impact that has been the most 
highlighted in media coverage of the pandemic and the available research data are 
the most alarming about it. The Six months in crisis report on Spanish-speaking 
domestic workers, most of them housecleaners, states: ‘by late March, more than 
90% of workers lost jobs due to Covid-19’ and 70% were out of work in early May 
(López González & Anderson, 2020). The Notes from the storm report on Black 
immigrant workers identified that ‘[i]n all locations, 70% of the Black immigrant 
domestic workers surveyed have either lost their jobs (45%) or received reduced 
hours and pay (25%)’ (IPS, 2020).
People who lost their jobs have struggled financially to cover basic expenses. 
According to our analysis, this scenario has been typical for cleaners and some nan-
nies. They have struggled with rent payments and faced housing and food insecurity 
(López González & Anderson, 2020). Losing jobs or having hours cut is common 
among domestic workers, alongside housing insecurity and the lack of a safety net, 
also according to the IPS report (IPS, 2020).
Other workers found themselves in a situation where they were required to work, 
sometimes more, and in dangerous conditions and under a lot of stress. They are 
‘vulnerable because still on the job’. This was especially common in the situation of 
PCAs that, by the nature of their job, are usually in contact with multiple clients. 
Frontline workers including PCAs have reported not having access to personal pro-
tective equipment (PPE). Lack of PPE, lack of medical insurance, and exposure to 
Covid-19 were mentioned as the major threats to those still on the job (IPS, 2020; 
for more on the differentiated impact on domestic workers in various jobs, see 
Rosińska, 2021).
Within every job, particular vulnerability was experienced by undocumented 
workers. They were more likely to lose their jobs in two of the three locations stud-
ied by WeDiB (López González & Anderson, 2020). Domestic workers often do not 
have any formal safety net, whether due to their status as undocumented immigrants 
or as workers not recognised by employment regulations. Those immigrant workers 
who can travel to and from their country of origin often rely on healthcare and other 
services that are more affordable back home. This has been cut off due to the closing 
of borders (Wilson & Stimpson, 2020).
While domestic workers face increased vulnerability from the syndemic itself 
and the lockdown measures that jeopardise their employment, the federal relief 
measures passed early in the pandemic included some domestic workers under the 
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umbrella of workers in need of relief. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act 
(FFCRA) provided for increased food assistance and, at least in theory, provided for 
emergency paid medical leave for care of oneself or a family member through 
December 2020, to be paid by the employer (FFCRA, 2020). However, undocu-
mented immigrants are largely excluded from food aid programmes like SNAP and 
WIC, are ineligible for federal stimulus checks, and may be less likely to seek assis-
tance in the first place due to their vulnerable legal status, concern about the risk of 
deportation when applying, and the potential impact of applying for public support 
on current or future visa applications (see López González & Anderson, 2020; IPS, 
2020). Emergency paid sick leave provisions are only available to full- time employ-
ees (US Code §5102).
The Essential Workers Bill of Rights, introduced in April 2020 by Senator 
Elizabeth Warren and Representative Ro Khanna, would rectify many of these 
exclusions by naming domestic and care workers under the umbrella of eligible 
workers. The policy would explicitly provide health and safety protections, pre-
mium pay, universal paid sick leave, childcare, and more, but also tackle broader 
labour issues such as the misclassification of workers and corporate tax breaks.
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), also 
passed in March 2020, widened the umbrella of eligibility for unemployment insur-
ance (UI) and extended the amount of time an individual can collect UI (US Code 
§2102); established moratoria on foreclosure and eviction in properties that receive 
federal funding (US Code §4022–4);4 and issued one-time stimulus payments and 
additional boosts to UI payments for a short period of time. While the importance 
of expanding unemployment insurance to independent contractors and other vulner-
able employees should not be underestimated, the barriers to collection remain in 
place for employees without a steady, full-time work history and, in particular, for 
undocumented workers.
As for OSHA, the agency’s response to Covid-19 has been widely criticised as 
slow and inadequate, largely attributed to bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of 
political will to protect workers in the anti-worker and anti-immigrant Trump 
Administration. There is no OSHA standard for worker safety during the pandemic 
in spite of advocates pushing for one; more disturbingly, OSHA has declined to 
provide workplace enforcement of Covid-specific guidance.5 While OSHA grants 
employees the right to refuse unsafe work, the standard for refusal and the enforce-
ment of this policy is weak and it seems unlikely that domestic workers could ben-
efit from this clause (Berkowitz & Sonn, 2020). Individual states with OSHA 
regulations have likewise been overburdened to the point of incapacity. Each of 
these Acts and agencies need to be understood within the exclusionary historical 
4 A more widespread eviction moratorium has been declared by the CDC, though at the time of 
writing it is set to expire in March 2021 with no further relief in sight and with Covid-19 cases and 
new unemployment applications still soaring.
5 One of President Biden’s first acts when he took office in January 2021 was to direct OSHA to 
create such a standard, though at the time of writing it has not yet been issued.
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context of US labour law. While these Acts did provide some basic protections to 
domestic workers, nonetheless immigrants remained in precarious situations.
Mindful of the developments and some improvements under the new administra-
tion that took office in January 2021, the rest of this chapter depicts the response of 
the organisations throughout 2020, under particularly difficult circumstances.
7.5  Domestic Workers’ Activism in the US
In the US, organising in the domestic sector has a rich and deep history going back 
to the end of the nineteenth century. In the early days of the movement, from the 
1881 washerwomen’s strike in Atlanta, Georgia, Black domestic workers who dom-
inated the sector became the first advocates of domestic workers’ rights. Black 
domestic workers’ activism peaked in the Fifties, Sixties, and Seventies (Nadasen, 
2015). One of the results of that period of activism was the passing of the amend-
ment to the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1974 that included domestic workers under 
these laws, discussed in the previous section, as well as advancements on the state 
level, for example by the efforts of Women’s Service Club of Boston, which was 
able to enact legislation including domestic workers in state labour regulations.6
Starting from the 2000s, there was a new wave of domestic worker organising 
that was principally led by immigrant workers. The movement broadly shifted its 
energies toward mobilising and organising diverse immigrant and local workers on 
a large scale. These efforts bore fruit in the form of the National Domestic Workers 
Alliance (NDWA), established in 2007 by 13 organisations from around the coun-
try. Among the NDWA’s achievements is inspiring the Domestic Workers Bill of 
Rights passed in New York in 2010, and consequently, in nine more states and two 
cities; one of their recent initiatives was the National Domestic Workers Bill of 
Rights that was presented to Congress in July 2019 and re-introduced in July 2021.
Along with advocacy organizations like the NDWA that span the entire country, 
domestic workers in the US have largely built power through worker centres in the 
twenty-first century. These centres are often organised along lines of race, ethnicity, 
or nationality, and have historically organised African American workers and immi-
grants working in precarious industries left behind by organised labour. Because of 
the growing prevalence of immigrants in the sector, and the fact that domestic work-
ers are excluded from the list of industries that can unionise at the federal level, 
many (though not all) worker centres that have developed in the US have by neces-
sity focused on both economic justice and immigrant justice, in many cases present-
ing them as inseparable. And because these centres provide a space for the most 
precarious workers to come together, they face a unique set of challenges, even in 
pre-pandemic times. Many worker centres find creative ways to overcome these 
challenges, including creating multi-lingual spaces, providing childcare during 
6 https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/497429
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meetings, and using public spaces like parks or libraries or even buses for outreach. 
This has been the case in Massachusetts, where activism has largely been led by the 
Massachusetts Coalition of Domestic Workers (MCDW) formed in 2010 by two 
workers centres: the Dominican Development Center that works with Dominican 
personal caregivers, and Matahari, a women’s worker centre that principally repre-
sents nannies and au pairs from all over the world but was established as an organ-
isation for gender justice; and by the Brazilian Women’s Group, a grassroots 
organisation that mostly mobilises Brazilian cleaners. Throughout 2020 and as of 
August 2021, the Massachusetts Coalition of Domestic Workers steering committee 
has been composed of Dominican Development Center, Brazilian Women’s Group, 
Brazilian Worker Center, Massachusetts Coalition for Occupational Safety and 
Health (MassCOSH) and Women’s Institute for Leadership Development (WILD).7
Janice Fine defines the work of immigrant worker centres in particular into three 
types: service delivery, advocacy, and organising; to this, we would add education 
and participatory research as additional categories that are central to the missions of 
many centres (2006). All these activities, and more, were a vital part of everyday 
work for the domestic workers organisations long before the pandemic. For exam-
ple, the Brazilian Worker Center provided food help for community members in 
need; the MCDW first successfully campaigned for the Bill and then organised 
regular trainings and workshops around the Domestic Workers Bill of Rights; and 
Matahari established neighbourhood chapters and organised International Nanny 
Training Day and other forms of learning and outreach. The events were multilin-
gual. The Brazilian Women’s Group established a cleaning cooperative that empha-
sised justice at work and safety for the environment and cleaners. Together with 
NDWA, Boston-based organisations carried out local research that contributed to 
the Home Economics report (Burnham & Theodore, 2012). These are only some of 
the multitude of pre-pandemic activities (see also Tracy et al., 2014).
7.6  Domestic Workers’ Activism Under the Pandemic. 
Addressing the Old Problems and the Covid- 
19- Related Challenges
In many ways, domestic workers’ organisations and worker centres in general have 
always operated in an emergency mode – trying to make up for the permanent defi-
ciencies in social security measures for immigrant and working class members. So, 
in a way, they have been more prepared for the pandemic than many other organisa-
tions because they have been forced to organise incredibly vulnerable and often 
dispersed workers on an ongoing basis. Globally, social movements adapted to the 
challenges of the lockdown, and as Geofrey Pleyers explains, have continued, modi-
fied, or invented five basic activities: protests, workfare actions and strikes; 
7 http://www.massdomesticworkers.org/about-steering-committee
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solidarity efforts; monitoring policymakers; and popular education and politicisa-
tion (2020). Popular education, monitoring policymakers, pushing for social reform, 
and solidarity efforts have been at the heart of the work performed by domestic 
workers organisations.
In what comes next, we discuss four types of activism: service delivery, popular 
education, organising, and political advocacy (including participatory research), 
during the Covid-19 pandemic. The organisations continued some of these activi-
ties, added new ones to respond to immediate needs, but also considerably expanded 
some actions, trying to use the pandemic as an opportunity to push their agenda 
forward. We will also analyse in what ways immigrant and domestic workers’ rights 
intertwined during the pandemic. In each case, we offer a review of existing prac-
tices and close-ups of selected practices.
7.6.1  Service Delivery
Though direct service often plays a role in the daily work of worker centres, the 
pandemic pushed this form of interaction with workers to the forefront, particularly 
in light of the fact that immigrant and undocumented populations face unique barri-
ers in accessing government relief programmes as described above. We define ser-
vice delivery as any programme that provides food, cash assistance, or legal aid to 
meet material needs of members. Whereas pre-pandemic service provision was 
dominated by assistance with wage and labour complaints and access to govern-
ment services, translation, and ESL classes, widespread loss of income meant that 
many organisations shifted to providing large-scale material relief in the form of 
food and supplies. Both the NDWA and many worker centres across the country 
offered some version of a mutual aid programme in which members could receive 
weekly food deliveries, masks, and PPE, or apply for cash assistance grants. For 
example, the NDWA has established a Coronavirus Care Fund that has assisted over 
30,000 domestic workers and their families. The Brazilian Worker Center in Boston 
has begun weekly food and diaper distribution, and paired this work with political 
campaigns and education including census outreach and advocacy for a bill that 
would provide access to driver’s licences to undocumented immigrants (see video at 
https://youtu.be/R- QEflFsutQ and in Advocacy subsection).
Matahari Women Workers’ Center of Boston reports that they have distributed 
over $340,000 in direct aid to more than 700 applicants, with priority funding going 
to domestic workers and undocumented workers. This number includes the NDWA 
funds and likely also money distributed through MassUndocuFund, a joint initiative 
between Massachusetts Jobs with Justice, Matahari, and One Fair Wage, which to 
date has distributed over $1 million to more than 800 undocumented families in 
Massachusetts. The Chinese Progressive Association in San Francisco reports on 
their website that they distributed $30,000  in assistance to 60 families; however, 
they also report that they received 4500 applications.
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Before the pandemic, the models for mutual aid work in the US included trade 
unions, the work of the Black Panther Party, African American-led earlier domestic 
workers organisations (Nadasen, 2015), and more recently the work of disability 
justice organisers, most notably Mia Mingus and the Bay Area Transformative 
Justice Collective. The context of mutual aid organising during Covid-19 differs 
from these other examples in the extent to which these funds have gone mainstream 
and the availability of foundation grants for distribution in networks that might have 
been more tightly regulated prior to the emergency.
Many of the mutual aid networks that have popped up have been regionally 
based, primarily online, and largely in English. One area of future study should be 
the extent to which mutual aid networks as constituted in the pandemic replicate the 
structural inequalities already present in more traditional models of non-profit work; 
in this context it appears likely that the mutual aid work of worker centres, particu-
larly those focused on immigrant women, is able to address some of the imbalance 
present elsewhere.
7.6.2  Popular Education
Popular education has always been at the core of domestic work activism. We define 
popular education as programming that uses liberatory pedagogy to deconstruct the 
expert/novice dichotomy (i.e., it values the prior knowledge and experience of stu-
dents) and, crucially, seeks political change as an outcome. Rather than simply pro-
viding information and expecting students to absorb that knowledge, popular 
education asks students to reflect on their own experiences and the systemic causes 
of oppression, and then asks them to take political action to create change. Popular 
education centres language justice by acknowledging that members have different 
linguistic needs and by providing the resources in many languages and making sure 
that as many members have information available in a language in which they feel 
most comfortable. Typically, pre-pandemic training was offered in person and trans-
lated simultaneously. As an example, the National Domestic Workers Alliance 
Assembly in February 2020 was translated into seven languages and the International 
Nanny Training Day organised by Matahari in 2019 was made available in five lan-
guages simultaneously. As Covid-19 in general was a very new phenomenon, hav-
ing information about the virus and about safety measures quickly became vital. 
Suddenly language justice became fundamental, a life and death type of situation, 
especially early in the pandemic. As more information were becoming available, the 
organisations provided online resources and training in more languages. In particu-
lar, the organisations provided information on the virus itself, on safety measures 
that workers should take, and on cleaning and disinfecting in an efficient but also 
safe manner.
In Massachusetts and in other states that have passed Domestic Workers Bills of 
Rights, considerable energy has been dedicated to promoting and enforcing these 
Bills. These efforts continued under the pandemic, but on top of regular educational 
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resources, there was also a need to expand the topic as new information and regula-
tions were becoming available. Workers’ rights training continued to be provided 
but included information on the safety net measures and how to access them.
What changed under the pandemic was that training went online, with various 
organisations adjusting to the remote format in different times. The online events 
mushroomed and making online resources available grew in importance. One of the 
first online Covid-19 related trainings was the webinar “What domestic workers 
need to know during the public health crisis” organised by Matahari on 19 March 
2020. The presentation was available in English and Spanish, and emphasised the 
accessibility of state laws irrespective of the immigration status.
The Massachusetts Coalition of Domestic Workers covered the topic of paid sick 
leave and new unemployment benefits in a Zoom call held in Spanish, Portuguese, 
and English on 9 April with a lawyer from Greater Boston Legal Services answering 
questions. The regulations were so new that the lawyers did not have answers to all 
the questions, but as a follow-up a leaflet in Spanish and Portuguese was distributed, 
providing basic information and contact details. The New  York chapter of the 
NDWA held a ‘Paid sick leave webinar/Pago por ausencia laboral seminario’ on 28 
April 2020 that discussed regulations including Federal Families First Coronavirus 
Response Act, New York State Emergency Sick Leave, New York City Safe and 
Sick Time, and Westchester County Safe and Sick Time. Likewise, the Chinese 
Progressive Association in San Francisco carried out Know Your Rights trainings in 
Chinese and English.
The Women’s Institute for Leadership Development held their annual Summer 
Institute over Zoom (it is usually held over 3 days on a college campus in June). 
Whereas the Summer Institute usually focuses on leadership development and spe-
cific skills workshops for women in unions and workers’ organisations, the 2020 
version happened over the course of one day and focused all workshops on 
pandemic- related information while providing simultaneous interpretation in 
English, Spanish, and Portuguese.
The information provided at many of these trainings was perhaps more geared 
towards those still employed (workers’ rights, paid sick leave, refusing unsafe work, 
tips on cleaning safely), but also about applying for unemployment insurance, 
including ‘new unemployment’ available under the CARES Act to new categories 
of workers (for example, independent contractors, especially pertinent to some 
house cleaners). This holds especially in the light of the overwhelming prevalence 
of unemployment related to workplace closures in the US in comparison to Europe 
(ILO, 2020a), of how common furloughs were, and within the domestic sector, how 
common it was to lose a job (ILO, 2020b).
Among online resources, we wanted to highlight the information and resource 
hub created by the NDWA, available at https://membership.domesticworkers.org/
coronavirus. As early as May 2020 the NDWA launched a simple webpage with a 
list of links such as “What is coronavirus?”, “Tips for home care workers”, 
“Information on accessing health care”. By November 2020 this page had grown 
into a Coronavirus Resource Centre, with articulate subsections that offer learning 
opportunities, support, and ways to get involved. The swift adaptation to an online 
format was a way to provide members with information, but also gave them a new 
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platform to connect and continue the sense of community, and also seek help 
through applying to the Coronavirus Care Fund and get involved (more under 
Organising below).
7.6.3  Organising
We define organising as bringing people together in the same space (physical or 
virtual) to build power, define goals, and take action together in order to change 
their conditions. While it can be read more broadly as encompassing all of the other 
areas of work, organising specifically focuses on relationship building, often via 
group meetings or one-on-ones. Because of the marginal position of domestic work-
ers, in comparison to more traditional union organising, worker centres’ focus has 
not been on membership as in the case of unions but on organising for change and 
creating a common space to come together. In addition, domestic workers’ move-
ment organising historically was community-based rather than workplace-based 
because of the particular character of the household as a workplace and workers’ 
isolation (Nadasen, 2015). This took creative forms such as recruiting members on 
the bus rides by Dorothy Bolden in Atlanta, Georgia, in the 1960s, and more recently 
required a lot of in-person outreach, like for example distributing flowers to nannies 
and au pairs in Boston public parks alongside information about the organisation 
during Nanny Appreciation Week (September 2019); working through neighbour-
hood sections, including local new members’ orientations sessions; and working 
with members in one-on-one sessions  – all of which are examples of past 
Matahari work.
The isolation of domestic workers has always been an inherent part of the sector 
so in some ways domestic workers were always going to be better positioned to 
adapt to organising in shutdown. Some groups quickly moved their organising (and 
education) efforts online. In doing so, it was important not only to keep the informa-
tion flow but also to provide a space of emotional care. Dominican Development 
Centre and NDWA NY chapters host regular weekly check-in sessions. NDWA 
offered a Care Together text line for emotional support and weekly Connection 
Calls to address isolation and distress. The purpose was to stay in touch, provide 
each other company in times of isolation, and exchange experiences. Many of the 
meetings start with a circle of everybody sharing something personal. Some of these 
events have built-in fun segments. For example, a circle meeting of MCDW had a 
music listening component. The We Dream in Black chapter of the NDWA launched 
the ‘Unbossed agenda’ at a separate dance party with a professional DJ. The WILD 
Summer Institute included a multilingual talent show, with members sharing poems, 
performances, stories, and singalongs in their native languages.
New Labor is a worker centre and advocacy organisation in New Jersey that 
largely focuses on Hispanic workers in precarious industries including, but not lim-
ited to, domestic work. They built an online video library with interviews from a 
variety of workers on a set topic each week during the pandemic – from shutdown 
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to culturally relevant holidays to the right to refuse unsafe work to the Black Lives 
Matter movement. This gives workers a forum to come together, educate one 
another, share stories and experiences, and advocate for initiatives like a New Jersey 
domestic workers’ bill of rights. (https://newlabor.org/covid19/).
It should be noted here that as organisations were moving online, their members 
had to adjust as well, and to the best of our knowledge, there was no training on 
digital literacy nor was there support for broadband or internet access. While the 
online move was the only one available, it may have also left behind those workers 
who are not confident with technology, live in rural areas without reliable broad-
band, or cannot afford consistent access to internet service.
7.6.4  Political Advocacy
Despite the dire and immediate needs of members, the organisations engaged in 
political advocacy alongside providing support to individual workers at previously 
unknown levels. We define political advocacy as the venue to address the ground- 
level problems at the systemic level by creating political pressure to effect changes 
in legal statutes and interpretation. According to the survey with Spanish-speaking 
workers, this is precisely what workers want. When consulted about priorities in 
negotiating the new federal relief package in August, they pointed to free Covid-19 
testing and treatment regardless of immigration status, childcare support, and food 
support for those in need (López González & Anderson, 2020).
This issue was part of a major study of Spanish-speaking domestic workers 
through the Alianza chatbot by NDWA. In fact, research efforts mushroomed under 
the pandemic. The organisations very quickly realised that they needed data to back 
up their claims. And the domestic sector in general is very hard to accurately esti-
mate because of the prevalent informality and the fact that some of the workers are 
undocumented. There always is a need to study the sector and hence some of the 
research projects brought to light under the pandemic were part of long-planned 
endeavours, like the We Dream in Black study of Black immigrant workers in 
Massachusetts, California, and Florida, published as the Notes from the storm report 
(IPS, 2020). Established projects shifted to encompass the pandemic in new ways. 
The Alianza survey switched from monthly to weekly to better reflect the swift 
changes in workers’ lives as they moved in and out of work. Another early project 
was the ‘Listening campaign’ by Matahari, in which organisers called 92 members 
to collect information about the Covid-19 crisis impact – and presented the results 
early in the pandemic, in May. All these instances were either participatory, carried 
out with, by, and for the members, or very strongly embedded in already established 
communication practices, like the chatbot Alianza that allowed the NDWA survey 
of more than 16,000 Hispanic domestic workers (López González & Anderson, 2020).
In general, it seems that organisations that worked with specific communities on 
a given terrain were swamped with needs and applications for support, and it was 
probably more difficult for them to get involved in advocacy during the crisis. 
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NDWA and some state-level umbrella organisations like the Massachusetts or 
California Coalitions of Domestic Workers were probably better equipped to handle 
both direct service provision in the form of funds and push for new legislation 
simultaneously. They acted at the federal and state levels respectively, pushing for 
passing Families First, CARES, or HEROES acts, but also to include domestic 
workers in the state health and safety regulations, as was the case of California 
Coalition of Domestic Workers, or protesting against ending the eviction morato-
rium in Massachusetts by the Massachusetts Coalition.
As is evident, some initiatives were focused on Covid-19, while some were 
grounded in more general issues and needs. Some were more reactive, some more 
proactive. Federal-level advocacy was more about organising against exclusion by 
advocating for the inclusion of domestic workers in relief bills, including the 
Essential Workers Bill of Rights introduced by Sen. Warren and Rep. Khanna. But 
the (unsuccessful) California initiative, for example, was one of the proactive efforts 
trying to highlight the needs of care workers in times when they are considered 
essential and closer to the centre of attention than usual.
This advocacy reflected the organisations’ collective identity scope and wider 
alliances they wanted to support. It is important to note that there were initiatives 
directly connected to domestic work, but also addressing needs of larger categories 
of workers and only partly overlapping with the domestic workers, like the afore-
mentioned eviction moratorium. Several efforts were grounded in the immigrants’ 
rights framework already present in their activism. Two examples include the 
Driving Families Forward campaign and the advocacy around the term ‘essen-
tial work’.
A key example of how traditional advocacy campaigns have overlapped with the 
impacts of Covid-19 is the Driving Families Forward campaign in Massachusetts. A 
coalition of labour unions, worker centres, economic justice organisations, and 
immigrants’ rights organisations began a campaign in 2019 for the passage of the 
Work and Family Mobility Act, which would provide the right to apply for a driv-
ers’ licence to undocumented immigrants (though there had been a much longer 
history of advocacy on this issue in the region). The coalition is co-led by Natalicia 
Tracy, director of the Brazilian Worker Center, and Dalida Rocha, Political Director 
of Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 32BJ Local 615, representing 
largely janitors and security officers in New England.
Before the onset of Covid-19, the campaign focused on convincing state legisla-
tors to co-sponsor the bills in the Senate and House; building community support 
and endorsements from key sectors including labour, faith, social justice, and, cru-
cially, law enforcement; and mobilising the public to contact their legislators in 
support of the bills. Key talking points in support of the Act prior to March 2020 
included public safety, the need for mobility and limitations of public transporta-
tion, immigrants’ rights, and economic stability for both undocumented immigrants 
and state tax revenues.
After the onset of Covid-19, the campaign shifted its messaging to address 
broader concerns relevant to the pandemic, including public health and spread of 
disease, and the stability of supply chains. A flyer released by the campaign declares, 
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‘Work & Family Mobility Act becomes even more critical during Covid-19 pan-
demic/Licencia de Conducir Para Inmigrantes se vuelve critico durante la pandemia 
de Covid-19’. The flyer’s text explains that immigrants are part of the essential 
workforce – including agricultural workers, cleaners, and healthcare workers – that 
others rely on during the pandemic and that public transportation does not allow for 
safe social distancing on their way to and from work, access to drive-through-only 
Covid-19 testing sites, and safer transportation for children accessing in-person 
education. A driver’s licence would also allow easier access to food and healthcare 
for immigrants and their families, helping to lower the total disease burden on area 
hospitals. Finally, the flyer explains that the agricultural industry is largely staffed 
by immigrants who do not have safe access to and from work without a driver’s 
licence; providing licences would help stabilise supply chains during a time of 
shortages.
The rhetorical strategies of the new flyer are largely the same, relying on both the 
human rights of immigrants and on the self-interest of non-immigrant populations 
in granting rights that would increase public health and safety. However, the cam-
paign was able to shift its rhetoric toward the issues at the forefront of public anxiet-
ies around the pandemic, while being careful not to play into xenophobic narratives 
about immigrants spreading disease. A higher disease burden is not inherent to 
immigrants, the flyers are clear to note, but rather due to laws and regulations that 
could be improved to stop the spread of the disease for everyone. These flyers were 
included with food distribution by the Brazilian Worker Center, and social media 
posts about immediate assistance were nearly always accompanied by action items 
to push for the passage of the Work and Family Mobility Act. In this way, Covid-19 
response almost always included multiple of the categories we analyse here, in this 
case including service, education, organising, and advocacy.
The pandemic edition of the ‘Driving Families Forward’ campaign made an 
explicit reference to the essential work argument, present in the public discourse 
and some regulations. Also, the National Domestic Workers Alliance has repeatedly 
claimed that ‘Domestic work is essential work’ and campaigned for the Essential 
Workers Bill of Rights, which explicitly includes domestic workers. The label itself 
appears a controversial way of obliging some workers to sustain the work-from- 
home mode of a minority of workers, even if, for example in Massachusetts, divid-
ing businesses into essential and non-essential was aimed at keeping the bare 
minimum of activity to curb the spread of the virus. There are several other prob-
lems with being an essential worker under the pandemic. Some workers do not have 
much choice but to work, even if the workplaces are not safe for them, with employ-
ers not providing personal protective equipment, as was the case of personal care 
aides and many healthcare workers.
Risky work is required of workers who as undocumented immigrants, concen-
trated among others in agriculture, meatpacking, and domestic work, have little 
protection in case they get sick. So why are the immigration justice and domestic 
workers organisations making an appeal to this category and embracing it? In our 
opinion, they are trying to counter the overall exploitative narrative by using essen-
tial work as a platform to access rights otherwise unavailable rather than just 
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accepting the risky obligation to provide vital services, no strings attached. There is 
a symbolic aspect to it, and in a way stating that domestic work is essential work, 
for example by the NDWA, is another way of saying ‘we make all other work pos-
sible’, ‘we are fundamental’. This is a way to have their importance recognised 
under new circumstances. There is a long historical tendency to treat domestic 
workers as ‘disposable domestics’ (Chang, 2000), meaning that they are both fun-
damental for everyday life but also so marginalised and replaceable that it is possi-
ble to just ‘dispose’ of them. By claiming the status of essential workers under these 
new circumstances, the organisations are counteracting the disposability and rein-
forcing the fundamentality narrative.
The important step implied in claiming the status of essential workers seems to 
be about making domestic employment official and formalised. Informality of the 
sector is one of its biggest problems, and it has a devastating impact on a laid-off 
person who cannot claim any benefits because they were not in formal employment 
to start with. This is more common among undocumented workers. Essential work-
ers should not work without a contract, right? But by claiming this status, the organ-
isations aim at more than just helping the workers to step out of the shadows. It is 
about gaining the benefits that they consider due. As essential workers, they require 
personal protective equipment, inclusion in relief funds, keeping their jobs, or hav-
ing the right to stay home to care for themselves or a loved one – or all. Just recently, 
Matahari has argued that domestic workers should be included in Phase 2 of the 
vaccine rollout in Massachusetts just like all essential workers.8 These organisations 
are trying to navigate the ‘essential work’ paradoxes as best they can, to the advan-
tage of domestic workers.
Domestic jobs are not created equal and the impact has been diverse depending 
on whether you are a nanny, a PCA, or a cleaner. Some workers, predominantly 
PCAs and some nannies, found themselves working more and confronted more 
challenges and risks on the job. Some, as most cleaners and some nannies, were laid 
off with short notice and often no access to any relief or benefits  (cf. Rosińska 
2021). It seems that recognising all domestic workers as essential prevents problems 
tied to both kinds of situations: protection for those on the job, paid time off to any-
body who needs a break, and inclusion in unemployment and relief measures in 
case the workers are out of a job.
Similarly, some organisations and unions have pushed for ‘hazard pay’ for low- 
paid workers whose jobs cannot be done remotely, mainly in grocery and retail 
sectors. This strategy, like that of harnessing the rhetoric of essential work and 
workers, is not without controversy. Specifically, it positions these workers as cen-
tral for white collar survival during the pandemic but presumes a return to the status 
quo when the social ‘emergency’ has ended; it also raises the fraught question of 
how exactly to quantify the lethal risks taken by the working classes on behalf of the 
wealthier classes. A more equitable approach would mean that nobody feels inclined 
to put themselves and their families at risk because of financial need. This is 
8 A letter to demand vaccine access for all domestic workers: https://linktr.ee/mataharijustice
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balanced by the desire to gain some benefit more tangible than gratitude for these 
workers. Those in the informal sectors, who may or may not be documented, are 
essential in the sense that their labour contributes to the comfort or survival of oth-
ers but are simultaneously declared disposable by employer and government poli-
cies that write them out of relief benefits.
7.7  Concluding Remarks
During a health and safety campaign at our public university employer this spring, 
management refused to provide face coverings for the maintenance workers on 
campus  – and simultaneously tried to unroll a ‘safe return to campus’ plan for 
research workers in labs that included free daily masks for researchers. Ultimately, 
when the coalition of campus unions pointed out that treating different categories of 
workers differently affects the spread of disease for everyone, the university’s 
administration changed its mind and began to provide face coverings for all work-
ers, including the lower-paid, immigrant workers in the maintenance unit.
The Covid-19 pandemic emphasises that real public health cannot be divided 
into sectors based on income, ethnicity, or immigration status. But what the syn-
demic teaches us is that introducing a pandemic into a system that is already largely 
out of balance and historically rooted in unequal treatment means that some – usu-
ally, those with the least to lose – will face much greater risks.
While public rhetoric in the US since March 2020 has emphasised togetherness 
and unity – for example, businesses and cities posting signs declaring ‘we are all in 
this together’ and ‘support our essential workers’ – the situation of domestic work-
ers paints a very different picture of the real situation. Flattening the curve, after all, 
is never about stopping the virus in its tracks; it always presumes a base level of 
cases (and fatalities) that are seemingly unavoidable, and in this way, the most vul-
nerable workers are expected to act as shock absorbers that allow the rest of the 
system to function.
The organisations’ responses to the Covid-19 crisis span from the initiatives 
addressed at individual workers in terms of organising funds and resources to pro-
vide financial, material, and food security to continuous training and organising in 
the online mode to continued and amplified policy campaigns at the federal and 
state levels when it comes to hazard pay, health and safety regulations, or eviction 
moratoria, while skilfully navigating the contentious label of ‘essential work’ to the 
workers’ advantage.
There has been an overwhelming need for direct financial and material help. To 
a certain extent it seems that some of the funds have been redistributed or were 
distributed differently than they would have been had there been no disaster situa-
tion. As much as these organizations have done their best to absorb some of the 
shock placed upon these workers, this support has been far from sufficient, and the 
blooming of mutual aid initiatives should not be the sign of relieving the state of its 
responsibility to its citizens; in fact, the organisations were balancing the enormous 
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on-the-ground service delivery and education initiatives with relentless efforts to 
change the system and include domestic workers in the relief measures and protec-
tions. They availed themselves of the sudden prominence of care under the pan-
demic (Fine & Tronto, 2020) and used it as an opportunity to push their agenda 
forward for a systemic change.
As immigrant workers form the majority of domestic workforce and domestic 
workers’ organisations, immigrants’ rights are at the heart of the domestic workers’ 
movement, both before and during the pandemic. Domestic workers’ precarity has 
been reinforced under the pandemic both in terms of job situation as well as immi-
gration status. This has required organisations to address the needs of domestic 
workers simultaneously as workers and as immigrants even more than before. Under 
the pandemic, the tool of the intersectional work continued to be language justice – 
offering popular education on workers’ rights in multiple languages. Another tool 
has been to be vocal and participate in issues geared towards immigrants as such, 
towards immigrant workers (not only domestic workers) as in the driving licences 
campaign, or against the eviction moratorium, which impacts an even larger 
population.
We should ask a question about the costs for the organisations operating in con-
stant overdrive mode; it is a situation that if protracted will lead to burnout in an 
already underfunded and understaffed area of activism and cannot be a model of 
dealing with social crises. The organisations are doing necessary work that should 
not leave the impression that ‘people are always going to cope’. That is why it is of 
vital importance for all the actors to support reforms advocated for by the organisa-
tions. We also wish to avoid narratives of ‘resiliency’ or ‘grit’ that risk oversimplify-
ing the achievements of these organisations during a time of immense emotional, 
financial, and physical stress. After all, the pandemic is a battlefield (Pleyers, 2020) 
and too many of those in power still want to ‘return to normal’ after vaccination 
rollout has been achieved.
So far in the US the successes of domestic workers’ organisations under the pan-
demic have been moderate, with initiatives failing or being stalled. But it is hard to 
say that the public and the policymakers are not aware of domestic workers, whether 
through a mural celebrating essential workers in Chicago9 or through explicitly list-
ing domestic workers in the still-unpassed ‘Essential workers bill of rights’. For 
these organisations, a ‘return to normal’ cannot be the solution for workers who 
were already marginalised and excluded before the pandemic, and their work 
emphasises their commitment to building a new and more equitable normal for 
the future.
9 http://iamsamkirk.com/murals
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In recent years, institutional and scholarly attention has focused on the exploitation 
and systematic denial of the rights of workers – in particular migrant workers – 
which underpins agri-food systems in many European Union (EU) countries, espe-
cially in southern European countries such as Italy and Spain (Corrado et al., 2018). 
In January 2020, just a few months before the Covid-19 pandemic hit Europe, the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Hilal Elver, denounced the 
situation in Italy: ‘from the North to the South of Italy, hundreds of thousands of 
workers farm the land or take care of livestock without adequate legal and social 
protections, coping with insufficient salaries and living under the constant threat of 
losing their job, being forcibly repatriated, or becoming the object of physical and 
moral violence’ (Elver, 2020). In February 2020, following his visit to Spain, Philip 
Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, said: ‘In 
Huelva, I met with workers living in a migrant settlement in conditions that rival the 
worst I have seen anywhere in the world. They are kilometres away from water, and 
live without electricity or adequate sanitation’ (Alston, 2020).
The Covid-19 emergency has exacerbated this situation, revealing the precarious-
ness of migrant labour in the agri-food system and, simultaneously, its essential role 
1 This chapter is the result of a common reflection of the two authors. However, Alessandra Corrado 
drafted Sects. 8.2 and  8.4 while Letizia Palumbo drafted Sects. 8.3 and  8.5. The  Introduction 
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in this sector. Indeed, since the outbreak, a rise in the demand for essential goods has 
also meant that workers in key sectors such as agri-food have been recognised as 
fundamental to the economic and societal functioning of EU countries. At the same 
time, the pandemic has sharply disclosed the limits of long supply dynamics (in terms 
of price distortion, unfair competition, and distribution dynamics) as well as the con-
ditions of exploitation and vulnerability experienced by many migrant farmworkers. 
An evident tension therefore has emerged between containing the pandemic through 
mobility restrictions, on the one hand, and preventing labour shortages (especially in 
core sectors) and addressing migrants’ situations of vulnerability, on the other.
On 31 January 2020, Italy became the first EU member state to declare a state of 
emergency. This was followed by a series of government decrees in March estab-
lishing lockdown measures in the most affected zones aimed at containing the pan-
demic. These were then progressively extended to the entire country. The measures 
included closure of borders, high mobility restrictions and controls, hygiene and 
sanitary controls, and the closure of all commercial and retail activities except those 
deemed essential to coping with the emergency  – such as the agri-food-sector. 
While in June 2020, the government lifted quarantine restrictions and reopened the 
borders, lockdown measures have been periodically implemented throughout the 
country. Indeed, at the time of writing Italy is still in a state of emergency.
In Spain, a state of emergency was enacted on 14 March 2020. This was then 
intensified on 27 March of the same year to be even more rigid for a further 15 days, 
during which a total ban on all non-essential work activities was established. In the 
case of Spain too the agri-food sector was declared strategic and therefore excluded 
from the so-called economic hibernation measures.
While the restrictions were progressively relaxed in June 2020, they continued to 
be adopted until Spring 2021. Indeed, the Spanish government declared the end of 
the state of emergency on 9 May 2021.
At the same time, both Italy and Spain, in line with other EU countries, adopted 
measures to respond to labour demand in key sectors, such as agri-food, and to face 
the situations of vulnerability of migrants employed in these sectors in a time of 
health and economic emergency. Both countries , in particular, drew the praise of the 
general public for adopting actions aimed at providing undocumented migrants with 
opportunity to regularise their legal status (Martín, 2020; Testore, 2020). However, 
despite the enthusiastic and optimistic tones, these interventions reveal shortcomings 
that significantly limit their impact and outcomes. This calls into question to what 
extent migrant workers are considered as really ‘essential’ in a long-term perspective 
and, above all, to what extent the current pandemic crisis constitutes an opportunity 
for a new national push to enforce labour rights and strengthen migrants’ rights.
By focusing on Italy and Spain and building on extensive research carried out on 
working conditions of migrant farm workers, this chapter illustrates the characteris-
tics and dynamics of migrant labour in the agri-food system, highlighting the impact 
of the Covid-19 crisis. It provides a critical comparative analysis of the legal and 
policy interventions adopted to tackle migrants’ rights during the pandemic by pay-
ing special attention to the measures concerning migrants’ situations of vulnerabil-
ity. This contribution relies on the analysis of information collected through 
interviews with key stakeholders, legal and policy documents, and relevant 
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literature and reports. The interviews were mainly carried out within a research 
project on the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on agri-food systems and migrant labour 
in EU countries which was commissioned by the Open Society European Policy 
Institute (OSEPI) and conducted by the Migration Policy Centre at the European 
University Institute (EUI) in May 2020 (Palumbo & Corrado, 2020).
8.2  Agri-Food Restructuring, Imbalances of Power, 
and Renewed Agrarian Conflicts
Spain and Italy are the top European countries for number of specialised farms, 
cultivated area, and organic fruit and vegetable production, and for the highest 
number of farms overall (after Romania); together they accounted for about two-
fifths of the total value of the EU’s fruit and fresh vegetable production in 2017 




























































Fig. 8.2 Area of fruit and vegetable by main producing EU Member State, 2017 (% of EU-28). 
(Source: Eurostat)
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some production (tomatoes, oranges) and (with Poland) the highest value of 
tomato production. Fresh fruit and vegetables were traded mainly on the European 
market; Spain was the leading trader. Spain and Italy, together with the 
Netherlands, accounted for more than two-thirds of intra-EU exports in value 
terms and were responsible for over one-third of the total value of production in 
2017 (Fig.  8.4). The EU as a whole was a net importer of processed fruit and 
vegetables, but some member states had record trade surpluses, including Spain 
and Italy (Eurostat 2019).
Both Spain and Italy have undergone a major restructuring of their agri-food 
systems, especially since the 1980s, within the dynamics of post-Fordist develop-
ment and neo-liberal globalisation (Corrado, 2016). In Italy, the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) served to support interventions for the modernisation of 
agriculture – i.e., the intensification of production, the enlargement of scale, the 
adoption of chemical inputs, varietal renewal, export orientation, entrepreneurship, 
and protection from foreign competition, at least until the early 1990s and the estab-
lishment of the European Single Market (1993). In Spain, on the other hand, agri-
cultural modernisation had already begun before entry into the European Community 
(in 1986), under the Francoist regime, in the years 1950–1960, laying the founda-
tions for the sector’s industrialisation and the structuring of the country’s main 
enclaves of production specialisation (e.g. Almeria and Murcia).
Through progressive reforms, following World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
agreements, the CAP has promoted competitiveness in global markets. Profit mar-
gins and market power in the agricultural sector have been severely weakened by 
the concentration process in the food industry, and the rapid expansion and centrali-
sation of power in large-scale retailing systems. In line with the dynamics of the 
rearrangement of production processes on a global scale, agri-food supply chains in 
Italy and Spain are buyer-driven, with retail  companies playing a central role in 
creating and managing a broad base of selected suppliers on which to build distribu-
tion systems. In 2017 supermarkets in Italy sold about 73.5% of all food and drinks 































Fig. 8.3 Fruit and vegetable production value by main producing Member State, 2017 (% of 
EU-28). (Source: Eurostat)
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operators. The top five companies jointly controlled just over 50% of the market in 
2017, and of these three have a market share of over 10% (Oxfam, 2018). In Spain, 
supermarkets and hypermarkets together controlled 82.3% of the food market in 
2018 (ANGED, 2019); in 2019, Mercadona controlled 25.5% of the food market 
(Kantar, 2020). However, it is worth noting that 80% of Spanish production is 
exported, while only 20% ends up in the domestic market – with large-scale retail-
ers marketing just 7% of national production (Romera, 2020).
The process of concentration today is also articulated through the establishment 
of international super buying centres – alliances between the largest distribution 
groups aimed at obtaining better contractual conditions through collective negotia-
tion with suppliers. The oligopolistic control of prices by the large international 
supermarket chains through continuous revisions and auctions on the reduction/
depreciation of products imposes an increasingly intense pressure on suppliers 
(Corrado et al., 2018).
Moreover, it is important to emphasise that, over the decades, in the light of a 
progressive process of defamilisation of agriculture or family deagrarisation 
(Arnalte-Alegre & Ortiz-Miranda, 2013), the sharp reduction in the number of 
employees and farms resulting from these transformations has been matched by the 
growth of salaried work. The growing recruitment of migrant workers has certainly 
served to support the capitalist development of the agri-food system, that is, the 
continuous intensification, capitalisation, and innovation of agri-food production 
and processing, to cope with market pressures and the squeeze dynamics on produc-
ers’ revenues. In both countries, Spain and Italy, therefore, the unequal relationship 
of global value chains has resulted in renewed agrarian conflicts (Perrotta, 2015; 
Perrotta & Sacchetto, 2014; Reigada, 2021) and has rendered migrant labour both 
essential and exploitable.
Between 2019 and 2020, the agricultural sector in Spain was incited by a protest 
movement initiated by a group of the largest agricultural organisations  – 


















Fig. 8.4 Intra EU-28 Export of fruit and vegetable, 2017 (1000 EUR, 1000 tonnes). (Source: 
Eurostat)
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Pequeños Agricultores y Ganaderos (UPA), and Asociación de Jóvenes Agricultores 
(ASAJA) – against low prices paid to companies, increases in production prices, 
and the imbalance of power along the food value chain. In February 2020, the Left- 
wing Spanish government established a 5.5% rise in the minimum interprofessional 
salary (Salario Minimo Interprofesional, SMI) over 2019, when it had been 
increased by 22.3% – that is, from €735.90 gross per month to 14 monthly pay-
ments of €900. This measure also provoked strong criticism, especially from the 
most capitalised farmers, ASAJA members, and employers’ organisations from the 
main enclaves of intensive production (such as Murcia and Huelva) that opposed 
the SMI increase in the local collective agreements in agriculture (Pedreño 
Cánovas, 2020).
Pressure from the farmers between February and June 2020 further forced the 
Spanish government to amend Food Chain Law No. 12 of 2013 (Ley de la Cadena 
Alimentaria) in line with EU Directive 2019/633 on unfair trading practices in 
business- to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain. Urgent 
measures on agriculture and food were introduced by the Royal Decree Law RD 
5/2020 issued in February 2020, and a Draft Law No. 36-1 amending Law 12/2013 
of 2 August on measures to improve the functioning of the food supply chain was 
approved by the Government on the 13 November 2020 (with the provision of entry 
into force in November 2021). The urgent measures made contracts obligatory in all 
transactions between producers and other actors in the chain; and prohibited sales at 
a loss and misleading offers at points of sale. In order to ban the destruction of value 
in the food chain, production costs have to be recorded and the price agreed by the 
producers and their first buyer has to be indicated in detail to ensure that sales prices 
are higher than production costs. The draft law extended the ‘blacklist’ of unfair 
practices, as well as the scope of sanctions and other measures to correct price 
imbalances harmful to farmers or stock breeders, and protection in international 
trade relations.
Similarly, in April 2021, the Italian Parliament approved the Law 53/2021 (2021 
European Delegation Act) which delegates the Government to transpose the EU 
Directive 2019/633 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships 
in the agricultural and food supply chain (Art. 7). In addition to being adopted with 
a significant delay, this law has introduced some criteria for the transposition of 
Directive 2019/633 that seem to be in contrast with the main approach of such EU 
instrument (Dongo, 2021).
Since 2019, the Parliament has also begun the process of approving a new law on 
‘ethical’ agri-food chains (Draft Law 1373), that aims to contribute to the respect of 
farmworkers’ rights, while providing consumers with tools to make informed food 
choices. The current draft law intends to define environmental, social and economic 
sustainability parameters, and provide tax relief and reward systems for agri-food 
companies that contribute to the creation of ethical chains, including those compa-
nies that join the Network of Quality Agricultural Work, which was established by 
Legislative Decree No. 91/2014 to recognise and support companies that respect 
fair labour and employment conditions in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, this 
draft law has introduced production traceability systems. 
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8.3  Migration Policies, Migrant Labour Composition, 
and Working Conditions
This section offers a critical overview of the relevant policies and legislation on 
migration in Italy and Spain, as well as information about migrant labour composi-
tion and working conditions in the agri-food systems in these two countries. The 
aim is to provide the background against which the pandemic crisis exploded.
Being characterised by an historical tradition of emigration, and with a recent 
history of immigration, Italy and Spain have been defined as emblematic of the 
‘Mediterranean model of migration’ (King et al., 2000). This is marked by a high 
element of ‘irregularity’, in which employment in the agricultural sector represents 
one of the main channels for migrants to access the labour market. Since the late 
2000s, this model has been challenged by several factors such as the European 
enlargement process, the economic crisis and the so-called refugee crisis. The 
impact of these factors, together with the inadequacies of national systems of 
recruitment of foreign workers, has reflected a change in migratory movements and, 
accordingly, in the composition of migrant labour. This is especially evident in sec-
tors such as agri-food which are marked by a high segmentation of labour on the 
basis of nationality, class, and gender, and by downward competition in terms of 
wages and labour rights.
In Italy, under Law No. 40/1998, the entry system for foreign workers is based 
on an employer-driven mechanism requiring a specific request from a resident 
employer. This system, which sets annual quotas for different categories of workers 
via government decree (Decreto Flussi), has proved inadequate and resulted mainly 
in ‘ex post regularisations’ and abusive practices. Furthermore, since 2011, quotas 
for non-seasonal workers have been drastically limited, while quotas for seasonal 
workers have been cut by almost half (Corrado et al., 2018).
In this context, the lack of an effective entry system for foreign workers capable 
of meeting labour demand in sectors such as agriculture has been offset mainly by 
migrants from eastern EU member states, undocumented workers, and, especially 
since 2015, by non-EU asylum seekers and refugees (Corrado et al., 2018). As sev-
eral studies have highlighted, the different situations of vulnerability of these cate-
gories of migrants seems to translate into a variety of forms of exploitation (Palumbo 
& Sciurba, 2018).
According to official data, Romanians are one the largest groups of farmworkers 
in Italy, involving a significant presence of women (CREA, 2019). In some areas, 
Romanians have ‘replaced’ African migrant workers as their wages are lower and 
they tend not to be unionised and are viewed as a less-empowered labour force. 
Thus, despite being able to freely move within the EU, Romanians often work under 
harsh and exploitative conditions. For instance, in the case of the agri-food district 
in Ragusa, Romanian labourers work between 10 and 12 h per day in unsafe condi-
tions for a meagre wage and live in crumbling shelters in the greenhouses, often 
with their children. In this scenario of isolation and dependency on employers, 
women’s labour exploitation is often accompanied by sexual blackmail and abuse 
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by employers and gangmasters. Women with family responsibilities in particular 
seem to be the most exposed to abuse (Palumbo & Sciurba, 2018).
While Romanian farmworkers are employed in both seasonal and permanent 
agricultural production (as in the case of the greenhouses in Ragusa), asylum seek-
ers and refugees as well as undocumented migrant workers are mainly involved in 
seasonal cultivation, moving from one harvesting zone to another across the 
country.
Some scholars have talked about a process of ‘refugeesation of the agricultural 
workforce’ (Dines & Rigo, 2015) to highlight the rising number of refugees and 
asylum seekers employed in agriculture. For asylum seekers especially, the inter-
play between the inadequate implementation of asylum procedures and the absence 
of appropriate hosting and inclusion measures in the country has produced a condi-
tion of ‘hyper precarity’ (Lewis & Waite, 2015) that fosters their exposure to dynam-
ics of exploitation. This situation of vulnerability has been further exacerbated by 
the provisions of the so-called Security Decree or Salvini Decree’ (Decree Law No. 
113/2018 converted into Law No. 132/2018), which was adopted in October 2018. 
Building on an emergency-based approach to migration, the Security Decree abol-
ished the residence permit for humanitarian reasons (known as ‘humanitarian pro-
tection’). This form of protection had been established by Legislative Decree No. 
286/98 (Consolidated Act on Immigration) to protect people in situations of vulner-
ability who are non-eligible for refugee status or subsidiary protection but could not 
be expelled from the country because of ‘serious reasons of humanitarian nature or 
resulting from constitutional or international obligations of the State’. The abolition 
of humanitarian protection has led to a significant increase in the number of irregu-
lar migrants (Geddes & Pettrachin, 2020, 238).
The Security Decree also excluded asylum seekers from the decentralised state 
reception system SPRAR (Sistema di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati), 
renamed SIPROIMI (Sistema di protezione per titolari di protezione internazionale 
e per i minori stranieri non accompagnati), which supports social and labour inclu-
sion for migrants. Asylum seekers have therefore been crammed into emergency 
reception centres known as CAS (Centri di Accoglienza Straordinaria), many of 
which lack adequate structures and services, fail to meet basic hygiene and safety 
conditions, are overcrowded, and do not provide effective inclusion programmes. 
Moreover, some of these centres are in isolated rural areas and have become a pool 
of cheap and easily exploitable migrant farmworkers (Corrado et al., 2018).
At the same time, thousands of migrants, including seasonal workers, asylum 
seekers, beneficiaries of international protection, and undocumented migrants, live 
in informal settlements (MSF, 2018) without basic services such as access to water 
and sanitation. As discussed below, the degrading conditions of these informal 
camps as well as the inadequacies of the institutional reception centres have raised 
serious concerns during the pandemic.
Exploitation and social and spatial ghettoisation are also common elements in 
Spain. According to official data, in 2017 migrant workers constituted roughly 
23.2% of the total salaried agricultural workforce (Cuesta & Sánchez, 2017). 
However, as in the case of Italy, these statistics cannot provide an effective depiction 
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of reality given the significant presence of undeclared work in the agri-food sector. 
Migrant farmworkers are mainly concentrated in the southern areas of the country, 
and their employment is characterised by a market of internal circular mobility 
linked to the harvest period, moving, for example, between Murcia, Alicante, 
Albacete, Huelva, and Alméria, or Barcelona and the provinces of Tarragona and 
Girona (Viruela & Torres Pérez, 2015).
As for recruitment system of foreign seasonal workers, in Huelva and Lleida one 
of the main institutional mechanisms for the employment of third-country migrant 
farmworkers is the so-called ‘contract in origin’ or ‘at source’ (contratación en 
origen), within defined annual quotas, as established by the Law on the Rights and 
Freedoms of Foreigners (Ley Organica No. 4/2000). Migrants are recruited directly 
in their country of origin, arriving in Spain having already signed a contract for 
specific employment with pre-set working and social conditions. Returning home at 
the end of the contract is a conditional criterion for reapplying for other ‘contracts 
in origin’ within the next year’s quotas.
The first trial of the ‘contracts in origin’ mechanism was based on bilateral agree-
ments between Spain and eastern European countries, in particular Romania, in the 
early 2000s. Recruitment mainly involved female workers who, in accordance with 
gender and social stereotypes, were considered more ‘docile’ and culturally similar 
than African males (Hellio, 2016).
Contrary to what happened in Italy (especially in rural areas like Ragusa), EU 
enlargement in 2007 resulted in a decrease in EU migrant workers in the Spanish 
agri-food sector in districts such as Huelva. Romanian and Polish female farmwork-
ers in particular were almost entirely replaced by Moroccan women employed 
through ‘contracts in origin’. In this case, the fact of having left young children in 
the country of origin was an explicit formal prerequisite to be selected, as it was 
considered a guarantee of their return to the country of origin at the end of the har-
vest (Palumbo & Sciurba, 2018).
But similar to Italy, in Spain too agriculture has become a refuge sector for 
migrants, especially Africans, as a consequence of the 2008 economic crisis 
(Pedreño Cánovas, 2020). At the same time, the economic crisis affected the system 
of ‘contracts in origin’ with a decrease in quotas and contracts since 2011. This has 
in turn led to an increase in the presence of EU migrant workers. In particular, 
Romanian farmworkers have become, once again, one of the largest components of 
migrant labour in the Spanish agri-food sector (Caruso, 2016); many are women, 
usually recruited through temporary work agencies (Molinero Gerbeau, 2018) and 
often in conditions of exploitation.
Yet, ‘contracts in origin’ is still the main path for farmworkers’ (women) recruit-
ment from third countries in the areas of Huelva and Lleida. This model has been 
criticised for creating a strong worker dependency on employers, leading workers to 
be more ‘docile’ and willing to accept abusive work conditions. Moreover, within 
this system, care relations and family responsibilities have formally become ele-
ments used as a guarantee of the recruitment of a vulnerable, flexible, and feminised 
labour force. While in some Italian contexts, such as Ragusa, similar dynamics 
emerge as a consequence of the interplay between inadequate entry systems, new 
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composition of migratory movements, and the requests of employers, in Huelva 
these seem to be facilitated by institutional policies. Several studies have reported 
how the ‘contracts in origin’ model has fostered specific forms of gender-based 
exploitation and abuse, ranging from arbitrary deductions of a percentage of wages 
and excessive unpaid overtime to sexual assault and exploitation (Palumbo & 
Sciurba, 2018). As discussed below, this situation of dependency and vulnerability 
has been exacerbated by the Covid-19 lockdown.
8.4  The Pandemic’s Effects on the Agri-Food Sector 
and Migrant Labour Conditions
In both Italy and Spain lockdowns and other measures taken to stem the pandemic 
significantly hit the hotels, restaurants, and catering sector, or ‘Horeca’. This in turn 
affected the demand for agricultural products, especially ‘quality products’ such as 
cheeses and wines. In Italy the sector’s losses were around €34 billion. A drop in 
seasonal products – i.e., tomatoes, strawberries – was recorded, but a rise in demand 
for domestic food consumption and a drop in imports helped maintain or in some 
cases boost products’ prices (ISMEA, 2020; MAPA, 2020). However , employment 
rates in Italy’s agricultural sector remained close to 2019 levels and have been rising 
since May, revealing good stability relative to other sectors (Mlps et al., 2020).
In Spain, by contrast, agricultural employment has been significantly impacted 
by Covid-19, with migrant labourers particularly hit as the jobs in the sector shrunk 
to 791,163 in 2020 from 808,255 in 2019 (Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad social 
y Migraciones, 2020a, b). Even so, there has been substantial employment stability 
in the enclaves of intensive agriculture, such as Huelva, Almeria, and Murcia.
The pandemic border restrictions and lockdown have led national farmers’ 
organisations to sound the alarm on labour shortages, especially of eastern European 
workers (mainly Romanians), highlighting the agri-food sector’s dependence on 
cheap and flexible migrant labour – one of the results of power imbalances in long 
supply chains. However, labour shortages in many areas have been offset by a 
reserve army of migrant labour in situations of irregularity and vulnerability, and 
through dynamics of work intensification.
In Spring 2020, farmers’ organisations asked for the establishment of special 
‘green corridors’ facilitating the mobility of seasonal workers within the EU, 
according to the EU Commission on the free movement of workers during the crisis 
(European Commission, 2020a, b). In Italy, this proposal was supported by the 
Italian Minister of Agriculture, Food and Forestry. However, despite numerous 
bilateral meetings, no concrete agreements were reached with Romania. National 
emergency measures did not provide for ‘active quarantine’ - i.e. the possibility for 
foreign seasonal workers to spend their quarantine working in the fields albeit at a 
distance from other workers. This measure has been adopted by Germany, with the 
result of attracting many Romanian farmworkers, also because of the higher wages 
(Cappellini, 2021).
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Since the beginning of the pandemic, companies or producer organisations have 
arranged the transport of groups of seasonal workers by charter flights to countries 
such as Italy from Morocco or to Spain from Uruguay. In Italy, especially in the 
northern regions, businesses have looked for workers through employment agencies 
or local employment centres (Macrì, 2020).
As has emerged in the case of Italy, the lockdown measures initially made it 
impossible for many migrant farmworkers, especially those without a residence per-
mit or a regular contract (mainly Sub-Saharan Africans) to move and access farms. 
Lockdown measures also undermined the actions of illegal gangmasters (so-called 
caporali), who in some zones of Italy maintain near-total control – in an exploitative 
way  – over the recruitment, transportation, and accommodation of farmworkers. 
Gradually, the situation has changed as police and labour inspectorate controls have 
been relaxed, allowing caporali to move and transport workers to complete the har-
vest, such as in the area around Foggia, or farmers to hire irregular workers (inter-
view with R. Falcone, trade union Flai Cgil, 17 June 2020).
In Spain, border restrictions have meant serious repercussions for the ‘contracts 
in origin’ system. Before the state of emergency, only 9000 of the 24,000 workers 
from Morocco who had initially been contracted entered Spain. When the harvests 
ended, the Moroccan government prohibited the return of the (mostly female) work-
ers who remained ‘immobilised’ in the Spanish countryside with no means of sub-
sistence and were supported solely by trade unions (Echevarría, 2020). In other 
words, the pandemic has put the spotlight on the reality of a system built on depen-
dence on employers and gendered dynamics and power relations.
Moreover, since the lockdown, there has been an intensification of rhythms in the 
fields; conditions have been more abusive, with workers having to harvest larger 
quantities of produce and to do more overtime, such as in Huelva (interviews with 
A. Pinto, Jornaleras de Huelva en Lucha, and S. Gorsky, Instituto Joaquín Herrera 
Flores, 29 June 2020; interviews with A. Márquez Tejón and H. Wilson, Women’s 
Link Worldwide, 30 June 2020). The Jornaleras de Huelva en Lucha collective, in 
collaboration with the Abogadas Sociedad Cooperativa association, urged state 
institutions to intervene and raised several complaints against companies and local 
authorities for non-compliance with safety regulations to protect workers.
In Italy, trade unions have also reported a lack of compliance with safety proto-
cols in the countryside. Few businesses have provided workers with masks and 
enforced safety measures. Several complaints were addressed by workers, espe-
cially in packaging warehouses (interviews with G. Scifo, Cgil, 19 June 2020 and 
R. Falcone, Flai Cgil, 17 June 2020).
In both Italy and Spain, the degrading living conditions of migrant farmworkers 
raise even more concerns in a pandemic. In the informal camps where many migrant 
farmworkers settle, personal protection measures have been practically impossible 
to implement due to a lack of drinking water, electricity, and essential minimum 
services, as well as precarious and overcrowded housing conditions. In both the 
countries, trade unions and humanitarian organisations have supported agricultural 
workers by distributing drinking water, essential goods, and personal protective 
equipment to informal settlements such as the Sindicado Andaluz de Trabajadores 
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(SAT) in Hueva and Almeria, or Unione Sindacale di Base (USB) in Foggia and in 
the Plane of Gioia Tauro-Rosarno.
Various outbreaks of Covid-19 have been reported. In Spring 2020, the conta-
gion spread to the industrial animal slaughtering sector, as in Bari (Italy) and Huesca 
(Spain), but then gradually affected mobile seasonal labourers housed in informal 
ghettos or collective dormitories. The temporary work enterprise Terra Fecundis, 
based in Murcia (Spain) but operating across interprovincial or national borders, 
was investigated in France for the Covid-19 outbreaks triggered by seasonal work-
ers in Provence.
On the other hand, there have been migrant workers’ demonstrations in both 
countries: for instance, in May 2020, in Italy (in particular, in Foggia) hundreds of 
migrant workers went on strike to demand a strengthening of their rights; in July 
2020 in Spain, migrant farmworkers took the streets to protest against the confine-
ment imposed on an informal settlement and claim the need to work in order to meet 
their livelihood (as in Albacete, Castilla-La-Mancha), or demand decent housing in 
(Lepe, Huelva) (Summers, 2020).
In June 2020, a coronavirus outbreak hit Bulgarian Roma farmworkers living in 
degraded buildings in Mondragone (Italy). This situation – and the ensuing lock-
down of the entire residential area – triggered protests and clashes with the Italian 
inhabitants. In October of the same year, the spread of infections in the crowded 
emergency camps in the Plane of Gioia Tauro-Rosarno (in the province of Reggio 
Calabria) resulted in the confinement of hundreds of migrant workers (Fig. 8.5).
Fig. 8.5 Maps of main Covid-19-related infections and mobilisations involving migrant farm-
workers in Italy and Spain. (Source: own elaboration)
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8.5  Legal and Political Responses to Address Migrant Farm 
Workers’ Situations of Vulnerability During 
the Pandemic
In response to alarm about labour shortages, and to address the situations of vulner-
ability of many migrant farmworkers, Italy and Spain have adopted several mea-
sures to support the agri-food sector and to facilitate the mobility and recruitment of 
seasonal migrant workers and guarantee them adequate and safe services during the 
pandemic .
In Italy, in March and April 2020, the government adopted some measures to 
provide a financial support package during the crisis, also covering the agri-food 
sector. It established an increase from 50% to 70% in advance payments from the 
CAP, as well as incentives for exports. The measures also provide for a two-month 
€600 transfer to agricultural workers on short-term contracts, subsidised lay-offs for 
all employees in the sector, and rolled out social protection for seasonal workers. 
However, many migrant farmworkers who were employed informally could not 
benefit from these subsidies (Palumbo and Corrado 2020).
With respect to alarm about labour shortages, in Italy most of the institutional 
attention focused on the adoption of a plan to regularise undocumented migrants. 
The regularisation scheme was adopted after intense debate, with some misgivings 
within the governing coalition and opposition from the far-right Lega and Fratelli 
D’Italia parties. This provision, entitled ‘Emergence of Employment Relationships’, 
was included in the so-called Relaunch Decree (in particular in Article 103) 
approved by the Italian government on 13 May 2020 for a post-pandemic economic 
recovery (Law-Decree n. 34 of 19/05/2020 converted into Law n. 77 of 17 July 
2020). The provision aimed to ‘ensure adequate levels of individual and collective 
health protection’ as a consequence of the health emergency, and to ‘facilitate the 
emergence of irregular employment relationships’, applying only to the agri-food, 
care and domestic work sectors. It aimed to cover all those doing undeclared work, 
whether undocumented foreign workers, Italian citizens, EU migrants, or regular 
non-EU migrants.
The provision established two application channels and a 15 July 2020 deadline, 
which was subsequently extended to 15 August 2020. The first channel allowed 
employers to apply to conclude a fixed-term employment contract for foreign 
nationals or declare the existence of an irregular employment relationship with 
Italian citizens or foreign nationals. Foreign citizens must have been present in Italy 
before 8 March 2020 and must not have left the country since that date. In the case 
of undocumented migrants, they received a residence permit for work reasons.
The second channel allowed foreign citizens with a residence permit that had 
expired since 31 October 2019, who were able to prove they worked in one of the 
eligible sectors before that date and who had been present in Italy before 8 March 
2020, to apply for a six-month temporary residence permit to look for a job in these 
sectors. This temporary permit can be converted into a residence permit for work 
reasons.
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In both channels, if the employment relationship terminates, even in the case of 
a seasonal contract, foreign nationals have the possibility of applying for a one-year 
residence permit while ‘awaiting employment’.
It might be argued that given the Italian government’s hesitant and restrictive 
approach to migration, this regularisation could be considered a step forward. 
However, since the beginning it has been clear that significant inadequacies would 
affect its impact, resulting in a limited number of regularised migrants, especially 
migrant farmworkers.
In line with the previous regularisation schemes, the plan has mainly relied on an 
employer-driven approach, providing a limited space of action for the workers. The 
limits of this approach are particularly evident for cases characterising the agri-food 
sector, where irregular recruitment of workers is connected to exploitation of work-
ers in a situation of vulnerability. The Decree does suspend some ongoing criminal 
and administrative proceedings against employers; however, this has not been suf-
ficient to sway employers who find it more convenient to use undeclared workers 
(Palumbo, 2020; Schiavone, 2020).
With regard to the second channel, a temporary residence permit to look for work 
is a relative novelty for the Italian legal system which, since 2002, has closely linked 
residence permits to the existence of a labour contract and channelled foreign work-
ers into the above-mentioned inadequate entry mechanism (see above ‘Migration 
policies’ section). However, prerequisites for this second path significantly limited 
its scope, leaving out numerous migrants in situations of irregularity and precari-
ousness, including many of those affected by the so-called Security Decrees.
Lastly, by applying only to the agri-food and domestic/care sectors, the plan 
overlooked sectors such as logistics, construction, tourism, and food services that 
have high rates of undeclared work, including by migrants in irregular and exploit-
ative conditions. This decision clearly highlighted the economic and labour market 
logic behind this regularisation.
According to official data provided by the Italian Minister of the Interior 
(Ministero dell'Interno, 2020), there have been 220,528 applications for both chan-
nels of regularisation: respectively, 207,542 for the first channel, and mainly in the 
domestic and care work sector (that is 85% of the total number of applications), and 
12,986 for the second, and basically in agriculture (that is 15% of the total). 
Interestingly, 64% of applications in domestic and care work concern foreign men. 
Given the high percentage of women in this sector, the latter datum suggests that 
there have been abusive practices such as sale of ‘false’ contracts to allow people to 
access to regularisation (Rondi, 2021).
The number of accepted applications is not yet known or estimated. However, it 
is worth underlining that, while there is a correspondence between the number of 
applications estimated by government and the real number of applications, 220,000 
is only a fraction of the estimated 600,000 undocumented migrants (Fondazione 
Ismu, 2020) at risk of marginalisation and exploitation. Moreover, the regularisation 
seems also to have had a limited impact for specific sectors covered by the scheme: 
around 46,000 migrants irregularly employed in agriculture and some 132,000 
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migrant workers in care and domestic work have not benefited from the regularisa-
tion (Schiavone, 2020, 133).
At the time of writing, the processing of the applications has proceeded at an 
unbelievably slow pace (in May 2021, only 12,7% of the applications were exam-
ined). This, in turn, has resulted in a slow number of residence permits that have 
been issued: with regard to the first channel, at the end of 2020, only 1480 residence 
permits were issued throughout Italy (0.71% of the total), while in the case of the 
second path, data are slightly better as in the same time frame 8887 residence per-
mits were issued (68% of the total) (Ero straniero, 2021). Although migrant workers 
are allowed to work while waiting for the processing of their applications, this con-
dition of uncertainty leaves them in a limbo that increases their situations of 
vulnerability.
The Relaunch Decree (Article 103) also provided that competent national and 
regional authorities adopt – including through the implementation of the measures 
established by the 2020–2022 national Plan against exploitation in the agricultural 
sector and illegal gangmastering – interventions and actions to guarantee adequate 
and safe accommodation and services, as well as to combat undeclared work and 
exploitation. These measures should also be adopted in accordance with the actions 
provided by Law N. 199/2016 addressing labour exploitation and illegal gangmas-
tering, which constitutes an important milestone in the fight against exploitation but 
is still inadequately implemented, especially in respect to the development of the 
above-mentioned Network of Quality Agricultural Work at national and local levels 
(Corrado et al., 2018).
Far from implementing structural actions, at the time of writing, only emergency- 
based interventions have been developed in a few rural areas of Southern Italy, 
providing migrant workers in the informal settlements with water, food, health and 
legal assistance, and temporary housing structures.
In October 2020, the Italian government issued a new Decree Law No. 130/2020 
on migration and international protection, which was converted into Law No. 
173/2020 by Parliament on 18 December 2020. The Decree has significantly 
changed some provisions of the so-called Security decrees,2 in particular introduc-
ing a form of ‘special protection’, similar to the former humanitarian one and which 
is valid for two years and can be converted into a resident permit for work. It has 
also revised the reception system SIPROIMI (now renamed SAI, Sistema di 
Accoglienza e Integrazione) by restoring a widespread reception system managed 
by the municipalities and allowing asylum seekers access to it. In addition, the 
Decree has strengthened services for asylum seekers’ social inclusion.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that in Italy many local Civil Tribunals have recog-
nised the right to essential services and benefits (such as food vouchers) of 
2 In 2019 the government issued Decree Law No. 59, known as the Follow-up ‘Security Decree’, 
implemented by Law 77/2019, and which, in particular, toughened sanctions on NGO ships seek-
ing to bring migrants rescued in the Mediterranean to Italy. Both the first Security Decree and 
follow-up decree were supported by Interior Minister Matteo Salvini.
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undocumented migrants during the current health emergency (Giammarinaro & 
Palumbo, 2020).3
In Spain, the government also adopted measures to prevent targeted migrant 
workers from finding themselves in a condition of irregularity due to public admin-
istration delays or difficulties in renewing residence permits during the pandemic. 
In particular, to address labour shortages, support agricultural activities, and encour-
age the recruitment of new categories such as young third-country nationals in the 
agri-food sector, the Spanish government – through Royal Law Decree (RD) No. 
13/2020, of 7 April 2020 – extended the validity of migrants’ residence permits 
expiring during the lockdown period. In addition, young third-country nationals 
(aged between 18 and 21 years) in possession of regular documentation could ben-
efit from being allowed to work in agriculture. This group consisted mainly of unac-
companied foreign minors (menores extranjeros no acompañados, also called 
‘mena’) who turn 18 with their documents still pending resolution. This measure 
was updated and extended on 26 May 2020 by RD 19/2020, which allowed migrants 
employed in other sectors whose jobs had been affected by Covid-19 crisis to seek 
employment in agriculture. Furthermore, this RD provided a residence and work 
permit for two years (with a possible renewal of two more years and without sec-
toral limits) to young third-country nationals who obtained their first work contract 
thanks to the measure on work flexibility in the agricultural sector. This would allow 
these young migrants to potentially access long-term residence (OSEPI, 2020: 15).
In addition, the Spanish government adopted another wide-ranging measure 
extending permits to migrants already in possession of documents (Orden 
SND/421/2020, May 18). This measure established automatic renewal for six 
months following the expiration date of all temporary work, residence, and study 
permits expiring during the state of emergency or 90 days before its declaration. 
Furthermore, it provided for the renewal of residence cards of family members of 
EU citizens. However, even in this case, this measure did not apply to all migrants, 
excluding some categories such as, for instance, foreigners doing internships in the 
health sector  – an exclusion that sounds quite bizarre in the middle of a public 
health crisis.
On the other hand, in June 2020, the government rolled out specific short-term 
social measures (Instrucciones) to stop more migrants falling into undocumented 
status. Income thresholds and other requirements were lowered to facilitate access 
to permit renewals, family reunification (Instrucciones DGM 4/2020), and the tem-
porary residence permits based on social integration (arraigo social) (Instrucciones 
DGM 6/2020). Residence permits will also be renewed for those who are unem-
ployed or receiving income support or the minimum living income, and for those 
who depend on their families.
Lastly, the Spanish government also issued a set of measures to protect asylum 
seekers who are in reception centres and who have pending administrative deadlines 
(Instrucción DGIAH 2020/03/20).
3 See, for instance, Tribunal of Rome, Decision of 22 April 2020, R.G. No. 18957/2020.
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In general, it might be highlighted that, unlike the Italian regularisation plan, 
Spanish measures have consisted mainly of extending permits to migrants who were 
already in possession of documents. Therefore, they have not applied to migrants 
already in a condition of irregularity. At the same time, and perhaps related to the 
fact that they mainly consist of an extension, these measures do not rely on an 
employer-driven approach, as in the case of Italy. However, similarly to the Italian 
regularisation scheme, the Spanish measures have covered specific sectors 
and groups.
On 23 September 2020, the Spanish Congress refused to ask the government for 
a general and unconditional regularisation of undocumented migrants as proposed 
by the Republican Left of Catalonia party with the Confederal Parliamentary Group 
of Unidos Podemos, En Comú Podem, Galicia en Común. The initiative was rejected 
by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), Popular Party (PP), Ciudadanos 
(Citizens), and the far-right Vox. The PSOE, in particular, argued that neither 
Spanish nor European legislation allows this measure, since both provide for ‘indi-
vidualised’ and ‘case by case’ regularisation. This view has been significantly con-
tested by Left parties, such as the Republican Left of Catalonia.
Like Italy, official data reveal that in Spain there are around 600,000 people in a 
condition of irregularity and precarity, including undocumented migrants and asy-
lum seekers awaiting a decision on their case who could benefit from the move to 
grant them legal residency papers (Díez & Casqueiro, 2020). As the RegularizacionYa 
campaign by civil society groups claims, rejecting the proposal for an unconditional 
regularisation is a missed opportunity that marks a significant step backwards for 
the rights of migrants in Spain.
On the other hand, important measures and court decisions have been adopted in 
Spain at the regional level to address the degrading living conditions of migrant 
farmworkers during the lockdown and pandemic crisis. For instance, the 
Administrative Court of Huelva (decision No. 345/2020) has allowed migrants liv-
ing in informal settlements to register in the Municipality of Lepe (empadrona-
miento). This registration also lets irregular migrants access citizens’ rights and is 
important for them to initiate the process of regularisation based on social integra-
tion (arraigo social) (Sainz, 2020). Furthermore, in Lleida and several municipali-
ties in Catalonia, local authorities provided temporary shelters for farm workers. 
The regional government of Andalusia allocated over €1.1 million to guarantee 
minimum services to some 2200 inhabitants in the 79 settlements in the province of 
Almeria and another €1.1 million for 2200 people in 30 villages in Huelva. However, 
xenophobic and racist attitudes against migrant groups or institutional interventions 
also emerged, as in Albacete and Murcia (Palumbo & Corrado, 2020).
In addition, unlike the Italian context, where there have been no actions to 
increase the institutional capacity to monitor during the pandemic, in Spain, in May 
2020, the Minister of Labour provided for a strengthening of labour inspections in 
the agri-food sector during harvesting. This provoked strong reactions from agricul-
tural businesses and employers who asked for the Minister’s resignation, claiming 
that she attempted to stigmatise the sector (León, 2020).
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Finally, the participation of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in the anti- 
Covid- 19 vaccination campaign is another relevant issue. In Italy, the vaccination 
plan does not make any specific reference to migrant people. This is a significant 
limitation considering that the access to health assistance is often problematic for 
migrants, especially for those who are in a condition of irregularity. In Spain, on the 
contrary, the vaccination strategy clearly states that vaccination could be applied to 
socially, economically and occupationally vulnerable groups, such as homeless 
people, people in the horticultural sector and undocumented migrants. The govern-
ment of Aragon, for example, established the vaccination of temporary agricultural 
workers in May 2021 (Pérez, 2021).
8.6  Concluding Remarks
In many European countries, key and labour-intensive sectors such as agri-food rely 
on the employment of migrant workers, often in conditions of exploitation. The 
main factors driving the recourse to this labour force include agri-food restructuring 
processes, in particular imbalance of power in long supply chains. At the same time, 
stringent migration policies and labour market liberalisation processes play a cru-
cial role in fostering the conditions of vulnerability of migrant workers and produc-
ing labour market segmentation based on gender, nationality, and legal status. This 
contributes to confining a migrant labour force to specific sectors and facilitates 
their continuous replacement and substitution by taking advantage of specific situa-
tions of vulnerability.
Such dynamics have been disclosed and simultaneously aggravated by the cur-
rent Covid-19 crisis. In particular, the Covid-19 crisis has brought under the spot-
light the essential character of migrant farmworkers and exacerbated their situations 
of vulnerability as it disproportionately impacted people most affected by discrimi-
nation and social exclusion.
By focusing on Italy and Spain, this chapter illustrates how, since the pandemic, 
labour shortages in the agri-food system have been offset both by a reserve army of 
migrant labour in situations of irregularity and vulnerability and also through work 
intensification and a further compression of workers’ rights. This process has also 
involved encouraging the recruitment of new categories (such as young third- 
country nationals) which, according to the dynamics of high labour turnover con-
stantly reproduced in agriculture, sustains the need for a fresh and docile workforce. 
As the case of Huelva reveals, these processes have been compounded by gendered 
dynamics and power relations.
At the same time, the poor and degrading housing conditions have raised even 
more concern at this time of health emergency in terms of the dramatic conse-
quences for individuals and public health. Contagions and risks of contagion of 
migrant agri-food workers are associated with overcrowded collective dormitories, 
extreme spatial mobility, reduced or non-existent protection measures at work and 
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during transportation to employment, and the precarity and flexibility of labour 
contracts.
By reflecting the main political concerns and agri-food issues in the two coun-
tries, the Italian and Spanish governments have adopted different legal and policy 
responses to sustain the agri-food sector and address migrants’ situations of vulner-
ability. In both cases, the responses of national governments have consisted primar-
ily of short-term solutions, aimed at meeting seasonal labour demand and, as in the 
Italian case, at reducing the number of undocumented migrants working in agricul-
ture or, as in the case of Spain, at preventing migrants’ condition of irregularity. In 
Italy regularisation has had a limited impact, especially on the agricultural sector, 
resulting in a sort of failure. While it is true that Spain has taken some tentative steps 
towards more longer-term solutions, as in the case of measures for young third- 
country nationals (OSEPI, 2020), even in this country, as in Italy, the question of a 
profound change in migration policies has remained unaddressed.
However, some differences have emerged in the institutional responses to address 
labour rights in agri-food systems before and during the pandemic. The Spanish 
government established a new increase in the minimum wage in agriculture, 
strengthened labour inspections in the countryside, and introduced reforms to con-
trast market pressures and unfair practices all along value chains, in line with EU 
Directive 2019/633 on unfair trade practices. In Italy, on the contrary, although the 
adoption of the Law n. 199/2016 on labour exploitation and illegal gangmastering, 
and the 2020–2022 Plan against exploitation in the agricultural sector marked an 
important step forward, no effective institutional initiatives have been adopted so far 
to support the implementation of specific provisions concerning the enforcement of 
labour rights and workers’ transport and accommodation. Moreover, there is not yet 
a legal instrument to address unfair trade practices.
Since the outbreak of the Covid-19 crisis, it has been clear that agri-food sectors 
do not suffer from labour shortages, but from a shortage of rights for workers. Even 
if migrant farmworkers have been recognised as essential, their situations of vul-
nerability have been addressed in many countries, such as Italy and Spain, by 
implementing mainly emergency and short-term measures to mitigate the effects of 
the pandemic and provide them with some degree of social protection and tempo-
rary residence permits. However, as many trade unions, NGOs, and workers them-
selves have claimed, the response cannot be limited to this. The Covid-19 
emergency, and all the inequalities and discriminations that the pandemic has made 
evident and exacerbated, should induce the adoption of structural interventions to 
overhaul a system that takes advantage of – and simultaneously engenders – the 
vulnerability of workers, especially of migrant workers. These interventions should 
be aimed at creating safe and legal entry routes for low- and medium-skilled work-
ers, strengthening wages and labour rights, ensuring decent living conditions, 
developing welfare services, and supporting fair and sustainable agri-food supply 
chains. Only by moving in this direction might the pandemic constitute a crucial 
opportunity for a new drive to forge more labour and migrant rights compliant agri-
food systems.
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Chapter 9
The Entangled Infrastructures 




International students are a growing share of the global migrant population. The top 
two countries of origin are China and India while the top destinations are the United 
States, Australia, and the United Kingdom (Fig. 9.1). Students are often considered 
to be transient and therefore not pertinent to the politically divisive dialogues around 
migration in many countries. Perhaps, as a result, through the second half of the 
twentieth century, when migration moved up on research agendas, student migra-
tion research was still relatively embryonic. However, there has been an explosion 
of research in the last two decades tracing the causes, experiences, and consequences 
of student migration as student migrant numbers have increased (Brooks & Waters, 
2011). They have produced new insights and agendas for research (King & 
Raghuram, 2013).
If international student experiences have been based on the lack of permanence, 
i.e., the itinerancy of study, then it is precisely this lack of permanency that has 
made international students some of those hardest hit by Covid-19 (Bilecen, 2020) 
as it exposed the liminalities that are inherent to study but also the constitutive 
nature of mobility1 to higher education today.
1 In this chapter we use the terms migration and im/mobility in specific ways. International student 
migration is the lens through which this chapter examines the infrastructures of migration- corpo-
real, knowledge, and finance. A deeper discussion of the nuances of migration and mobility is 
beyond the scope of this chapter.
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This chapter focuses on the experiences of international students in the UK dur-
ing the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. It particularly addresses the altered mobilities 
and immobilities produced by the pandemic and the infrastructures that shaped 
them. The rest of the chapter is divided into four further sections. The next section 
outlines how Covid-19 may be seen not only as a crisis, but also as a conjuncture 
that exposes the infrastructures shaping student lives. It suggests that focusing on 
the fissures in the infrastructures that are supposed to support the mobility of inter-
national students offers a useful lens for migration research. Section three outlines 
the project and data collection methods and describes the international students who 
participated in the study. The fourth section delves into the experiences of interna-
tional students to show how the entangled infrastructures of education, migration, 
and finance failed during the pandemic, leading to particular forms of immobility 
and mobility for international students. The section argues for deeper examination 
of these infrastructures to capture the inherent liminality of the lives of international 
Fig. 9.1 Global flows of international students in 2017 (top 20 countries). (Source: OECD)
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students. The chapter concludes by exploring the implications of these findings for 
theoretical and policy research.
9.2  Covid-19 and Infrastructures of International 
Student Migration
The Covid-19 pandemic led to the introduction of short-term but stringent measures 
to control the spread of the virus. When the outbreak was first detected, it was dif-
ficult to comprehend and anticipate the intensity, nature, and length of disruption to 
our normal lives. For students in destination countries, the hope was that the inter-
ruption to study would be short term, but the challenges faced by international stu-
dents revealed the fractures in the infrastructures shaping student lives. 
Conceptualising Covid-19 as a crisis provides us a productive entry point towards 
exploring the failures in these infrastructures and how international students negoti-
ate them.
Covid-19 as crisis, like other crises, offers opportunities for unpacking what 
went before. Crises then are not events, but condensed moments where the internal 
contradictions of a period come to light (Hall & Massey, 2010). They highlight the 
complex entanglements of the social and cultural character not only of the crisis but 
also the conditions under which it arose.
Infrastructures offer one way of exploring that character. Migration and mobility 
scholars have, for some time, focused on the infrastructures of mobility (Hannam 
et  al., 2006) and immobility (Breines et  al., 2019). Xiang and Lindquist define 
‘migration infrastructures’ as ‘the systematically interlinked technologies, institu-
tions, and actors that facilitate and condition mobility’ (2014, S124). International 
migration and its infrastructures, which link ‘technologies, institutions, and actors’ 
have been analysed for how they enable different forms of mobility. For instance, 
authors have explored the role that intermediaries such as education brokers, 
employment agencies, and migration brokers play in facilitating student and skilled 
migration (Cranston, 2017; Harvey et al., 2018). Student migrants are filtered and 
stopped through a range of methods from fee requirements to visas. Their onward 
mobility and their presence are also governed and securitised through everyday bor-
dering (Dear, 2018).
The intertwining of infrastructures of mobility and immobility, and how they 
shape international students’ mobility is highly differentiated by nationality and 
class. For instance, students from some countries, particularly in Africa, have fewer 
venues to go to get their visas to study in the UK as visa functions are centralised in 
major sending countries. Moreover, the infrastructures around funding are variable 
based on whether students travel on scholarships or through personal funding or 
loans. Finally, some apparatuses and technologies, institutions, and intermediaries 
appear far more significant when viewed through the eyes of such migrants than 
they appear in the eyes of the receiving countries.
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These infrastructures of mobility were particularly affected during the Covid-19 
crisis. Mobility is central to this pandemic. Viruses travel on moving objects and 
bodies so the only solution to this crisis is to make them immobile. It requires stasis 
to contain the virus. People stopped wherever they were, irrespective of status and 
location. In some senses, the story of the solution to the spread of Covid-19 is 
immobility. This had social effects – with people only allowed to mix socially in 
bubbles with tightly drawn boundaries and encouraged to work from home if they 
could as well as with compulsory regulations stopping movement except for defined 
purposes. Educational institutions were also initially closed for face-to-face study 
but over time the restrictions were partly lifted.
However, Covid-19 did, in effect, lead to large scale mobility (Rajan, 2020). The 
pandemic triggered an economic downturn, with extant job losses and global reces-
sion which fed right through the economic system. People who lost jobs went 
back – to their home countries as well as to their rural homes. Both the informal 
economy and the lowest-paid sectors such as hospitality, which employs large num-
bers of migrants in cities, contracted sharply. The rural economy  – and sending 
countries, themselves affected by the pandemic – however, had to accept large num-
bers of return migrants.
Mobility and immobility were thus entangled in the strategies for containment of 
Covid-19. International students were amongst the first to feel the impact of the 
Covid-19 crisis. Chinese students, the largest cohort of international students glob-
ally, returning from the festive break at the turn of the year, were subject to quaran-
tining mingled with an unhealthy dose of racism. Those who returned found that 
they had little ability to then return to their home countries as borders hardened and 
travel restrictions grew. Those who were wealthy and healthy could return. However, 
not all international students are wealthy and able to buy airline tickets at short 
notice and at inflated prices. They stayed. Many students were unable to ‘go home’ 
as the other infrastructures that are supposed to support and enable mobility were 
also failing, consequently immobilising students both within their country of desti-
nation and within the sending countries.
Despite these issues, the first and most persistent concerns about international 
students were not around their welfare but on what a system of education based on 
mobility would do without international students (Gamlen, 2020). Universities UK 
(UUK) estimates that the education sector generates £13.1 billion in export earn-
ings. This helps underpin employment of around 940,000 people across the sector. 
It, therefore, requested ‘a balanced package of measures to maximise universities’ 
contribution to the economy, communities and the post virus recovery,’ i.e., a cash 
injection of about £2.2 billion to help the sector cope with the outcomes of the 
Covid-19 pandemic (Universities UK 2020). Universities UK argued that the poten-
tial loss in revenue could be over £790 million in 2019–2020 and potentially £6.9 
billion in 2020–2021 if there was a drop in international students’ enrolments as 
these were critical to the financial health of the sector (Ahlburg, 2020). Similarly, 
the Australian government abandoned students until the impact of this attitude on 
future student flows was driven home (Nguyen & Balakrishnan, 2020). The infra-
structural role that international student fees play in constituting educational 
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institutions and systems is little recognised and analysed but became particularly 
apparent during the pandemic. It led to new registers of recognition of the role that 
international students play in higher education.
However, the issues faced by students received much less attention. There were 
some media reports, but they remained marginal to mainstream concerns about the 
effect of Covid-19 on UK higher education. Our project aimed to address this lacuna 
through a small-scale study of the issues that the students themselves faced. The 
next section outlines the study and the methods adopted.
9.3  Studying International Student Migrants During 
Covid- 19: Digital Methods
The research presented in this chapter is based on a project that emerged out of 
concerns for international students during the initial stages of the lockdown in the 
UK (Raghuram & Sondhi, 2020). It aimed to capture the experiences of the pan-
demic on the 2019–2020 cohort of international students in the UK. The study used 
online methods, which were widely adopted by research communities studying 
migration during the pandemic. The researchers knew before embarking on the 
study that while the subject of their study was clear, the field site of their study was 
less clear, and required further consideration. The researchers were also sensitive to 
the ethical issues and safety concerns of both the researchers and participants.
This research took shape amidst the pandemic as well as the Black Lives Matter 
movement and the calls to decolonise the curriculum and research that accompanied 
it. The research was undertaken after obtaining ethical clearance from the univer-
sity. Although some meetings were allowed by the time the research was under-
taken, ethics clearance was only requested and obtained for online interviewing. 
The researchers had considerable experience of undertaking online interviews in 
previous research. By undertaking the data collection entirely online, the research 
challenged our assumptions of the ‘field’, but also forced us to think of what the 
field meant at a time when the media was full of stories, such as those around the 
illness itself, and to the mobility limitations being imposed, that were directly rele-
vant to the students. The field, in this research, therefore included the contexts 
within which research problems were conceptualised and designed. We were con-
scious that these problems were pressing for many students but that the students 
were also vulnerable in the context of very rapidly changing regulations.
There are four ways in which the digital appears in research. Drawing on schol-
arship on the ‘digital turn’ in geography the digital in this paper was understood as:
 (a) an interface through which access to the field is mediated
 (b) a field site where data can be generated
 (c) field of concern about how data is generated
 (d) offering opportunities for generating various sorts of ‘telling’ geographies as 
outputs.
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In our project we primarily used the digital as interface. We used a mainstream 
meeting software offered through our university and in doing so were able to access 
students, irrespective of physical location. This included students who had physical 
disability. However, we were aware that other forms of exclusion were operating. 
For instance, those with limited bandwidth or inability use the software or unwilling 
to download the software. Those who were concerned about digital interviewing too 
would, no doubt, have opted out although the ease with which participants interact 
online had no doubt been strengthened by the time we undertook the interviews. 
Students had been exposed to hours of online learning after universities closed face- 
to- face teaching in March 2020, as such, the digital also became our field of/for 
concern as we considered the inclusions and exclusions digital methods pose. The 
digital was not then simply an interface.
The study employed a mixed-method approach to data collection using a bespoke 
online survey on a software platform and in-depth online interviews. The survey ran 
from August 2020 to 15 October 2020. The project was advertised through the 
researchers’ Twitter accounts, and their respective Twitter networks, as well as other 
channels offered by the project partner UK Council for International Student Affairs 
(UKCISA). UKCISA circulated the call for participation through their social media 
platforms and their student ambassadors. Interview respondents were recruited 
from among the survey respondents; survey respondents who expressed an interest 
in being interviewed were contacted by researchers.
The survey generated a total of 85 complete responses. Sixty per cent of respon-
dents identified as women. Of the remaining 40%, the majority identified as men, 
and a smaller group identified as non-binary.2 International students were defined as 
those who were enrolled in UK higher education institutions as international stu-
dents either on a Tier 4 visa3 or paying international student fees or both. Unlike 
other studies, two definitions were used to identify international students. This was 
to capture students with dual nationalities who may not need a visa to be in the UK 
because they hold EU or British passports, but do not meet the residency criteria that 
makes them eligible for home fees.4 This project, therefore, includes British-born 
migrants who may be returning to the UK for higher education. The data collected 
through the individual survey aimed to be illustrative rather than representative. The 
survey captured a cross-section of students who were studying in the UK from 
around the world. This is in contrast to other recent studies that have focused on 
2 Specific percentages are not provided because of data privacy issues.
3 Tier 4 (General) Student is the visa category a person needs to have in hand if entering the UK for 
study. From October 2020,‘Student Visa’ replaced the Tier 4 (General) category. This was because 
the UK moved to a Points Based migration system.
4 To avail of UK home-based fees, students need to demonstrate residency in the UK up to 3 years 
prior to starting study, i.e., continued stay at a UK residence. Prior to 2021, for EU citizens to be 
eligible for home status fees, they had to show evidence of three-year prior residency at an EU 
address. The implications of this eligibility requirement are that British or EU nationals (holding 
British or EU passports) are not automatically eligible for home status fees if they cannot prove 
residency for 3 years prior. Hence, there are several cases where British and EU passport holders 
also pay international students rate fees.
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specific sending countries such as Chinese students abroad (Hu et al., 2020) and 
Indians in Germany (Jayadeva, 2020). The survey was organised around seven 
broad themes to explore the impact of the crisis on students: experiences of migra-
tion, education, financing, housing, social exclusion/racism, institutional support, 
and future intentions.
The majority of respondents were under the age of 33 years (75%) and many 
were enrolled in a Masters-level program of study (42%). Nearly 60% of the respon-
dents were single, with another 37% either in a relationship or married. Thirty per 
cent of the respondents selected China as their primary nationality. This was double 
the number of the next most populous group, Indian nationals (15%). The survey 
also captured the experiences of students from West African countries (Nigeria, 
Ghana), North America (US, Canada), Latin American countries (Brazil and 
Columbia), and South-East Asian countries (Malaysia and Singapore) (Table 9.1).
In addition to the survey, the project also included ten in-depth interviews with 
students to contextualise and explain the data. The interviews were conducted in 
September and October 2020, as the UK was emerging out of lockdown and inter-
national student recruitment was picking up. Universities UK was reflecting on the 
absence of the drop in international student figures, and this formed the background 
to public discussions at this time. Each interview lasted an average of 45 min. Of the 
ten students interviewed, eight were based in the UK at the time of the interviews, 
one had returned to their home country as they had run out of funds and could not 
afford to live in the UK, and one respondent had started their studies at a distance in 
the midst of the lockdown, and hence had yet to enter the UK. The sample of inter-
view respondents was gender balanced and included nationals from Asian and 
North American countries. The interviews followed the survey and explored the 
seven key themes in greater depth, the findings from which we will turn to below.
Throughout the research process we were conscious of the implications of this 
study for our participants. Briggs (1986) refers to interviews as ‘speech’ events and 
Johnson et al. (2004) as ‘meetings’. Both these terms aim to draw attention to the 
relational and dialogic elements that are central to interviewing. They highlight the 
specific contexts and spaces that are created through the interactions. The context of 
the study was shaped by the difficulties that students had been experiencing which 
had been very upsetting and unsettling. During some interviews, students could 
barely hold back their tears as they talked about their family members and how 
much they missed them. Others spoke of resilience and holding on as pragmatic 
Table 9.1 Top 5 nationalities by gender
M (%) F (%) Total
China 33 66 100
India 66 33 100
Nigeria 33 66 100
USA 50 50 100
Malaysia 40 60 100
Source: Authors’ COVID ISM Survey
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responses to uncontrollable events and uncertain futures. The interviewee was con-
tinuously conscious of these issues, sensing discomfort, and doing care work 
through and in the interviews. Care was particularly taken to ensure that participants 
were not left more grieved and in poorer shape than before. Both the authors had 
themselves been international students, albeit some time ago, giving them some 
insights into the issues that students face in the UK. They both have worked on 
international student migration for some years and have also supervised and men-
tored international students. They have argued for international students to be 
included in the global compact for migration as the fees that students pay is a form 
of negative remittance for sending countries (Raghuram & Sondhi, 2017). They 
have written widely about the issues that students from the global south face 
(Raghuram et al., 2020; Sondhi, 2013, 2019). They thus came to this research with 
strong sensibilities around the issues facing student migration. Moreover, they have 
engaged in broader debates around the Indian diaspora in the UK and Canada and 
thus were sensitive to some of the racialisation that students were facing in the con-
text of COVID-19 (Kim & Sondhi, 2015, 2018). Thus, these ‘meetings’ involved 
shared experiences as well as differences.
9.4  Migration Infrastructures and Failure
International higher education was one of the first major global sectors to be signifi-
cantly impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic because of the closure of borders and 
radical reductions in air transportation. It led to a range of hardships for students, 
several of which are discussed below. Moreover, it also showed the constitutive role 
that international students play in global higher education (Raghuram, 2013).
As lockdowns were announced, many of the students who could return to their 
home countries did so, but this was not always an option. Some students stayed on 
in their country of study because their courses involved laboratory work and co- 
presence with supervisors  – technological infrastructures and sites that were 
emplaced in their institution of study. Their studies could not all be moved online. 
As the policies being adopted by the universities were unclear, the students had to 
anticipate how the closure might affect their subject areas and decide if, for them, 
mobility was risky. Despite this some students left as uncertainties loomed large and 
families extricated their children. Others stayed on because of the time-lag between 
the closure of borders between the countries where they study and those to which 
they wanted to return but were now enforcing restrictions or simply did not offer 
enough means of transport to get back. Still others simply could not afford to go 
back and forth without some certainty of their future. These disabled, delayed, and 
disrupted mobility outcomes were the results of failures of migration infrastruc-
tures. Table 9.2 explores how these components differently interacted to produce 
differential mobilities and immobilities.
International students who were already in the UK as lockdowns began to be 
implemented in various parts of the world were faced with two options: they could 
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Table 9.2 Components of infrastructures of migration that shaped mobility and immobility during 
the pandemic
Components of 
Infrastructures Unable to leave
Unable to re-enter the 
UK




Uncertain of whether they 
would meet the Tier 4 
requirements in the UK
Uncertain of whether 
post-study visa would 
require a minimum period of 
stay and students did not 
want to jeopardise that
Unable to return to families 
who were not living in the 
country of citizenship
Uncertain of how 
migration policy 




Closure of offices due to 
lockdown (unable to renew 
passports for home country 
where they had lapsed)
Delays in processing 
biometric residence permits 
for those who had arrived 
recently
Closure of offices due to 







Uncertain about whether 
face-to-face studies were 
suspended and for how long
Uncertain about when 




would be offered 
face-to-face or 
online
Uncertain of the 
value of online 
study
Financial Prohibitive cost of airfares 
and uncertainty about when 
flights might be cancelled
Prohibitive cost of living in 
the UK without being able to 
supplement with part-time 
work
Prohibitive cost of 
flights.
Cancellation of flights 
from sending country.
Travel Lockdown in receiving 
country meant that students 
could not fly back.
Flights were often cancelled 
or reserved for repatriation of 
select groups
Lockdown in sending 
country meant students 
could not travel
There were limited 
flights and many 
countries had 
compulsory and often 
expensive quarantining
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stay in the UK or leave and return to their home countries. Over 65% of respondents 
indicated that they did not return to their home country, with nearly 35% indicating 
that they left the UK and returned to the sending country during the UK lockdown 
(Fig. 9.2). Our survey asked respondents who decided to stay in the UK for the dura-
tion of the lockdown about why they made that decision. Forty per cent of respondents 
said that they wanted or needed to return home but did not do so. The most common 
reasons among this subgroup for staying was concern about their migration status.
Overall, the educational infrastructure negatively impacted students’ education 
experience but the specific challenges international students face has received little 
attention. Survey responses (Fig. 9.3) showed that for the majority of those in taught 
programmes studies have been slowed with delayed assessment and study breaks as 
well as due to illness of staff or students. Students often struggled with Internet con-
nectivity as tutoring moved online. Some found that their course options were no 
longer offered, changing the nature and content of their degree.
At a time of uncertainty, international students did not want to make decisions 
that would further compromise their precarious situation. This was especially an 
issue for international students in the UK.
Students engaging in research-related projects were particularly affected as they 
had to rethink their case studies and methods. Laboratory-based taught courses and 
research were delayed, sometimes stalled, occasionally abandoned. Some students 
deferred or stopped their studies as the courses they registered for were not what 
they were now being offered. Although the fast-moving and changing nature of the 
pandemic meant that several of these issues were faced by all students, UK students 
largely went home to their families as they navigated this. This was not an option for 
international students.






I wanted or needed to retutn, still intend to return but my travel plans have been delayed due to the pandemic. 
I wanted or needed to retutn, still intend to return but my travel plans have been delayed due to reasons that are unrelated to the pandemici.
I wanted or needed to retutn but will stay because pandemic-related reasons have forced me to cancel my plans.
I wanted or needed to retutn but will stay due to reasons that are unrelated to the pandemic.
Fig. 9.2 Decision to stay in UK or leave during lockdown. (Source: Authors’ COVID ISM Survey)
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This is because in the UK universities, acting as agents of the UK Border Agency, 
are required to monitor continuous attendance of classes by international students 
on Tier 4 Visa category (Jenkins, 2014). The rules also limit the amount of time a 
student can spend abroad and requires evidence of commitment to uninter-
rupted study.
There was a lot of uncertainty about the rules as the studies were interrupted and 
face-to-face study requirements could not be met (Fig. 9.4). As such, students were 
deeply concerned that they could unwittingly break rules. Any irregularities or 
missed classes might result in the students losing their migrant status, and poten-
tially, deportation from the country. In fact, nearly 50% of the respondents identified 
this as the reason they did not leave as they were uncertain about where they stood 
with regard to their visa if they did not attend classes. Which rules would be relaxed, 
how, and when were all unclear. The interlinked nature of physical presence in the 
country, their studies, and visa was not only stressful but is often little understood as 
these are often seen as separate issues. Moreover, all these were also linked to their 
financial position and affected the poorest students the most. In an effort to mitigate 
Studies deferred / stopped temporarily (14%)
Assessment altered e.g. examination changed to coursework (14%) Unable to carry out research (20%)
Studies altered e.g. replaced one taught course module with another (9%)
Studies slowed (33%) Assessment delayed (10%)
Fig. 9.3 Impact of COVID on programme of study. (Source: Authors’ COVID ISM Survey)
Fig. 9.4 Impact of migration rules on studies. (Source Authors’ COVID ISM Survey)
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the uncertainties around migration processes, many students had already paid or 
expected to pay extra fees related to visa and passport processing due to the 
pandemic.
This situation was exacerbated by the lack of timely clarifications by the UK 
government who periodically provided updates on their website as well as through 
social media and universities but offered little direct advice to the students. While 
some respondents implicitly pointed to the issue of poor communication, all respon-
dents expressed deep dissatisfaction with the incomplete or incorrect information 
they received from their universities during this pandemic. Survey respondents indi-
cated that the majority of institutional support and messaging relating to students 
was on mental health and well-being; only a minority indicated that their institution 
provided them with any financial or housing support (Fig.  9.5). Thus, structural 
reasons and infrastructural failures leading to poor mental health were ignored, and 
mental health was individualised and made into a personal responsibility. The uni-
versities were not adjusting the structures and infrastructures of education, housing, 
and visa to meet student requirements. The lack of institutional support on these 
issues exacerbated ongoing visa-related challenges.
Moreover, delay in completion of their studies raises distinctive problems for 
future planning among international students. Post-study plans are an issue for all 
students, especially in the context of the economic upheaval, job losses, and trun-
cated opportunities that have resulted from the pandemic, but it is particularly so for 
international students who aim to obtain some labour market experience or embel-
lish their CVs through internships before returning home. Students, especially those 
from the Global South who had taken loans to study, aimed to recoup some of the 
money spent on education through working, but were no longer sure if this would 
be possible. Self-funded students make up the largest share of the international stu-
dents in the UK. Over 40% of our survey respondents said they were self-funded 
and were reliant on funds from friends and family or bank loans. Because of the 
differential values of currency and the earning power back home, the difficulties of 
recouping that money by working in their own countries was much greater. The high 
interest rate charged for loans, often at compound interest, also made the need to 
quickly pay back the money urgent. Those who had borrowed from family and 
friends or had been funded by them did not have to pay interest but were usually 
wealthier as they moved in a network where they knew others who had some money. 
Fig. 9.5 Type of support offered by university. (Source: Authors’ COVID ISM Survey)
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Some respondents expressed concern that if they were unable to complete their 
studies and were still outside the UK, they may no longer be able to avail of oppor-
tunities for further study and post-study visas. Several students spoke about how 
they had intended to transition into further programmes of study in January or 
September 2020 but were unable to do so. The importance of post-study work and 
of being able to retain that ability to have this visa cannot therefore be 
overestimated.
For many the post-study visa period also offered a bit of slack when they could 
plan future study and migration. International students have a time-limited period in 
which their visa is valid in which to accomplish these things. However, international 
students also varied in how far they had access to resources with which to cushion 
periods when they have no income. They were incurring expenditure on rent and 
living as they had no homes to go to while they waited for their plans to materialise, 
making the utilisation of the post-study visa much riskier. As a result, there was a 
drop in the proportion of students in the survey who were planning to stay on 
(Figs. 9.6 and 9.7).
Fig. 9.6 Original post-study intentions prior to lockdown. (Source: Authors’ COVID ISM Survey)
Fig. 9.7 Post-study intentions after experiencing lockdown. (Source: Authors’ COVID 
ISM Survey)
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In reflecting back on their intentions, nearly 80% of the student respondents 
reported that prior to the lockdown they had intended to stay in the UK, either tran-
sitioning to a work permit (53%) or pursuing further studies (25%). However, when 
asked what they felt after the lockdown, only 70% intended to make those choices 
(44% work and 25% study). This lack of confidence in post-study stay in the UK 
was also exacerbated by what students considered as the poor handling of the pan-
demic in the UK, as it has had some of the highest infection and death rates (thus 
far) globally. Thus, the drop in those who intend to stay on does not adequately 
reflect the extent to which migrant students were anxious about this issue. One of 
the interviewee’s reflections on the complexities of how these concerns play out is 
presented below:
Due to severe sickness, I couldn’t submit my dissertation on time, and I didn’t get enough 
time to concentrate well on the dissertation. I had self-isolated myself as I was unwell, and 
NHS had asked me to stay at home for more than 21 days. Therefore, I requested for visa 
extension, but I didn’t get positive response from the University and the home office. I am 
literally trapped as I cannot apply for a job anywhere due to COVID 19. I can’t even apply 
for another course as I won’t get enough time to search the course because I am getting just 
one month of time instead of 4 months after completing. (Female, Masters student)
However, it was not only the students who were stuck in the UK who faced chal-
lenges. Students who had left the UK when the lockdown was first imposed had 
been unable to re-enter to pick up their things and wrap up. As one survey respon-
dent reported:
I initially went home for Easter break and stuck here since then. I haven’t moved out from 
my accommodation and is continuing paying. I really hope I can go back soon! To retrieve 
my things and secure a job! (Female, Bachelors student)
Our project primarily focused on those who were in the UK during the period of the 
lockdown. Several of our interviewees talked about colleagues and peers who had 
been stuck in their countries and were unable to leave them. They also spoke about 
others who left when the lockdown was lifted because they were unable to afford to 
live due to the high rent costs and were now trying to re-enter the UK. They were 
struggling to travel.
Those who were looking to start their studies and enter the UK for the first time 
faced other challenges too. Language testing centres had closed for a period, mak-
ing it difficult for students to obtain the necessary documentation. The consular 
services were also operating with reduced staff and at a distance. Moreover, stu-
dents were unclear about whether the studies would be offered online or face-to- 
face and how studies would progress once they arrived. The different waves of the 
pandemic were also geographically varied, with source countries going into lock-
down at contrasting times than in the UK. The variegated nature of disease spread 
and intensity, and hence of the control measures, meant that the students faced limi-
tations over their mobility both in their own countries and in the UK. While some 
students were unable to leave the UK, others were unable to re-enter or enter it due 
to failures in the entangled infrastructures  – migration, education, and finance, 
namely visa offices, biometric centres, and language testing centres to list a few.
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Moreover, travel itself came to be increasingly brought under new forms of sur-
veillance. Many visa centres were closed, and immigration regulations restricted 
entry for non-nationals. Covid-19 testing, sometimes difficult to access in the UK 
but a mandatory requirement for entering some countries, created new costs and 
immobilities. The mobility of students who had access to sufficient finances to 
access these was delayed rather than entirely disabled but for others, the costs of 
mobility were too high. The impact on students has been and continues to be 
class-differentiated.
The challenges of visa centres, unclear migration policies, ineffective communi-
cation, and surveillance by the universities have long been hallmarks of infrastruc-
tures of student migration. The slippages and problems of these systems were often 
apparent to those who had to use these infrastructures, especially those from and in 
the Global South. They were set up to filter those from some nationalities and 
classes and they very often did just that, albeit in new ways. Crucially, the effects of 
the pandemic also furthered inequalities with some students more severely affected, 
especially those from the Global South. However, the power of intermediaries, 
infrastructures, and policies in shaping migration outcomes became even more 
exposed due to the pandemic.
In sum, the infrastructures supporting student mobility in the UK were fractured 
and incomprehensive. This led to international students being trapped in the UK, 
unable to leave fearing that they may not be able to return to the UK if they returned 
home for the period of the lockdown. They were anxious that this would leave them 
with an incomplete education and with no chance of reimbursement of the money 
spent. Others left but found it difficult to re-enter. Yet others have delayed their 
international study plans or dropped them. Thus, infrastructures of mobility led to 
the selective mobilities and immobilites of students.
9.5  Concluding Remarks
This chapter has explored the entangled nature of migration, education, and finance 
infrastructures that have shaped international students’ Covid-19 lives. Drawing on 
an online survey and select interviews, the paper explored the experiences of migrant 
students in the UK.  It particularly pointed to the issues that students face. For 
instance, some of the infrastructures around mobility are used to filter students 
rather than facilitate mobility. They are also situated within a governance complex 
which is suspicious of mobility from the Global South. The infrastructures of mobil-
ity of receiving countries are comprised of various components, the most visible of 
which are visa policies, visa offices, biometric centres, and language testing centres. 
The pandemic highlighted how these are entangled with and delivered through edu-
cational institutions and mobility infrastructures. The tenuous relations between 
these infrastructures came unstuck during the pandemic, leading many to become 
locked within UK borders, while others were unable to enter the UK. Moreover, 
students were also concerned about their post-study lives and how their future could 
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be affected. Crucially, these infrastructures always existed and particularly impeded 
those from the Global South, but the pandemic exposed not only the politics and 
operations of these infrastructures but also their failures.
Importantly, these crises are moments which shed light on existing infrastruc-
tural arrangements that are often hidden from view. It requires that analysis of 
Covid-19 goes beyond descriptions and beyond seeing it as an acute unprecedented 
event. It is all those things but it also much more. It is an analytical invitation to re- 
read the past and see how hegemonic systems have been maintained, who benefited, 
and how infrastructures were shaped through very particular politics of operations, 
stitching together these multiple infrastructures. For instance, concerns about atten-
dance can become a problem if there is illness in the family or if financial conditions 
change. Finances, education, mobilities, and health have to routinely align for inter-
national student migration to become successful. However, each of these is also 
surrounded by infrastructures that routinely fail. Yet these entanglements are rarely 
recognised either by researchers or institutions providing student-facing services. 
Rather, institutions routinely see students as cash-cows (Indelicato & Pražić, 2019). 
The insistence that it is higher education institutions and national economies that 
suffered during the pandemic rather than the students themselves suggests a utilitar-
ian and extractive politics to international student migration which infuses their 
reception, not only now but also in pre-Covid-19 times. These are some of the les-
sons we learnt from our study.
This poses important questions for researching international student migration in 
the future. What do the failures of infrastructure that negatively impacted interna-
tional student experiences of Covid-19 tell us about how infrastructures are rou-
tinely experienced? What do crises expose about how infrastructures appear as 
impediments selectively for some students and at some times? What is the work 
undertaken to maintain and repair these infrastructures routinely and how complete 
or incomplete are these operations of maintenance when it comes to intermediaries 
in the Global South? In short, what are the routine failures that those wanting to 
pursue international study face on their route to becoming a migrant?
But crises also offer a political opening to think otherwise. They point to analyti-
cal opportunities and to moments when change can be identified. This requires that 
we also explore the emergent, i.e., new arrangements of power and how they will 
operate to shape international student mobility. For instance, future research on 
international study must address the effects of negative remittances, situate the class 
dimensions in international study, and read for how these intersect with gender and 
race. It should also focus on how students themselves negotiate the entangled infra-
structures and their agency in the face of severe constraints. While the UK has 
retained its international student numbers, this is not globally true. For instance, 
there has been a significant drop in numbers travelling to some other major destina-
tions such as Australia. Overall student migration numbers have thus dropped. Is 
this the beginning of a pattern of change or only an aberration? How will individual 
countries’ ways of handling Covid-19 affect who goes where? The impact of the 
quarantine costs, and potential implementation of vaccine passports are estimated to 
lower international student flows along certain corridors. Moreover, given that 
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international students have underwritten the costs of higher education to the national 
exchequer and to domestic students, how will nations respond? What role will inter-
national distance education (Mittelmeier et al., 2020) play in the unrelenting spread 
of internationalised higher education? What lessons can this form of internationali-
sation learn from the experiences of international student migrants? These are all 
important questions for future research.
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Chapter 10




The Covid-19 pandemic has had an impact on all types of mobility and migration 
dynamics, including return migration. The almost immediate closing of borders in 
the face of pandemic lead to the panic mobility of those returning home across the 
globe. In addition to visitors and tourists, internal and international migrants 
returned to their country or city of origin. Lockdown measures prevent many 
migrants from earning a living from their unsecured, temporary, and informal jobs. 
The pandemic also brought evident risks for highly-skilled migrants’ access to 
healthcare, financial security, and social protection, forcing them to consider the 
return option. The crisis, like economic recession and pandemics, makes migrants’ 
aspirations and decision-making far more complex than in ‘normal’ times. Migrants’ 
decisions are marked by deep dilemma between staying and returning.
Against his background, the chapter addresses the following questions: how and 
to what extent has the pandemic triggered the returns of migrants? What are the 
diverging characteristics of returning compared to other crisis situations and before 
pandemic times? How do receiving and sending countries respond to returns? How 
does the pandemic influence migrants’ aspirations about staying and returning? 
Does the pandemic create different sets of challenges for irregular migrants and 
regular migrants?
An emphasis on returns offers insights to evaluate changing characteristics of 
migration in ‘pandemic times’. It will also contribute to revisiting discussions on 
dichotomies in the return discourse such as voluntary versus forced, return assis-
tance, and reintegration during and after the pandemic crisis. The chapter is based 
on desk research and analysis of the scholarly literature, reports, and grey literature 
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from international organisations (particularly the International Organization of 
Migration, IOM), civil society reports, scientific blogs, and media reports. Data on 
returns are based on information provided by the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC).
The chapter starts with a brief review of literature on return migration. It then 
moves to the recent scholarship addressing the crisis – particularly in the global 
economy – and its impact on returns. The next section explores how the pandemic 
influences the multiple facets of the migrant returns. After presenting the main pat-
terns during the pandemic, this section introduces two subsections to further elabo-
rate on the topic: the first focuses on the logistics of returns, with special attention 
to IOM’s involvement in the assisted return operations; the second provides some 
insights into the complexity of return decisions, drawing mainly from secondary 
sources. The challenges in which returnees encountered on the way and after return 
are addressed next, and the chapter concludes with a summary of main trends and 
some projections.
10.2  An Overview of Return Migration Scholarship
Return is a broad concept that is variously defined. An encompassing definition 
refers to ‘the movement of a person going from a host country back to a country of 
origin, country of nationality or habitual residence usually after spending a signifi-
cant period of time in the host country whether voluntary or forced assisted or 
assisted or spontaneous’ (IOM, 2011). The scholarship on return migration over-
whelmingly draws from the experiences of international labour migrants, while 
refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced people (IDPs) have been paid 
less attention.
Existing studies seek to theorise return migration (Cassarino, 2004; Carling & 
Pettersen, 2014; King, 2015). Mapping the plethora of studies shows that there are 
no single reasons explaining return aspirations, decisions, the actual return process, 
and reintegration. The approaches on return aspirations and decisions diverge based 
on the level of analysis (individual, household, state), the primary motives driving 
return (economic aspects, non-economic aspects) as well as micro or macro dimen-
sions. As the migration processes have often been explained by push-pull factors 
highlighting economic reasons, return migration scholarship also adopts a similar 
approach.
The first strand of scholarship focuses on motivations for returns, also called 
intentions and aspirations. It should be noted that return motivation is not the exact 
predictor of actual returning. Although most migrants initially intend to return, they 
rarely do. Studies on return aspirations draw largely from neoclassical economics, 
labour economics, and transnationalism literature (Waldorf, 1995; De Haas et al., 
2015). Large-N studies about migrant workers find that failure of integration in the 
country of residence is a factor, prompting return intentions and pushing for returns. 
This is because labour market participation, education, and job satisfaction are 
expected to increase migrants’ stay intentions (De Haas et al., 2015; Waldorf, 1995). 
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Return also happens when migrants miscalculate the costs of migration and when 
they realise they are not able to access high standards of living, higher income, or 
accumulate saving (Cassarino, 2004: 255; Dumont & Spielvogel, 2008: 178). 
Although the level of education is not directly related to the tendency to return, 
those who work below their qualifications may have a higher tendency to return.
In return decisions, the economic and education variables interact with other fac-
tors such as the initial migration plans, expectations upon return, demographic char-
acteristics, gender relations, and family issues, among others. Quantitative studies 
specify demographic characteristics such as age, lifecycle, generation, gender, num-
ber of dependents, household decision-making, and lifestyle reasons to explain like-
lihood to return (De Bree et al., 2010; De Haas & Fokkema, 2010). For example, 
studies on return migration to central and eastern Europe find that ‘returnees are 
predominantly male, young, not married, and with a medium or high level of educa-
tion’ (Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2012, 2). A return move may also occur when any 
pre-defined objectives are achieved, such as completing education (or children’s 
education), accumulating a certain amount of wealth or gaining citizenship or pen-
sions. Duration of residence in the host country and years prior to retirement may 
impact on return decisions (Waldorf, 1995; Dustman, 2003). So, as Cassarino 
(2004) notes, migrants consider return when they achieve migration-related goals 
and targets; return is thus a ‘calculated strategy’ of both migrants and migrant 
households.
Return decisions can be also explained by pull factors related to the home coun-
try. Factors that may influence migrants’ decision-making to return include invest-
ments and social ties to the homeland, political and economic opportunities; family 
demands; identity-driven motivations such as feelings of belonging to the home-
land; and ethnic (Wang & Fan, 2006; De Haas et al., 2015; Skrentny et al., 2007).
All these factors are neither related in a predictable way nor independent of each 
other, making any analysis quite complex (Carling & Pettersen, 2014). To illustrate, 
based on the cases of Eastern European migrant workers’ return to their home coun-
tries, Anzelika Zaiceva and Klaus F. Zimmermann found that
If migration is temporary, the decision to move will not only be based on immediate and 
future incomes in the destination, but also on the expected future returns in the country of 
origin. The main motives for return include preference for consumption in the home coun-
try, family and other networks at home, taking advantage of differences in relative prices 
between host and home countries (high wages abroad and low prices at home), and the 
possibility of accumulating human capital abroad, the returns to which are higher at home. 
(Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2012: 2)
Individual factors also interact with the host country’s policies. In a recent article 
on Bolivian migrants’ return from Spain, Raquel Martínez-Buján (2019) argues that 
‘migrants’ decisions to return home are embedded in the gendered allocation of 
economic and reproductive responsibilities and patriarchal ideology’ as well as in 
fluctuating Spanish migration policies restricting circular migration and allowing 
citizenship acquisition (p. 3105).
In addition to analysing factors that shape return intentions and decision, the 
second strand of return migration scholarship – which emerges more in the field of 
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Refugee Studies and Forced Migration  – raises the question of how returns are 
organised. Focusing on the return of refugees, asylum seekers, and IDPs, existing 
studies question the pre- and post-return assistance, practices, and interventions of 
international agencies, home and host states (Bascom, 2005; Omata, 2013; Iaria, 
2014; Arias et al., 2014). Drawing from the existing practices, several studies offer 
key dimensions of better return programmes such as compliance with legal princi-
ples (safety, voluntariness, dignity), livelihood development, and equal citizenship 
within a nation (George et al., 2016; Frank, 2017; Gerver, 2018). In recent years, 
much interest has been dedicated to examining Assisted Voluntary Return and 
Reintegration (AVRR) schemes adopted by European countries to facilitate the 
return of rejected asylum seekers and those who voluntarily return (Lietaert et al., 
2017; Lietaert, 2019; Koser & Kuschminder, 2017).
The third strand of return migration focuses on reintegration of returnees. The 
studies examine the impact of several factors on returnees’ reintegration, including 
human capital and financial capital; resource conditions, particularly livelihoods; 
economic opportunities and housing; personal networks, social contacts and existing 
power relations; reception by host communities; and traditions and values in the 
home country (De Bree et al., 2010; Ruben et al., 2009; Iaria, 2014; Cassarino, 2004). 
Despite the significant insights these studies provide, we do not yet have adequate 
knowledge about how crisis situations like economic recession or a pandemic influ-
ence migrants’ return aspirations, actual returning practices, and reintegration.
10.3  Returning Home in Times of Crisis
The impact of crisis over a return migration had received limited scholarly attention 
until the global economic crisis, also called the Great Recession. Drawing from the 
mainstream literature on return migration and labour migration, growing scholar-
ship has focused on the ‘crisis returnees’ emerging from 2007 to 2011 (Apsite- 
Berina et al., 2020). These studies engaged with the hypothesis that ‘the economic 
crisis and the resulting situation on the labour market in the immigrant-receiving 
countries have a negligible influence on the migration decisions (including return 
and onward migration)’. A number of large-N and single case studies cover return 
dynamics during economic crisis in Europe (Smoliner et al., 2012; Machnis- Walasek 
and Organiściak-Krzykowska), North America (mainly US-Mexico)  (Buznego 
et al., 2020), and South and East Asia (Zachariah & Rajan, 2010).
The main finding for internal European migration is that no mass return migra-
tion was observed because the economic situation in migrants’ home countries also 
worsened, however, emigration slowed as migrants adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ strat-
egy during this period (Holland et al., 2011; Koehler et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the 
crisis has given momentum to accelerate planned returns and onward migration to 
elsewhere (Koehler et al., 2010; Eurofound, 2012). Some migrants from new EU 
member states (central and eastern European countries) working in the old member 
states of the EU (known as the EU15 countries) had to return home. The Baltic 
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states, Slovakia, and Poland had the largest proportions of returnees during the cri-
sis period. A prominent quantitative study highlights that the probability to return 
emerges as larger for individuals with middle and higher educational attainments. 
Also, migrants who are males, single, and older, and those without children are 
more likely to return, relative to other migrants in the same destination countries 
(Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2012). Returns during crisis occurred due to economic 
reasons – mainly job loss – because migrants often are employed in sectors most 
affected by the crisis such as services, construction, and retail. Migrants experi-
enced bigger rises in unemployment compared to natives. Also, some of these 
returnees initially hold temporary intentions of staying abroad or feel emerging 
social pressures fuelled by economic difficulties in destination countries. As in the 
case of Polish returnees from the UK in this period, migrants ‘might not intend to 
return due to the crisis, with the main reasons for return in this case also being fam-
ily related’ (ibid., 9) In the case of returnees to Lithuania, family and cultural 
motives appear as the most important for return decisions (ibid).
Aside from several push factors for returning home during a crisis, there are also 
pulling factors that make staying a more rational decision under some conditions. 
As regional or global economic crisis affects both receiving and sending countries, 
the economic situation at home might become worse than that in the destination. 
Some migrants thus delayed return; unemployed migrants ruled out the return 
option due to uncertainty about the possibility to re-enter the destination country in 
the future. Despite job loss, the presence of established networks abroad (feasibility 
of re-migration to elsewhere), migrant-to-migrant solidarity, expansion of social 
assistance or transitional measures in a way to include migrants, and a sense of 
belonging and security or having settled family (Pusti, 2013) acted as factors deter-
ring returns. Some migrants chose to migrate onwards to other destinations less 
severely affected by the recession. Even in instances of return, these did not neces-
sarily mean the end of the migration trajectory, rather potential repeat and circular 
migration seem to be the case. Many returnees have strong aspirations for repeat 
emigration (Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2012, 9).
Several other case studies such as research looking at the impact of the Greek 
debt crisis on the decision of Albanian migrants to return (Kerpaci & Kuka, 2019), 
the return motivations of Romanian healthcare staff (Roman & Goschin, 2014), 
highly educated Polish emigrants (Machnis-Walasek & Organiściak-Krzykowska, 
2014), Romanians and Latvians (Apsite-Berina et al., 2020), or Bolivians’ return 
from Spain (Martínez-Buján, 2019 found similar patterns to those discussed above.
Existing research on the impact of financial crisis provides us some insights for 
examining return dynamics during pandemics, as McKee and Stuckler rightly note:
The Covid-19 pandemic is, first and foremost, a health crisis. However, it is rapidly becom-
ing an economic one too…because of…reduction in economic activity reduces the circula-
tion of money and, with it, tax revenues…hits individuals and families, who may see their 
income plummet catastrophically…Once they have depleted their financial reserves, com-
panies close, with consequences for their owners, employees, and suppliers. (2020, 1)
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Although conditions of economic crisis display similarities with pandemics, 
there are some differences too. First, the pandemic created serious health risks for 
migrants and returnees, including the potential of spreading it to the communities 
on return. Second, immediate border closures to control the spread of Covid-19 
generated more restrictions over all types of mobilities – which was not the case in 
the time of economic crisis. Third, migrants’ exits from or re-entry to may not be 
feasible, hindering the circular migration patterns and embracing stranding or a 
‘wait and see approach’. Fourth, the pandemic hit almost all countries, while eco-
nomic crisis was more region-specific. Given this context, the pandemic has par-
ticular sets of impacts on return migration that can be conceptualised as crisis-return. 
The term implies that crisis shapes return intentions and decision, the actual return-
ing practices, the involvement of state and international actors, and the conditions 
encountered by migrants upon return as will be discussed below.
10.4  The Pandemic’s Impact on the Acceleration of Returns
The Covid-19 crisis prompted many migrant workers, irregular migrants including 
asylum seekers, and those stranded in transit zones to evaluate the option of return-
ing to their home countries. Actual returns occur across the globe with small and 
high numbers according to news and reports, mainly published by the IOM and 
research institutions like the Mixed Migration Center (MMC).
India, the country of the highest number emigrants in the world, observed one of 
the biggest return movements of international and internal labour migrants. 
Hundreds of thousands of Indian citizens working in the Gulf Countries as well as 
the US, the UK, Spain, and Italy had returned to India by 22 March when it restricted 
all international travel. Reports claim that ‘as many as 4,56,431 expatriates wanting 
to return home registered on the government-run Non-Resident Keralites Affairs 
department website in April. According to the state government data, over 90,000 
have so far been evacuated’ (Babu, 2020). Indian journalists and scholars identify 
this movement as a reverse migration (Premkumar, 2020; Menon & Vadakepat, 
2020). Moreover, a half-million internal migrants literally walked to back to their 
home villages to survive as they lost daily earnings in the large cities.
Some other massive returns occurred in South America and Europe. One of the 
largest return movements was that of an estimated 15,000 Venezuelans (Polanco & 
Sequera, 2020). Some 90% of Venezuelan refugees and migrants in Columbia and 
Peru reported losing income due to the pandemic – a much higher percentage of job 
losses than in other regions (MMC, 2020a). In Europe, tens of thousands of 
Ukrainians working in Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy, and elsewhere rushed to 
return home because of business shutdowns and economic contraction (Scollon, 
2020). Seasonal workers from Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria who work in farms 
and food plants in Germany, Australia, and the UK had to return to their origin 
countries in March, while in early summer they were asked back to the destination 
countries as much-needed agricultural labour (Gherasim, 2020).
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One of the largest movements observed was the ‘spontaneous’ return of irregular 
Afghan migrants from Iran and Pakistan. It is the pandemic’s best-documented 
return because it had been underway before the pandemic. While some of these 
returns occurred due to the loss of income (MMC, 2020a), others can be attributed 
to the inability to continue the migration journey due to the increased risk of deten-
tion and deportation. From January to September 2020, a total of 576,801 Afghans 
had returned – 571,800 from Iran and 5001 from Pakistan. Parallel to rising Covid-19 
cases in Iran, these spontaneous returns of stranded migrants from Iran to Afghanistan 
increased marginally. For example, while the total number of returns was only 
9478 in the week of 23–29 February, the figures peaked at 62,341 for the week of 
15–21 March (IOM, 2020). A similar sharp rise was also observed in the assisted 
returns of Afghans from Iran, organised by the IOM; whereas 527 Afghans returned 
in the week of 23–29 February, their number rose to 3300 in the week of 15–21 
February (IOM, 2020).
In general, some migrants returned using their own resources, while others had 
to wait for their governments to fly them home as they lacked financial resources or 
faced border closures (Gulf News, 2020). Migrant workers’ returns are often 
labelled ‘voluntary returns’ in the reports by the IOM, research institutions, and 
academic publications (Menon & Vadakepat, 2020, 2), although they lacked another 
option, raising questions about how this return is ‘voluntary’. In addition to those 
able to return, many migrant workers were stranded or did not find opportunity to 
return (Scollon, 2020). Some of those stranded became more vulnerable to exploita-
tion and had to take up or continue to work in employment in conditions with 
increased exposure to Covid-19 such as delivery and food processing (IOM-Abuja, 
2020). Many migrants, unfortunately, died of Covid-19 – for example, 296 expatri-
ates from Kerala who died in West Asia – thus adding other sets of difficulties for 
families of migrants such as bringing home the deceased’s body when commercial 
flights resume (Babu, 2020).
The difficulties in logistics of migrant returns spurred some migration gover-
nance arrangements, with the involvement and funding of international organisa-
tions. Home countries with fewer resources to arrange charter flights and host 
countries looking for the quick return of migrants cooperated with the IOM in 
developing solutions, as will be elaborated below.
10.5  Logistics of Returns for Stranded Migrants: The IOM’s 
Interventions
Many migrants were stranded for some time in transit points (or buffer zones) of 
several lands and maritime migratory routes such as Turkey, Greece (eastern 
Mediterranean), Libya (central Mediterranean), Niger (Sahara route), Djibouti, and 
Yemen (East African route to Saudi Arabia), Kenya (southern route) and elsewhere. 
According to reports, among these transits, the highest percentages of trapped 
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migrants for a time were in Libya, Niger, and Kenya (MMC, 2020b). Some of these 
migrants had to return after being stranded for months, although they rarely changed 
their actual plan of migration (MMC, 2020b).
Between Spring and Fall 2020, some migrants stranded in transit were returned 
with the assistance of the IOM because they were neither able to reach their destina-
tion nor to return home (IOM-Djibouti, 2020). The IOM worked with regional gov-
ernments in Africa, Latin America, and Asia to facilitate the return of stranded 
migrants, opening ‘humanitarian corridors’ by collaborating and negotiating with 
the origin and host countries (IOM-Freetown, 2020). In Latin America, the return 
operations emerged as part of the IOM’s Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration 
Programme (AVRR) (IOM-Belize, 2020). In Africa, IOM interventions were part 
of the AVRR and the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrants Protection and 
Reintegration. These programmes are funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for 
Africa (IOM- Freetown, 2020) as well as donor countries such as the US, Germany, 
Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands. From March to May 2020, the IOM facili-
tated the voluntary return of over 16,500 migrants under the EU-IOM Joint Initiative 
for Migrant Protection and Reintegration (IOM-Nigeria, 2020). The operations 
continued. The majority of assisted return operations were in Africa’s transit points, 
as shown in Table 10.1.
Moreover, the IOM worked with the World Health Organization (WHO) to 
strengthen health surveillance measures at points of exit and entry of returnees, 
including the distribution of personal protective equipment, pre-departure testing 
for Covid-19, rehabilitation of screening  and isolation facilities, and training of 
frontline border officers on infection prevention and control (IOM-Sudan, 2020). 
For instance, some 5822 persons returned from the US and Mexico to Honduras 
(IOM-Honduras, 2020) were provided post-return assistance. Similar support was 
given to 14,000 Mozambican returnees from South Africa (Africanews, 2020).
In almost all IOM operations, both IOM regional staff and coordinating home 
and host state officers underlined compliance with the principles of returns: volun-
tariness, safe and dignified return. A review of news published in IOM’s official 
website shows that many of the country representatives (called ‘Missions’ in IOM’s 
terminology) emphasised how the IOM assisted returns by invitation and ensures 
safe and dignified return. It should be underlined that the published quotes below 
from country representatives are preselected by the Media and Communication 
Division at IOM Headquarters. Thus, it is not surprising that they align with the 
overarching discourse reflected in the IOM’s ongoing information campaigns and 
communications with crisis-affected communities and governments. Like all politi-
cal discursive practices, press releases about return operations of stranded migrants 
during the pandemic may have a legitimising function. The quotes chosen for inclu-
sion in press releases exemplify this attempt at justification by appropriating a 
rights-based terminology.
For example, Michele Bombassei, IOM Regional Senior Programme Coordinator 
for West and Central Africa, legitimised the necessity of IOM’s interventions by 
underlining the terminology on safe and dignified return as well as taking action 
after invitation (rhetoric). He reported:
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An increased number of migrants and governments have approached IOM for support in the 
organization of return operations to countries of origin…Governments are approving 
exceptions to the closure of borders for IOM to operate and to support the safe and dignified 
return [italics added] of stranded migrants. (IOM-Freetown, 2020)
The IOM and collaborating partners seem certain about the voluntariness of the 
returns. Chief of Mission of IOM in South Africa Lily Sanya stressed the same vol-
untariness aspect:
Since the beginning of the pandemic, IOM and our partners have provided voluntary return 
support to approximately 400 nationals from various countries in the region. This is a con-
tinuation of our support to vulnerable migrants that decide they would be better off return-
ing home. (IOM-Pretoria, 2020)
The continuation of return operations in new formats and narratives during the 
pandemic might be expected to aim at strengthening IOM’s visibility and credibil-
ity. They may bring the organisation more leverage in migration governance in gen-
eral by carrying out the critical role of negotiating/operating further returns that 
have been the goal of regional and global migration governance (see UN Compact, 
Table 10.1 IOM-assisted return operations during the Pandemic
Returned to/Nationality Stranded in/Returned from
Total 
number
Ethiopia Sudan, Djibouti, Somali, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Lebanon
17,000
Sudan Middle East, North Africa, Asia 15,000
Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Benin, 
Nigeria, Cameroon
Niger 2800




Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia Algeria 114
Ghana Libya 118
Malawi South Africa 111
Nigeria Lebanon 165
Sierra Leoneans Senegal 59
Uganda Saudi Arabia (female migrant workers) 100





Belize El Salvador 13
Source: Author compilation from IOM press releases: IOM-Addis Ababa 2020; IOM-Accra 2020; 
IOM-Bamako 2020; IOM-Niger 2020; IOM-Algiers 2020; IOM-Pretoria 2020; IOM-Abuja 2020; 
IOM-Freetown 2020; IOM-Kampala 2020; IOM- N’Djamena 2020; IOM- Mogadishu 2020; 
IOM-Nicosia 2020; IOM-Ulaanbaatar 2020; IOM-Belize 2020; IOM-Sudan 2020
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2018; EU Pact, 2020). The consistency of the statements delivered by different IOM 
officers confirms the previous findings that IOM has ‘an intra-organisational cohe-
sion which contributes to the power and authority of the organisation as related to 
AVRR programming’ and that ‘the IOM has become a key source of power and 
authority in the pursuit of global forms of migration governance’ (Smith, 2019, 1).
While the pandemic opened a space for the IOM to operate new modes of return 
operations, it had to suspend or downsize formal AVRR programs in Europe. For 
instance, only 432 migrants on Greek islands voluntarily returned to 20 countries of 
origin via commercial flights with the IOM’s assistance from March to mid-July 
2020 (IOM-Athens, 2020). However, since mid-July 2020, several EU member 
states resumed returns with the IOM. The first ‘voluntary returns’ were facilitated 
by IOM in Greece and the Hellenic authorities, in coordination with IOM Iraq and 
the diplomatic corps, for the return of 134 Iraqi nationals who had been residing on 
the islands of Lesvos, Samos, Kos, Chios, and Leros, as well as the Greek mainland 
for several months and wished to return to Iraq (ibid.). Moreover, in August 2020, 
after a 6-month hiatus due to Covid-19 border closures, the IOM resumed its AVRR 
programme from Niger to Gambia, by returning 26 Gambian migrants who in the 
IOM’s transit centres in Niger (IOM-Banjul, 2020).
10.6  Reasons of Return
Migrants’ aspirations and decisions for return have always been a complex process, 
as discussed in the literature overview above. Covid-19 created conditions of severe 
financial crisis for many migrants, thus ‘returning home’ emerged as a desired or 
required urgent decision. A review of the independent think tank Mixed Migration 
Centre’s weekly snapshot reports shows that the ‘Covid-19 was cited as a main 
driver of return’ in the survey questionnaire filled by returnees in Asia and Latin 
America. The survey was conducted with 7000 participants in five regions and 14 
countries between April and July 2020 to collect data about the impact of Covid-19 
on migrants and refugees’ (Mixed Migration, 2020). According to other research 
and news reports, returns are most likely to happen due to the income losses and 
consequent deterioration of living conditions in the host countries.
The impact of Covid-19 on global trade and the resultant shocks to national 
economies have put both public and private businesses at huge risks. Distressed 
companies – especially those in ‘recession-hit’ sectors such as construction, manu-
facturing, and services – have either suspended or slowed their activities (Menon & 
Vadakepat, 2020, 7; Zeeshan & Sultana, 2020, 135). Accordingly, lockdown mea-
sures prevented many labour migrants from earning a living due to the business 
shutdowns, wage cuts, outstanding back pay, paused or cancelled employment con-
tracts, being placed on paid or unpaid leave, and asked to vacate their accommoda-
tions (Babu, 2020; Kuttappan, 2020). The pandemic reduced possibilities of finding 
new jobs not only due to the consequences of Covid-19 on the national economies 
but also because of governments’ greater focus on prioritising the employment of 
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own nationals to protect them in the shrinking labour market (Menon & Vadakepat, 
2020). From the policymakers’ perspective, ‘the common assumption is that labour 
migration is a temporary feature which in the event of an economic crisis can be 
simply “turned off,” mitigating the effect on the national population and institu-
tions’ (Chang, 2014, 93). Thus, the policy environment is eager to encourage or 
force migrants to return until the crisis passes (Chang, 2014). States introduced 
relief packages that would partly compensate for worker salaries mainly for citi-
zens, but rarely for the benefit of migrants (Zeeshan & Sultana, 2020, 135).
Those working in temporary and informal jobs experienced greater deterioration 
of financial insecurity coupled with rising prices of essential goods. In addition to 
the loss of their livelihoods, they faced impediments in access to health facilities, 
sanitary items, and basics such as food, water, and shelter. Restricted economic 
activity to contain the virus’s continued spread left many migrants without money 
to buy food or pay rent (Polanco & Sequera, 2020). The social support and protec-
tion mechanisms became more limited for migrants, while signs of increasing stig-
matisation and xenophobia emerged. Some other factors pushing returns include the 
desire to unite with their families and concern for the safety of their families during 
this emergency.
Some snapshots from interviews with returnees about triggering factors are 
found in IOM’s reports and scholarly publications. In their study, Zeeshan and 
Sultana quote one Pakistani returnee among some 60,000 working in the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE):
I have never felt so helpless in my lifetime. We neither had money, nor were our dues 
cleared by the employers we served. Also, there was no way of approaching them since 
most of the offices were closed and our movement was banned. Many of us had left with no 
mode of communication with their companies. Some of us started having symptoms of the 
Covid-19, but they were denied of any access to health facility. After repeated contact with 
the consulate, we were informed that the repatriation services are going on. (cited in 
Zeeshan & Sultana, 2020, 141)
As quoted by the IOM in a press release on Covid-19, a domestic worker who 
returned from Lebanon to Ethiopia at the onset of the pandemic recalled her 
experience:
We lost our jobs, we struggled. Some of our friends fell ill…Things in Beirut are currently 
bad, and it was getting to a point where our lives were at risk. (IOM-Addis Ababa, 2020)
In another IOM press release, a Malawian migrant who returned from South 
Africa explained his reason for return:
Since the pandemic, I lost my job and source of income and support to my family. It’s been 
too tough, so I decided to go back home and figure things out with the people I have missed 
all this time. (IOM-Pretoria 2020)
Additionally, as labour migrants’ visas and work permits might expire due to job 
loss, they worried about being stranded or detained in already-overcrowded facili-
ties where the virus spreads fast. In the case of Indian workers, the UAE government 
extended the validity period of residence visas (Travel News, 2020), while Kuwait 
used the lockdown period to crack down on workers over-staying their visas or 
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permits (Irudaya Rajan & Arokkiaraj, 2020). Some Gulf countries waited for the 
borders to reopen before repatriating or simply deporting migrants with a view to 
implementing a ‘safe returns’ policy, but others did not. Saudi Arabia deported 2870 
Ethiopian migrants without regular papers to Addis Ababa between early March and 
April, while some 200,000 Ethiopians were expected to be deported in the follow-
ing months (Endeshaw & Paravicini, 2020).
The US administration banned immigration to the US and suspended processing 
of all work visas and appointments in March 2020. Migrants who were on vacation 
and in immigration processes were negatively affected by the hasty decision. As one 
Pakistani returnee from the US explained,
I do think of returning back to work but my work permit has expired and the immigration 
processing is banned. My employer is directed by the US government to induct the local 
citizens keeping the national interest due to very high rate of unemployment. I neither have 
a way to get back, nor an opportunity in Pakistan due to immense downsizing in the job 
market. (quoted in Zeeshan & Sultana, 2020, 137)
For irregular and undocumented migrants, the pandemic brought more chal-
lenges for overall security and well-being. The pandemic-related measures reduced 
access to asylum applications and processes (MMC Asia, 2020) on the one hand, 
and increased the risk of forced returns, including detention, deportation, and push-
backs on the other. More frequent identity checks by police on the street for citi-
zens’ compliance with movement restrictions caused concern among undocumented 
migrants in destination countries, particularly those in Europe, that they may be 
detained or deported (Butterly, 2020). For undocumented migrants travelling to des-
tination, the pandemic created an inability to continue the migration journey (MMC 
Asia, 2020), raising risks even higher due to the travel restrictions, border closures, 
and extreme danger along migratory routes. The continuing pushbacks on the sea 
borders of the EU’s frontline countries like Greece, Cyprus, and Malta were justi-
fied by the risk to spreading the coronavirus, although the lack of rescue operations 
and assistance cost the lives of dozens of migrants (Butterly, 2020). The US alleg-
edly deported thousands of undocumented migrants to neighbouring Guatemala and 
Mexico amidst the pandemic, including some who were infected with the virus 
(Dickerson & Semple, 2020).
Although the impact of Covid-19 on return decisions was more detrimental for 
temporary migrant workers and irregular/undocumented migrants, highly-skilled 
migrants were also influenced by the pandemic into reconsidering their return plans. 
The imminent danger of ‘job loss’ or a ‘lack of permanent residency’ in the host 
countries led migrants to feel insecure (Menon & Vadakepat, 2020). Anecdotal 
pieces of evidence from social media posts of immigrant groups illustrate that the 
highly-skilled migrants, such as engineers and those working in the multinational 
companies abroad, became the first candidates for layoffs in companies’ downsiz-
ing, meaning the return of some to their countries of origin sooner or later. Even 
immigrant families with no financial stress worried about who would take care of 
their children if they contracted Covid-19, how their bodies would be sent to their 
countries of origin, and how they would attend the funerals of elderly parents if they 
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passed. In such cases, Covid-19 seem to act as a catalyst for a return migration deci-
sion that had was being planned prior to the pandemic (ibid.).
10.7  Challenges Faced During and After Return
Previous research has documented how returning migrants encounter problems 
upon return and have to navigate socioeconomic, cultural, and moral differences 
and renegotiate transnational identities and intergenerational relationships (De Bree 
et al., 2010; Saar, 2018).
Returning due to Covid-19 has created additional challenges to already- 
contentious relationships about belonging and citizenship. Those making the return 
home because of the pandemic have faced severe difficulties. For example, many 
Afghans and Africans encountered troubles in crossing borders, movement within 
the country, and increased risk of detention and deportation throughout the return 
journey and reduced access to smugglers (MMC Asia, 2020).
Host countries and regions were not prepared to accommodate the sudden mass 
return migration economically by absorbing returnees into the labour market or 
providing services such as healthcare (Menon & Vadakepat, 2020, 2). It is not 
unusual during pandemics to target those deemed ‘foreign’ and accuse them of 
‘importing disease’. Such prejudices were also aimed at return migrants 
(Munasinghe, 2020), prompting heated public discussion about the contribution of 
emigrants, their belonging, and citizenship. The following quote from a Sri Lankan 
emigrant in Italy reflects how the return discussion entangles the claims about citi-
zenship rights of emigrants and emigrants’ contribution to the economy of the home 
country.
These workers are Sri Lankans. They work in homes, outside, in factories… the money they 
make they send to Sri Lanka, nowhere else. They were born in Sri Lanka, where else can 
they go? These innocent young men and women work hard to send money to Sri Lanka, and 
you will happily eat from that money. How can you say, “when you are sick, don’t come to 
Sri Lanka?” People who are living abroad are living in fear, not knowing what will happen. 
Without coming to Sri Lanka, should they jump in the ocean?. (ibid.,1)
Both prejudices and facts created an environment in which returnees were sus-
pected and accused of bringing the disease with them as being ‘super spreaders’ 
(RFE, 2020). In India, regions having high emigration linkages with Gulf countries 
like Kerala and Tamil Nadu saw a sudden spike of Covid-19 cases in relation to the 
returns since April 2020 (Mitra et al., 2020). In response, in June 2020 the Indian 
state made Covid-free certificates mandatory for the returnees (Babu, 2020). Also, 
the local government restricted evacuation flights, considering that they do not have 
adequate facilities to tackle a surge in the number of returnees (ibid.). In Pakistan, it 
is reported that people testing positive on flights bringing migrant workers back 
from the UAE averaged 12% but that on some flights, the positivity rate shot up to 
40–50% as many of these workers had lived in congested dormitories where the 
disease spread fast (Zeeshan & Sultana, 2020, 137).
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In the case of Venezuelans, over 2100 migrants returning from Colombia were 
required to quarantine in unsanitary conditions at makeshift shelters near the border, 
reflecting the perceived threat from the influx to Venezuela’s medical system, which 
has decayed during 6 years of economic collapse (Polanco & Sequera, 2020).
Many returnees were unable to find work upon return to their home country, hit 
not only by the pandemic and lockdown measures but still reeling from previous 
crises. For example, Ukrainian returnees were not welcomed in their home country 
as unemployment is skyrocketing (RFE, 2020). Returnees thus experience impedi-
ments in accessing livelihoods and health services. As in the case of Afghan return-
ees, reduced access to work is higher for returnees; more returnees lost income and 
received even less assistance than refugees (MMC Global, 2020, 7–9). In the words 
of a male Afghan returnee:
When I was in Iran I was terrified by the news on Corona. Everybody was talking about the 
virus and all the dead people in the hospitals. It was like a war out there. When I returned to 
Afghanistan, I saw that the situation was worse here than in Iran. Many people are infected, 
but there is no proper health assistance available. (MMC Asia-May, 2020)
A Pakistani returnee explains his dilemma in returning:
After three months of unemployment and bewilderment, I reached home and thanked the 
Almighty and my family for all the efforts. I am now at peace that I am backing home, but 
the future is haunting me now. I used to send the remittances and hence could not save. 
Neither I have any savings to initiate any business, nor do I have any hope to get back to 
Britain to work. (quoted in Zeeshan & Sultana, 2020, 137)
Home states and communities expressed concern that a huge influx of unem-
ployed returnees would threaten the already fragile economic situation due to the 
sudden decline in foreign remittances and rising unemployment, collapse the health 
system due to the Covid-19 cases, and disturb demographic/social dynamics 
(Komireddi 2020; Zeeshan & Sultana, 2020). Anxiety and even in some cases 
resentment against returnees made providing emotional support and feelings of 
belonging for returnees unavailable and reintegration harder (Zeeshan & Sultana, 
2020, 145).
Regarding belonging and feelings of migrants, return carried the risk of losing 
the hard-gained self-esteem, achievements, and recognition in their family and soci-
ety from working abroad. They sought to sustain these values while returning home 
(Sabharwal & Verma, 2020) and expected emotional support from their home com-
munities (Menon & Vadakepat, 2020, 2). For instance, many Indian returnees from 
UAE (Malayalees) felt neglected by both central and state governments. They 
believed that many lives ‘could have been saved if people had been evacuated in the 
early days of the pandemic’ (Babu, 2020).
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10.8  Concluding Remarks
As Anna Lindley rightly advocates, it is important to treat ‘crisis and migration as 
contextualised processes, rather than isolated events, because migration is either a 
symptom or a cause of crisis’ (2015, 1). The pandemic as a crisis has impact over 
various types of migration, including return migration.
During the pandemic, migrants’ decisions are marked by the deep dilemma 
between staying and returning. Migrants face changing circumstances and conflict-
ing motivations. Those migrants who continued to stay took risks for their health 
and safety as well as several layers of uncertainty as they might be unemployed due 
to economic downturn, running out of money, and not being able to send remit-
tances to their homes. Returnees took the risks of returning to a life of uncertainty, 
not being able to go back again to the country where they worked, not completing 
their migration project, and encountering stigma in the country of origin as import-
ers of the virus. Hyperinflation, poverty, unemployment even violence in the coun-
tries of origin have all loomed as highly possible prospects. Rational calculations, 
fears, concerns, and emotions are all mixed up to make immigrants reconsider mul-
tiple dimensions of staying and returning.
Data from this study can be shaped into a tentative typology (Table 10.2). The 
typology illustrates that the despite the general impact of Covid-19 on international 
migrants’ return aspirations and decisions, its immediate impact on returning acts 
differs between types of migration (economic, humanitarian, transit, educational), 
migration status (temporary, seasonal, permanent); types of skills (low, high) and 
countries/regions. Also, these characteristics shape the possibilities for remigration 
to the destination country before pandemic or adopting in other ways.
For temporary migrant workers, the pandemic has a direct and indirect impact on 
returns. The loss of income and working/residence permit left no option to some 
migrants other than returning, as observed among South Asian migrants working in 
Gulf countries or East European migrants working in southern and western European 
countries. The pandemic has given momentum to some previously planned returns 
and onward migration to elsewhere, thus serving as a catalyst.
It may be anticipated that for highly-skilled migrants, including immigrant inves-
tors, the health system of the destination country may be a consideration in making 
migration and return decisions, although it was not a determining factor before. As 
desirable destinations such as the US and the UK showed slower and poorer perfor-
mance in responding to the pandemic, this may deter migrants with high capital and 
lead them to re-evaluate alternatives such as Germany.
For asylum seekers and refugees, Covid-19 caused slowness in the asylum 
admissions/decisions and suspension of relocation and resettlement provisions for 
refugees given the public health situation of the host countries (Infomigrants, 2020). 
It temporarily suspended deportation of rejected asylum seekers in some European 
countries. It has not necessarily made asylum seekers and refugees consider return 
options due to the worse conditions in the country of origin and the increasing risk 
and costs of migrating.
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For irregular migrants on the move, it is difficult to claim that the pandemic 
makes the majority decide to return. Nevertheless, it indirectly triggers returns as it 
impedes the migration journey. It increases difficulty moving within transit coun-
tries or crossing borders, reduces access to smugglers, and increases costs, stranding 
irregular migrants in transits like those experienced in Libya, Niger, Kenya, and 
Yemen. While some become too afraid to either continue their journey or return 
home, others do not change their plans as a result of the pandemic, but simply wait 
out developments.
At the political level, the Covid-19 crisis met with highly nationalist government 
discourses and more restrictive immigration and mobility measures. At the social 
level, the feelings of suspicion surrounding immigrants and returnees were aggre-
gated due to the perceived risk of the virus spread and growing economic chal-
lenges. There are too many shreds of evidence not to anticipate a possible surge in 
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discrimination and xenophobia which might target migrants, thus prioritising return 
as a most desired option.
Neither well-planned voluntary returns nor quickly implemented forced returns 
or deportations necessarily mean the end of the migration journey. As earlier 
research on economic crises illustrates, many of the migrants continue to be the part 
of circular migration (both across countries and urban/rural) as the main motiva-
tions for migration – the need to earn income or escape persecution – persist, push-
ing millions to migrate. Most returnees are waiting and have not decided what they 
will do next. Showing similar characteristics with the global economic crisis, the 
pandemic has already intensified the struggles of labour.
Despite immediate migration restrictions, there is an ongoing demand for low 
wage migrants in labour-intensive sectors such as agriculture, meatpacking, pro-
cessing, caregiving, and construction which are mainly populated by migrants. As 
Hanse Randal highlights, ‘in a poorer world suffering major virus-inflicted struc-
tural damage, the demand for cheap labour – and cheap migrant labour – will only 
be stronger’ (Hansen, 2020).
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Chapter 11




The pandemic has impacted the mobility of people across the globe in a way no 
other event in the past ever has. Travel restrictions and border sealing imposed by 
countries to curb the spread of the Covid-19 resulted in a large number of people 
being stuck in foreign nations, unable to return to their homes. The effect of such a 
move was felt not just by the migrant population living and working abroad but also 
by students studying abroad, tourists, and business travellers. Migrants felt the pan-
demic’s effect in different ways, ranging from loss of jobs to cancellation or expira-
tion of visas, thus rendering many unemployed and without any income to support 
them or send remittances to their families back home who depend on such remit-
tances for their day-to-day expenditures. It is thus pertinent that we study the chal-
lenges faced by the emigrants, the assistance provided by the governments in the 
host and destination countries, and the policies that the home government has put 
forward to facilitate their rehabilitation and reintegrate them into the labour market 
of their country of origin. This chapter aims to shed lighton the above-mentioned 
aspects.
In a recent report, the IOM (2020a) defined stranded migrants in the context of 
Covid-19 as individuals outside of their country of habitual residence, wishing to 
return home but who are unable to do so due to mobility restrictions related to the 
pandemic. The number of migrants stranded abroad as of 13 July 2020was placed at 
three million, with the Middle East and North African Region reporting the largest 
number of stranded migrants (Table 11.1).
According to the International Migration Report 2019 (UN-DESA, 2019), India 
has the largest diaspora in the world at 18  million people; India’s Ministry of 
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External Affairs puts their number at 32 million (Table 11.2). These patterns also 
vary according to the state of origin and destination countries (IOM, 2020c; Ratha 
et al., 2020a, b). Table 11.3 shows the number of Indians who travelled to different 
countries for employment in the last 3 years. In addition to this data, the number of 
Indian workers travelling to Gulf countries in the past 5  years is on the decline 
(Table 11.4).
However, country-specific and occupational-specific figures may differ (Kumar 
& Rajan, 2014; Singh & Rajan, 2016). For example, Kerala still maintains the trend 
of sending the maximum number of nurses to Saudi Arabia over the years. On the 
other hand, the number of female domestic workers emigrating to Gulf countries 
from different states of India has declined in the past 6 years (Table 11.5).
Table 11.1 Estimated known cases of stranded migrants by IOM Region
IOM region Stranded migrants
Asia and Pacific 976,869
European Economic Area and Switzerland 202,578
South America 37,484
Middle East and North Africa 1,257,053
West and Central Africa 5503
East and Horn of Africa 2509
Southern Africa 99,893
Central America, North America, Caribbean 111,384




Table 11.2 Top 10 hosts of overseas Indian populations (NRIs+PIOs)
Country NRIs PIOs Population
United States of America 1,280,000 3,180,000 4,460,000
United Arab Emirates 3,100,000 4586 3,104,586
Malaysia 227,950 2,760,000 2,987,950
Saudi Arabia 2,812,408 2160 2,814,568
Myanmar 8991 2,000,000 2,008,991
United Kingdom 325,000 1500,000 1,825,000
Sri Lanka 14,000 1,600,000 1,614,000
South Africa 60,000 1500,000 1,560,000
Kuwait 928,421 1482 929,000
Mauritius 10,500 884,000 894,500
Total 13,459,195 18,683,645 32,100,340
Source: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (Data given as of December 2018. 
Accessed from: https://mea.gov.in/images/attach/NRIs- and- PIOs_1.pdf)
Note: NRI = Non-resident Indians (an individual who is a citizen of India but is residing in a for-
eign country and holds a valid Indian passport). PIO = People of Indian Origin (Foreign Citizens 
except for nationals of Pakistan and Bangladesh, who have either held an Indian passport at any 
point in time or their parents/grandparents/great-grandparents were permanent residents of Indiaor 
are spouses of an Indian citizen)
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In recent decades, emigration from India has been largely concentrated towards 
the Gulf region, followed by the US. However, the nature of emigration differs; 
unlike migration to Western countries led by mostly highly educated and skilled 
migrants, migration to the Gulf is of a temporary nature, and this results in large 
scale return migration to India from the region. An important aspect of migration to 
the Gulf is the predominance of unskilled labourers (Rajan, 2017, 2018, 2019; 
Rajan & Oommen, 2020a; Rajan & Saxena, 2019). The temporary nature of the 
move along with the nature of skill possessed by the emigrants makes them an 
extremely vulnerable group, especially during a crisis like the pandemic (Rajan, 
2020a, b, 2021; Rajan et al., 2020, 2021). As per an official statement made by the 
Minister of State for External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha, of the total requests for 
repatriation received by the government, the largest number was from the Gulf 
region (Table 11.6).
Table 11.3 Number of Indians gone abroad for employment, 2017–2019




Source: Compiled by the authors from the annual reports of the Ministry of External Affairs and 
the eMigrate website of the Government of India










Source: Compiled by the authors from the annual reports of the Ministry of External Affairs and 
the eMigrate website of the Government of India
Table 11.5 Data on Indian female domestic worker emigrated by state, 2014–2019
State 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Andhra Pradesh 965 112 51 41 27 85
Karnataka 43 66 68 44 28 20
Kerala 470 597 497 388 238 149
Tamil Nadu 60 95 86 69 52 27
Telangana 38 36 29 16 8 6
Source: Compiled by the authors from the annual reports of the Ministry of External Affairs and 
the eMigrate website of the Government of India
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A large number of Indian migrants are in the low-income category with tempo-
rary jobs. This ‘temporariness’ of Indian migrants working in the informal sector 
abroad contributes to their highly precarious living conditions during the pandemic. 
It is also estimated that around 586,183 Indian students are studying in 91 foreign 
countries.1 India ranks second after China in the number of international students in 
the United States and United Kingdom, while in 2018, India ranked first and fourth, 
respectively, in the number of foreign students in Ukraine and China. In Germany, 
India heads the rankings with regard to labour migration as compared to China in 
quantitative terms (Graf, 2019).
India was proactive in rescuing and bringing back its citizens from regions that 
were heavily affected by the pandemic, with rescue operations conducted in 
February 2020 for Indians stranded in China, Italy, and Iran. Following the rise in 
cases in India, the Government of India adopted a strategy of a nationwide 
1 Ministry of Human Resource Development (2018), Department of Higher Education, Government 
of India. Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No.2219. Answered on 1.1.2018. Accessed 29 
December 2020.
Table 11.6 Repatriation requests received (as of 16 September 2020)
Country Total requests






















Source: Lok Sabha Q&A Session, 16 September 2020 (Ministry of External Affairs (2020), Lok 
Sabha, Unstarred Question No.479, Answered on 16/09/2020 by MEA, Shri V. Muraleedharan. 
Accessed 29 December 2020.)
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lockdown and sealing of international borders for a 21-day period to curb Covid-19’s 
spread. This brought all such rescue missions to a halt, stranding many Indians in 
different countries across the world. India, as one of the largest migrant-sending 
nations, had a herculean task ahead of it in terms of bringing those stranded Indians 
back home.
With the government having announced complete restrictions on mobility both 
within and outside the country, several petitions were filed in the Supreme Court at 
the beginning of the lockdown period to bring back the stranded Indians. The 
Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and advised stranded migrants  – migrant 
workers, students, and tourists – to stay in the respective foreign countries until the 
lockdown ended. The Government of India subsequently extended the nationwide 
lockdown until 3 May, prompting new petitions, moston behalf of Indian migrant 
workers stuck in the Gulf countries. Their number is estimated to be between eight 
and ten million; Kerala alone accounts for 2.1 million emigrants in Gulf countries, 
as per the Kerala Migration Survey 2018 (Rajan, 2020c; Rajan & Zachariah, 2019; 
Zachariah et al., 1999). The state was a leading voice for the repatriation of stranded 
Indians, many of whom faced visa issues or lived in precarious conditions in labour 
camps without proper hygiene and unable to observe of proper social distancing – 
which often led to a spike in Covid-19 cases in many of these labour camps (Rajan 
& Oommen, 2020b).
Some media reports also mentioned that around 19 Indians were stuck in transit 
at international airports for the duration of the lockdown when India sealed its inter-
national borders. One petition also claimed that some of the migrant workers who 
tested positive for Covid-19 were denied treatment in hospitals. The Government of 
India finally decided to bring back the Indians stuck in countries across the world by 
launching a massive evacuation programme called the Vande Bharat Mission, which 
was introduced on 7 May 2020.
11.2  Differing Paths, Differing Problems
It can be observed that the pattern of international migration from India is diverse 
where workers originate from different Indian states and migrate to different coun-
tries. They are engaged in different occupations as white collar and blue-collar jobs 
or are students, which points to their distinct category or visa status.
The economic repercussions of the pandemic and lockdowns in most countries 
were felt acutely by migrant workers and professionals around the world. Many suf-
fered job losses and had to struggle to maintain their visa statuses in their respective 
countries. In no region was this impact more severe than among temporary migrant 
workers in the Gulf. Low-income Indian migrant workers in Gulf countries are 
either partially or fully excluded from social security and health insurance benefits 
(Chowdhury & Rajan, 2018; Rajan, 2016). Being infected by the virus would have 
led to increases in their health expenses, taking a huge toll on the meagre savings on 
which they were relying upon for sustenance abroad after being rendered jobless. 
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As a result, for these migrants, the financial woes would have been a bigger problem 
than the virus itself if they were left stranded in a foreign country without adequate 
assistance. Moreover, this would also push their families in India into greater diffi-
culty because of their dependence on remittances from these workers.
Visa expirations too were an issue that some of these migrants faced, exacerbat-
ing the problems of stranded emigrants. It is a common misconception that most of 
the people stranded abroad have a wealthy background. Several scholars in 
Migration Studies have pointed out that workers from low economic backgrounds 
tend to migrate in the Indo-Gulf migration corridor to enhance their financial status. 
Therefore, what was witnessed was a large number of Indians in the Gulf, who are 
low- and middle-income migrant workers wanting to return to India to overcome the 
crisis. Another issue that came up was the issue of wage theft among migrant work-
ers. As the pandemic and its economic effects became more apparent, it emerged 
that a number of employers had unlawfully dismissed workers and were withhold-
ing essential benefits and even wages of migrant workers – who then had to head 
home with empty hands and very few options for recourse (Piper & Foley, 2021).
Despite the assurances from the Central Government that every Indian abroad is 
safe and secure and their situation constantly monitored by the Indian embassies, 
several public interest litigations pertaining to Indians abroad were filed in the 
Supreme Court and the Kerala High Court to urge the respective governments to act 
quickly to bring back stranded migrants. Meanwhile in the Gulf countries, the kaf-
ala sponsorship method of recruiting workers – which gives local individuals or 
companies sponsorship permits to employ foreign laborers in GCC countries 
(except Bahrain) for whom the sponsor covers travel expenses and provides hous-
ing, often in dorm-like accommodations or, in the case of domestic workers, the 
sponsor’s home – made these migrant employees even more vulnerable as they live 
at the mercy of their sponsors. This was not the case with other countries, where the 
imposition of travel restrictions and halting the issuance of work permits had left 
some migrants unable to reach their place of employment and with no source of 
income (IOM, 2020b: Le Coz & Newland, 2021). There is also a need to consider 
that there are different categories of Indians holding different types of visas who are 
seeking help. In the US, for instance, the non-resident Indian community faced 
several issues in terms of consular services as the passport renewals were being 
withheld. Indians in the US include students, young persons on Optional Practical 
Training (OPT) for F-1 students, persons on temporary visas like the H-1B visa, and 
B-2 visa. There was a fear that their visas would expire during the lockdown without 
an extension, which would render their status as ‘undocumented’. Meanwhile, the 
community came together to create awareness sessions with attorneys, immigration 
attorneys, consul generals of different Indian posts.
The migration crisis in India resulting from the lockdown measures implemented 
to curb the pandemic’s spread has revealed several anomalies in terms of economic 
and social security provisions for both its internal and international migrant workers 
during the times of crisis. These vulnerable workers are either unaware of or not in 
a position to utilise the existing legal provisions to safeguard themselves from the 
problems they face with their employers or at their workplace, such as retrenchment 
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at a short notice. In fact, in the case of international migrants, there are no legal 
provisions to safeguard the rights of these workers in times of crisis. Further, the 
suspension of consular services by Indian embassies on account of Covid-19 and 
the virtual nature of providing emergency services made the situation for Indians 
even worse, as they found it difficult to contact the authorities for immediate help. 
At this juncture, the Indian embassies in Gulf and other countries are the only point 
of contact for stranded Indians, and this necessitates their being proactive by 
enabling them in such circumstances instead of temporarily suspending embassy 
services.
However, it was in these trying times that the Indian government initiated the 
largest repatriation mission in its history.
11.3  Assistance Amidst Travel Restrictions
In the initial stages of the lockdown, the lack of initiative from the Government of 
India towards the evacuation of its own citizens stranded abroad was in stark con-
trast with other countries. The government cited ‘lack of resources’ as a reason for 
not evacuating Indian citizens (The Hindu, 2020). However, there was also a dichot-
omy between India’s previous and current approach to tackle the issue of evacuation 
that points towards a lack of willingness, despite the pressure from stranded Indians 
and other stakeholders. During the travel restrictions due to the lockdown, Indian 
citizens were airlifted from the worst Covid-19-affected countries like China, Italy, 
and Iran. In view of this, the question arises as to why India had not evacuated its 
distressed citizens in the Gulf and other countries. The US, which at that point of 
time had been one of the worst-hit countries in the world, had embarked upon mass 
evacuation of their citizens stranded in 17 countries. Similarly, other countries 
affected by the pandemic such as Germany also made efforts to evacuate their citi-
zens stranded abroad. The Government of Kerala made repeated requests to the 
Central Government for arrangements to evacuate Non-Resident Keralites from the 
Gulf region citing reasons such as expiring work visas, inability to sustain them-
selves without work, and pregnant women and children. Kerala was prepared to 
provide necessary medical support for the returnees. Overall, this raises questions 
about the lack of such an initiative by India to evacuate all distressed Indians and not 
just some.
The central government’s reluctance to bring back the migrants was not received 
well by the Gulf nations. Several sent a stern message to the Indian government; the 
United Arab Emirates, for instance, threatened to enforce tight restrictions on coun-
tries failing to take back their migrants and also restructure or suspend its 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on labour with them, impose limits on the 
recruitment of workers from these countries, and apply a quota system in recruit-
ment operations (Nasrallah, 2020). Similarly, Kuwait demanded that India evacuate 
migrants, given the large number of infections in the community. Mounting pres-
sure from the migrant-hosting countries, the emigrants, but also their states back 
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home, forced the Government of India to launch the Vande Bharat Mission to evacu-
ate stranded migrants in a phased manner.
Kuwait announced an amnesty for foreign workers in the country from 1 April 
2020 to 30 April 2020 (The Wire, 2020). Its government allotted specific slots to 
different countries for the repatriation of foreign workers according to their nation-
ality. The first week was allotted to Philippines to make use of the amnesty. In 
coordination with the Philippine embassy in Kuwait, the Philippine government 
evacuated its citizens from Kuwait. The slot allotted to India for evacuating its citi-
zens was 16–20 April 2020. There were many Indian citizens willing to avail this 
amnesty and return to India, but the Supreme Court’s ruling and the Central 
Government’s response was a setback for them. During the same period, the United 
Arab Emirates government had also shown readiness to allow the evacuation of 
Indian citizens, but the Indian government was reluctant to take any initiative to help 
their own citizens stranded in difficult circumstances.
As the pandemic began spreading across the world between February and April, 
the Government of India embarked upon multiple missions to rescue its citizens 
from the countries severely hit by the pandemic, starting with missions to Wuhan in 
February. A mission was also launched in February to rescue members stranded 
aboard the Diamond Princess Cruise ship in Japan. In March, the missions were 
directed to Iran and Italy, which were severely affected by the pandemic, with a 
rescue mission conducted in Iran as late as 22March 2020 to bring back stranded 
Indians. Along with stranded Indians, the government also successfully evacuated 
nationals of Myanmar, Bangladesh, Maldives, China, and the US, among other 
countries, from the Hubei province in China.
11.4  Vande Bharat Mission (VBM)
The Government of India declared a complete lockdown on 24 March 2020 to con-
tain the pandemic and slow down the transmission rates. The lockdown was initially 
for a period of 21 days, which was further extended. During this period, the country 
came to a complete stand still as educational institutions, industries, trade, transpor-
tation, and government offices shut down. The lockdown included a total ban on 
international and inter-state travel. As the boundaries of the nation closed, these 
nationals along with Indians who had travelled abroad prior to the lockdown were 
stranded in different parts of the world, unable to return to India. The lockdown also 
ended the missions undertaken by the government to rescue Indians stranded abroad.
In April 2020, the government announced the Vande Bharat Mission for the safe 
passage of Indian nationals back to the homeland. This mammoth effort was an 
evacuation initiative jointly coordinated by the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry 
of Home Affairs, Ministry of Civil Aviation, and all state governments (Ministry of 
Civil Aviation, 2020a; Ministry of External Affairs, 2020a; Ministry of Home 
Affairs, 2020). The missions were to be carried put primarily by air, but the Indian 
Navy was also involved in the initial stages of the evacuation process. The Indian 
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Navy had named the evacuation process ‘Samudra Setu’ and had deployed ships to 
the Gulf to rescue stranded Indians in the region. A Standard Operating Protocol 
was framed for the mission, with the safety and health of the returnees given priority 
everywhere and at all points in time. Embassies, high commissions, and consulates 
were tasked with preparing the list of distressed nationals; they communicated with 
Indian nationals through social media, set up helplines, and played a key role in the 
mission. Stranded Indians were advised to register in portals for their return and the 
passengers were instructed to follow health protocols issued by the Ministry of 
Health, Ministry of Civil Aviation, and Indian Medical Association throughout the 
journey. Upon reaching India, all arrivals were screened at the airport and instructed 
to quarantine for a period of 14 days. The State governments were advised to arrange 
for testing, monitoring, and helping the returned nationals during their quarantine 
period and afterwards (Wadhwa, 2020).
There was an overwhelming number of registrations in the repatriation portals 
that were opened by the Government of India, with the official figures at over 
1.16 million on 16 September 2020 (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020d, e). The 
first phase of the mission from Abu Dhabi was flagged off on 7 May 2020. In the 
initial phase, rescue missions were undertaken jointly with the Indian Air Force, 
Indian Navy, along with Air India and its subsidiary, the Air India Express (Ministry 
of Defence, 2020). A total of seven phases of the Vande Bharat Mission had been 
completed by late October, with the eighth phase beginning on 1 November 2020. 
As of 17 December, 3,840,000 Indian nationals had been repatriated through the 
Vande Bharat Mission (Table 11.7). The missions were initially concentrated to the 
Gulf region where majority of stranded Indians were located, but in the later phases, 
repatriation missions were carried out in other parts of the world as well.
As per a government release on data pertaining to Indians repatriated through the 
Vande Bharat Mission, at 16September 2020, 1.4 million Indians had been repatri-
ated through different modes, with the government expecting an additional 1,20,000 
Indians returning to the country by the end of the Phase 6. Of them, 12,69,549 
people have been flown back (Table 11.8); the majority were returned from Gulf 
nations, notably United Arab Emirates, followed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, 
Table 11.7 Vande Bharat Mission: phases and repatriation
Phases Period Mission countries Cumulative no of repatriates
I 7 May – 15 May 2020 12 12,708
II 16 May − 10 June 2020 47 165,375
III 12 June – 2 July 2020 43 503,990
IV 3 July – 31 July 2020 29 900,000
V 1 August – 31 August 2020 22 1,300,000
VI 1 September – 31 September 2020 24 1,645,000
VII 1 October – 31 October 2020 24 2,157,000a
VIII 1 November – 31 December 2020 24 3,840,000b
Source: Compiled from the Media briefings and press releases of the Ministry of External Affairs
aFigure as of 6 November 2020
bFigure as of 17 December2020
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and the US. Looking at the state data, we see that close to 29% of Indians who have 
come back have returned to Kerala, followed by Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, 
and Maharashtra (Table 11.9).
Similarly, data obtained from a government statement in the Rajya Sabha on 
returnees from the Gulf, of the total number of Indians who have returned, more 
than 21% are from Kerala; indeed, more than half of the Bahrain returnees and one- 
third of Oman returnees are from Kerala (Table 11.10).









Saudi Arabia 163,851 12.91
Singapore 24,867 1.96
United Arab Emirates 457,596 36.04
United Kingdom 39,141 3.08
United States of America 77,305 6.08
Total Repatriated under VandeBharat 
Mission
1,269,549
Source: Ministry of External Affairs, 2020c
Table 11.9 Repatriates by state of arrival under Vande Bharat Mission
State Repatriates Percentage









Tamil Nadu 110,246 8.69
Telangana 66,518 5.24
Uttar Pradesh 116,009 9.14
India (Total) 1,269,549
Source: Rajya Sabha Q&A session, 22 September 2020
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Though the rescue mission undertaken by the Government of India, the biggest 
of its kind, has largely been deemed successful, returned nationals have had to face 
several issues related to the repatriation due to of the government’s delayed 
response – from authorities in the host countries to issues pertaining to the refunds 
and surcharges for return tickets cancelled because of the lockdown. Apart from 
these issues, the repatriation mission turned out to be a costly affair for many of the 
migrants – most of them were returning because they had lost their jobs – due to the 
exorbitant fares charged for repatriation flights on some of the routes. Media reports 
suggested the fares charged under the Vande Bharat Mission were higher than nor-
mal, especially on tickets from Europe and the Americas, where fares have been 
reported to be two or even three times higher (Chowdhury, 2020; Smitha, 2020).
After many reports of returnees having to bear the cost of the flights, Indian Civil 
Aviation Minister, HS Puri clarified that the ‘rates were reasonable when compared 
to repatriation flights of other countries’ (Smitha, 2020). This did little to assuage 
passengers’ concerns though. For instance, there were reports of one-way fares 
from the UK and the US being charged at the same rate as round-trip flights (some-
times even three times that of a normal ticket). Similarly, ticket prices from other 
popular destinations such as the United Arab Emirates ranged between 1300 and 
1700 AED (Arab Emirates Dirham) for a ticket that would normally cost about 900 
AED (ibid.).
In fact, the commercial aspect of these flights also came into question when the 
US Department of Transportation limited the number of Vande Bharat flights into 
the US in June, citing ‘unfair and discriminatory trade practices’. The US govern-
ment alleged that while Vande Bharat flights were operating from the US and charg-
ing fares, US airlines had been barred from entering India. They alleged that this 
created a ‘competitive disadvantage for American carriers’ (Levin, 2020). These 
high costs of repatriation put the humanitarian angle of the mission under a harsh 
light as they are out of the reach of many of the less privileged migrants, who would 
have had to stay in their destinations.
Table 11.10 Gulf repatriates under Vande Bharat Missiona
Country Arrived in Kerala Total Indians arrived Percentage of Keralites
United Arab Emirates 70,329 435,682 16.14
Bahrain 12,726 23,957 53.12
Kuwait 14,541 87,305 16.65
Oman 30,545 81,953 37.27
Qatar 27,445 101,182 27.12
Saudi Arabia 34,088 154,103 22.12
Total 18,9674 88,4182 21.45
aas per domicile declaration done on MEA online registration and the statement made by Minister 
of State for External affairs in Parliament on 17 September 2020 (Ministry of External 
Affairs, 2020b)
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11.5  Case Study: Undocumented Indian Workers in Kuwait 
During COVID-19
On 14 June 2020, Kumar (pseudonym) received a call from Indian embassy in 
Kuwait, which he recounted over the telephone in a conversation with us:
First they asked my name, then where I was working and was I willing to go back to home. 
They then asked about the nature of my problem and after gathering the remaining details, 
they asked me whether I had money to purchase the flight tickets. They told me, to my 
surprise, that only if I said “yes” would they proceed with the call, and if “no” then they 
would immediately disconnect the call. Furthermore, if I said “yes” then they mentioned 
that I would have to undergo Covid-19 testing followed by 14-day quarantine upon arrival. 
Only if I agreed to these conditions would they inform us on how to book the tickets and 
then they would note my name. Based on this, we had to decide on whether to go home or not.
This narration is telling about the plight and vulnerability of poor blue-collar work-
ers willing to return from the Gulf countries. For example, 78 Kuwaiti dinars 
(approx. Rs 19,100) were charged for the ticket in the special flight to Chennai from 
Kuwait, where they were placed in institutional quarantine – paid or free. The cost 
for those choosing paid quarantine facilities was around Rs 1500 per day for 
each person.
In the case of Kuwait, India did not only have to deal with stranded Indians with 
legal status but also with thousands of undocumented workers who registered for 
amnesty to leave the country without incurring any penalty – as had been decreed in 
April by the Kuwait government. These migrants were being housed in shelters 
provided by Kuwait. The repatriation of Pakistan and Philippine nationals had 
begun in the first week of April, but Indian expatriates who had applied for amnesty 
had been languishing at the shelters waiting for the India to devise evacuation plans.
Thousands of undocumented Indian workers applied for the amnesty announced 
by Kuwait and desperately waited for more than two weeks in the shelter homes. 
Furthermore, undocumented migrants had to wait for Emergency Certificates (EC)2 
issued by the Indian embassy, meantime living outdoors in unsafe and poor housing 
conditions in the absence of any legal status. ECs are valid for a single journey to 
India and the certificate does not exempt a holder from immigration or visa regula-
tions. Holders must guard the EC and submit it along with the application for a 
duplicate passport upon arrival in India.
It is unclear how many Indians wereinfectedwithCovid-19 in Kuwait, but reports 
state their number was second to infections among Indian migrant workers in 
Singapore (Laskar, 2020).
Thousands of Indians in Kuwait lost their jobs due to the pandemic; most undoc-
umented migrants work in construction, hotels, sheep herding, gardening, and other 
2 An Emergency Certificate is issued to an Indian national for his/her return back to India if there is 
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low-profile jobs. Generally, low-skilled migrant workers from India enter Gulf 
countries legally, slipping into undocumented status later as they lack the necessary 
identification documents after fleeing an abusive employer who confiscates their 
passport. Due to other reasons such as job loss, visa overstay, or non-renewal of 
visa, the workers lose their legal status. In the end, there is a sizeable number of 
undocumented Indian migrants in the Gulf region who were not widely discussed 
during the pandemic. Undocumented migrants are entirely excluded from both eco-
nomic and social security as they lack legal status.
Some undocumented migrants received their ECs to leave Kuwait but had no 
accommodation or basic amenities until returning home. As the EC is only valid for 
a short period and these migrants have no other legal documents for staying in 
Kuwait, their daily lives are fraught with risks as they are under the surveillance of 
Kuwait police and could face persecutions because of their undocumented status. 
Moreover, they don’t have money to pay accommodation, food, and return tickets as 
the pandemic left them unemployed, many for more than four months. These cir-
cumstances add to their physical and mental stress as their families in India worry 
about their situation. Moreover, these low-skilled migrants are illiterate and have no 
bargaining power with employers.
In Kuwait, unrest has slowly mounted among the Indian workers in shelters as 
they started taking to social media to narrate their plight and desperation to return to 
India. Many do not have money to recharge mobile phones and contact their fami-
lies or even money to meet basic needs. Moreover, they have inculcated the feeling 
that they are treated poorly when compared with other Indian citizens who can 
afford to return India. Meanwhile, Kuwait has offered free tickets to undocumented 
workers on its national carriers. However, at the time of writing, this category of 
Indian workers was still struggling to return home as the Indian government had yet 
to respond to Kuwait’s offer (Bhattacherjee, 2020; The Wire, 2020).
Kuwait has been imposing stringent regulations to contain the virus’s spread. 
Undocumented migrants awaiting assistance from the Indian embassy to use the 
amnesty are entirely dependent on the Kuwait government for necessary medical 
facilities and other daily needs. Furthermore, if infected with Covid-19, the big 
question is from where they would seek medical attention: Kuwait’s healthcare sys-
tem may face severe stress from contagion in shelters as happened in Singapore’s 
cramped migrant worker dormitories.
11.6  Rehabilitation and Beyond: Is There a Model in Place?
The huge influx of migrants in the wake of the pandemic throws up several ques-
tions for the future of migration and migration policy in India. Due to the large 
number of emigrants coming back to India, the country may face underemployment 
or unemployment situations especially among the skilled workforce. Moreover, 
Indian migrants contribute over $80  billion in remittances to the country every 
year– a vital inflow for the development of individuals, families, communities, 
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societies, and the country as a whole. The pandemic and return of migrants to India 
should raise concerns regarding rehabilitation, re-integration, and more importantly, 
re-migration once conditions normalise that the government must address very 
seriously.
At the beginning of the crisis, there was very little talk about the plight of inter-
national migrants, given the immediate concern about internal migrants (Rajan, 
2021; Rajan et al., 2020, 2021). Indeed, when the government announced its flag-
ship five-stage Aatmanirbhar Bharat (Self- Sufficient India) scheme to ameliorate 
the plight of migrants within India and revive the economy, it did not mention inter-
national migrants (Rajan, 2020d). However, with the plight of international migrants 
becoming more visible – and through efforts and pressure from state governments 
and civil society organisations – the central government launched a few initiatives. 
The Skilled Workers Arrival Database for Employment Support (SWADES) scheme, 
for example, is a joint venture of the Ministry of Skill Development and 
Entrepreneurship, Ministry of External Affairs, and Ministry of Civil Aviation to 
create a database of returned migrants according to skill and experience and thus 
meet human resource demands of Indian and foreign companies. It is aimed at all 
the citizens from around the world, across Emigration Clearance Required (ECR) 
and Emigration Clearance Not Required (ECNR) categories. This was done to facil-
itate reintegration of migrant workers into the labour market and promote employ-
ment opportunities. To facilitate employment opportunities, details of SWADES 
registrations have also been integrated with Skill India’s ASEEM (Aatmanirbhar 
Skilled Employee Employer Mapping) portal which was launched on 10 July 2020. 
Furthermore, all data regarding Indians returning under Vande Bharat Mission was 
also shared with relevant state governments on a real-time basis (Ministry of Civil 
Aviation, 2020b).
11.7  A Kerala Model of Rehabilitation?
Kerala, which is one of India’s largest migrant-sending states, took the lead in push-
ing for the welfare of its overseas citizens – which is unsurprising given the massive 
economic and social capital that they garner for the state. Given its large and promi-
nent diaspora, particularly in the Gulf countries which contribute almost 30% of the 
state’s GDP in remittances alone, Kerala has had long and proactive steps in migra-
tion policy and diaspora outreach, which precedes even that of the Indian govern-
ment (Rajan, 2020c). Thus, from the start, Kerala had pushed for the repatriation of 
the stranded migrants, coupled with mounting pressure from interventions made by 
the Indian Supreme Court and multiple Public Interest Litigations and appeals made 
by stranded Indians abroad; this led the government to eventually announce the 
Vande Bharat Mission. International migrants constitute an integral part of Kerala 
society and their rehabilitation and reintegration are vital for an economy that oth-
erwise suffers from a modest growth rate and high unemployment. Kerala has, 
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therefore, announced a slew of schemes that would aid in this effort – more than any 
other state or even the central government.
Such rehabilitation schemes and projects were launched through a separate web 
portal for Non-Resident Keralites via NORKA Roots, the Kerala government’s 
agency for the welfare of Non- Resident Keralites. Kerala is a developed state in 
India where the contribution of the non-resident Keralites to the economy is highly 
remarkable. The government had initiated a relief fund for the emigrants who 
reached Kerala after 1 January 2020. The amount of ₹25 (crore) was distributed to 
50,000 eligible people by the end of August. Each eligible return emigrant received 
₹5000 as a one-time benefit through this scheme (NORKA Roots, 2020a). An 
NDPREM (NORKA Department Project for Returned Migrants) scheme was also 
extended to provide seed capital funding of up to ₹30,00,000 for entrepreneurs. 
Along with ‘Meat Products of India’, this scheme extends service and benefits to 
migrants who returned during the pandemic. Banks will sanction loans for modest 
enterprises as per the business interest and the terms and conditions of the bank. For 
prompt repayment, 15% subsidy on capital and 3% rebate on interest of loan are 
offered for the first four years. The applicants must have at least 2 years working 
experience abroad. The returnees can even form societies, trusts, and companies to 
apply under this scheme (NORKA Roots, 2020b).
‘Santhwana’ is a relief scheme that aims to provide financial support for returned 
migrants. It offers aid to meet the financial needs of returned migrants such as mar-
riage assistance, purchase of physical aids to combat disabilities, medical treat-
ments, etc. Applicants are eligible only if family income is less than ₹1,00,000 per 
year and they had been a migrant for a minimum of 2  years. Also, to avail the 
scheme, the period after return should not have exceeded the period of his working 
in a foreign country or 10 years, whichever is shorter. Santhwana provides up to Rs 
1 lakh as death assistance, Rs 50,000 for the treatment of critical medical condi-
tions, Rs 20,000 for the treatment of other kinds of diseases, Rs 15,000 for marriage 
assistance, and Rs 10,000 to buy wheelchair, crutches, artificial limbs, etc. 
Additionally, under the scheme all returned migrants who still have a valid passport, 
valid visa, and have tested positive for Covid-19 receive₹10,000 as emergency 
financial assistance (NORKA Roots, 2020a).
The government of Kerala also launched the Dream Kerala Project, which pri-
marily aims to open new possibilities and opportunities for returned Keralites and 
fully utilise their skills and expertise. This project envisages crowdsourcing of ideas 
under the mentorship of young government officials and professionals experienced 
in the international job market. The expert committee will evaluate the proposals 
and make recommendations to the respective departments. Through successful 
implementation of these projects and schemes, government relief enhances welfare 
and thereby ensures the betterment of the Non-Resident Keralite community. 
However, these projects and schemes are still works-in-progress and whether they 
achieve their objectives is still a major question – one on which the future of the 
state depends.
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11.8  Concluding Remarks
Although the initiatives undertaken by India’s government to bring back stranded 
migrants have been pronounced as rather successful, the lack of initiative at the 
beginning of the lockdown and the delay in bringing the stranded emigrants back 
have come under a lot of scrutiny. What was witnessed was a lack of coherence in 
the government strategies to bring back these emigrants and differences on this 
issue between the positions among the states and the central government. The big-
gest challenge for the government now lies in the reintegration of these migrant 
workers into the domestic market. With the SWADES and ASEEM policies now in 
place to try and reintegrate the skilled migrants, the government should also look at 
policies and programmes that would cater to the skill development of the returned 
migrants. It should also adopt measures that would enable them to re-migrate, with 
better skills, which would then broaden their prospects to newer regions for migra-
tion and help enhance their bargaining power.
The government’s under-preparedness at such a time of crisis and the lack of 
coherence among the states and the central government can be partly attributed to 
the lack of a national policy on migration, which countries like Sri Lanka already 
had in place. The policies followed by countries like Sri Lanka, Philippines, and 
Malaysiaen courage migration from the states unlike India, which is not open about 
encouraging migration, even though India is one of the largest emigrant-sending 
and remittance-receiving countries in the world. What is also of utmost importance 
now is the need for proper data on emigration from the country that would have 
allowed better management of the pandemic’s effects. The right policies, backed by 
accurate evidence and data, are the need of the hour and would help chart a plan for 
the way forward and equip India to face such future crises in a better manner.
11.9  Postscript
In the middle of the first wave, MEA revised and reduced the minimum referral 
wages of Indians who work in Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE to $200 to $245 
for Kuwait, to $196 for domestic sector workers, and to $324 for Saudi Arabia. 
Meanwhile, to bypass the travel ban on India, hundreds of migrants transited 
through UAE to reach Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for jobs. There were also many 
other hurdles for stranded Indian workers whose visas had expired to move within 
and outside the Gulf. Workers who returned to India during the first wave were des-
perate to return to ensure their livelihoods, but the Covid-19 second wave hampered 
their travel plans as key destination countries for workers such as UAE and Saudi 
Arabia extended ban on flights from India. Newly arriving migrants in the Gulf 
countries under the VBM flights have to undergo mandatory quarantining, and the 
cost of it at the destination countries restricted workers’ mobility from India. On the 
other hand, not all the returnees want to leave their home until the pandemic curve 
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is flattered and are waiting for travel and mobility restrictions to be eased. Other 
issues have also been observed, such as unscrupulous recruitment agents making 
false job promises for nurses, who are exempted from travel restrictions. Migrants 
in Gulf countries continue to suffer greater financial strain as they face job and wage 
loss. As we write this during the Covid-19 second wave in India, almost all Indian 
labour-receiving countries in the Gulf have imposed a travel ban from India. In 
Kuwait, for example, only outbound flights are allowed to select states in India. In 
case of UAE, a complete travel ban has been imposed. Recently, the Kerala 
Government has started to issue vaccination certification with passport number, 
with the hope that this will enable migrant workers to get travel clearance in 
the future.
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Chapter 12




The pandemic has led to mass destabilisation of economies and societies across the 
world. The exponentially rising cases of infections around the globe prompted 
national lockdowns and near-blanket bans on the movement of people from one 
place to another. This has had major ramifications the work-life spectrum, but most 
notably on the lives of migrant workers, especially in India.
In the wake of India’s 25 March 2020 decision to impose a national lockdown, 
domestic migrants took desperate measures to reach home amid the pandemic and 
policies taken to contain it, at both the central and state levels. Migrants’ often long 
treks home were made in the most inhospitable of conditions, frequently with tragic 
results (Rajan et  al., 2020a, b). In the end, we witnessed what some observers 
describe as ‘the largest movement of migrants since the partition’ (Ellis-Petersen & 
Chaurasia, 2020).
This chapter examines how the pandemic affected the lives and livelihoods of 
migrants in India. In doing so, we also critically examine the response of the gov-
ernments at the central and state levels, thereby providing insights into how we can 
avoid such a dire situation in the future. In order to understand how these events 
came to pass, it is important to comprehend the size of the internal migrant popula-
tion in India.
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12.2  Internal Migration in India: Size and Characteristics
Migration within India has been a prevalent phenomenon throughout its history 
(Tumbe, 2018). The 2011 Census enumerated a staggering 450 million Indians as 
migrants based on place of last residence – a number representing 37% of the total 
population. In 2001, their number was at 309 million, with about 140 million added 
during 2001–2011 (Rajan, 2013). In the absence of a reliable estimate until the 2021 
Census, we estimate a migrant population of 600 million persons (Fig. 12.1)1 Based 
on the 2011 Census, around one-third of all internal migrants are inter-state and 
inter-district migrants, which makes them a population of almost 200 million. Of 
these 200 million inter-state and inter-district migrants, two-thirds are workers. This 
gives us an estimated migrant worker population of about 140 million today (Gupta, 
2020). If we include intra-district migrant workers, the total number of migrant 
workers touches 200 million, excluding temporary and circular migrants (Bhagat 
et al., 2020). These migrant workers represent a range of occupations in both urban 
1 The senior author came to this figure based on an estimated trend of additions to migrants through 
previous censuses. There was an increase of 140 million migrants from 2001 to 2011. In the inter-
vening years, given government-led urbanisation programmes like the Smart Cities initiatives, 
internal migration would have increased in the 2011–2021 period. However, the rise in migrants 
often sees a slight lag given that individual migrants move first and then bring their families to their 
destinations. Therefore, in the absence of a reliable estimate in the 2011–2021 period, if we were 
to add the same number of migrants as seen in 2001–2011 period, we have a migrant population of 
almost 600 million. One of the defining characteristics of internal migration in India is that 7 out 



















































Fig. 12.1 Trends of internal migration in India, 1971–2011. (Source: Census of India 1981–2011; 
2021 numbers based on authors’ projections)
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and rural milieus but are mainly concentrated in temporary, informal, and casual 
employment and are most vulnerable to exploitation (Keshri & Bhagat, 2013).
While India’s internal migrants totalled 450  million, the majority are short- 
distance inter-district migrants within states (Fig. 12.2). As per the 2011 Census, 
there were 117.9 million inter-district migrants and 54.4 million inter-state migrants 
in India.
Kone et al. (2018) note that the proportion of long-distance inter-state migration 
in India is low compared to other developing countries such as Brazil and China. 
This is despite the fact that, unlike in China under the hukou system, there are no 
separate restrictive measures for internal migrants at their destinations. This is due 
mainly to the non-portability of social welfare schemes such as the Public 
Distribution System (PDS) for subsidised food grain upon which millions of fami-
lies are dependent and the requirement of state domicile for government jobs  – 
which makes employment-based migration for a large cohort of the employable 
population challenging. Additionally, migration costs form a large barrier for most 
migrants to engage in long distance migration between states in India. This becomes 
extremely important, as there is an increase in the incidence of migration of families 
instead of individuals.
While most migration occurs within the district for work and employment rea-
sons, other categories of migration happen for education, marriage, and household 
movement, which are more intra-district in nature (Fig. 12.3). As noted earlier, mar-
riage and household migration are based on the movement of migrants with their 
dependents, which is another, and under-discussed feature of internal migration and 
































Fig. 12.2 Types of internal migrants in India, 1981–2011. (Source: Census of India 1981–2011)
12 Internal Migration and the Covid-19 Pandemic in India
230
12.3  Temporary and Seasonal Migration
Rural India is still heavily dependent on the agricultural sector as the primary source 
of employment. With agriculture closely linked to seasonality, the sector’s cycle 
also determines a main component of internal migration within the rural-urban 
migration stream (mostly temporary and seasonal). It has been estimated that 21 out 
of every 1000 persons in India is a temporary or seasonal migrant, with the state of 
Bihar having the highest proportion of 50 temporary migrants per 1000 of the popu-
lation (Keshri & Bhagat, 2013).
When analysing the patterns of temporary and seasonal migration, one finds that 
those in the lowest quintiles by Monthly Per Capita Income overwhelmingly consti-
tute the bulk of the temporary and seasonal migrants in the country, especially in the 
rural areas. These patterns reveal that poorer agricultural workers move to the urban 
areas to earn a livelihood during the agricultural off-season (Table 12.1).
The incidence of temporary and seasonal migration varies according to social 
groups as well, with the propensity for engaging in this type of migration higher 
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Fig. 12.3 Reasons for migration across migrant categories, 2011. (Source: Derived from Census 
2011. Note: numbers given are percentages of total migrants)
Table 12.1 Temporary and seasonal migration rates by area and quintile levels, 2007–2008
MPCE quintiles Rural Urban Total
Lowest 44.8 8.3 40.6
Lower 32.1 6.2 25.6
Medium 23.8 4.6 17.0
Higher 17.3 5.0 10.2
Highest 11.4 2.3 5.8
Total 26.4 5.5 20.5
Source: Keshri and Bhagat (2012)
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As we see, the incidence of temporary and seasonal migration is highest among 
people belonging to Scheduled Tribes in India – 45 migrants per 1000. Similarly, 
while not as high, those belonging to the category of Scheduled Castes show a high 
migration rate of almost 25 per 1000. People belonging to these two categories are 
amongst the most marginalised sections in society. However, the effect is far more 
pronounced in rural than in urban areas, with the rate of 49 per 1000 among the 
Scheduled Tribes and 30 per 1000 among the Scheduled Castes.
These migrants are essential for the basic functioning of both urban and rural 
industries as they engage inessential labour in a number of formal and mostly infor-
mal occupations in major sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and construc-
tion as well as in brick-kilns and textiles (Deshingkar & Akter, 2009; Srivastava & 
Sutradhar, 2016).
These characteristics, therefore, make it clear that a large chunk of the migrant 
population was already living in vulnerable conditions and livelihoods. The pan-
demic and its subsequent response put this fact under a glaring spotlight.
12.4  The Government Response: Story of Missteps 
and Half-Measures
As the infection started spreading across the globe, the Government of India, as part 
of their initial response, put into place a one-day lockdown called the ‘Janta curfew’ 
on 22 March 2020. A few days later, it announced a nationwide lockdown from 24 
March 2020, giving citizens only four hours’ notice to react. Overnight, transporta-
tion lines stopped, leaving passengers stranded and with nowhere to go. The subse-
quent days and months saw some of the most egregious scenes of desperation and 
misery in post-independence history. In the wake of the sudden shutting of busi-
nesses and industries, hundreds of thousands of migrants – mostly workers in pre-
carious employment situations – and their dependents were forced to take the long 
road back, often in the most inhospitable conditions and on foot. This resulted in 
untold hardship, tragedy, and even death (Rajan & Heller, 2020).
Table 12.2 Temporary and seasonal migration ratesa among social groups, 2007–2008
Social group Rural Urban Total
Scheduled tribes 49.0 6.5 45.2
Scheduled castes 29.9 6.7 24.8
Other backward classes 23.9 6.5 19.5
Others 18.0 4.3 12.2
Total 26.4 5.5 20.5
Source: Keshri and Bhagat (2013)
aMigration Rates refer to the number of temporary and seasonal migrants per 1000
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Millions of migrants returned to the villages from the big cities like Delhi, 
Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Pune, Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Chennai as the lockdown 
was extended. The exact number of returnees  – whether returning by their own 
vehicle, cycling, or on foot – is not available from government sources. However, 
those using government-arranged transport – buses and Shramik trains – were said 
to number 10.5 million, according to data cited on 14 September 2020 by the Lok 
Sabha, Parliament’s lower house. A large number of migrants returned to the two 
most populous and among the poorest states, namely Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The 
state-wise distribution of return migrants is shown in Fig. 12.4.
12.4.1  Central Government Response
On 24 March, the Central Government announced the first phase of the national 
lockdown, which subsequently underwent three more phases with increasingly 
relaxed restrictions on economic and human activity. However, on 7 June, when it 
was evident that further lockdowns would not be possible, the central government 
started initiating various phases of ‘un-lockdowns’, opening various sectors of the 
economy and ensuring limited mobility within the country.
The suddenness of the initial lockdown left migrants – who, as mentioned earlier, 
live and work in informal conditions in both rural and urban areas – exposed, and 
the enduring scenes of great distress caught the nation’s imagination. This put 
Scenes of Distress During the Lockdown
The Central Government’s four-hour notice of the national lockdown 
announced by the Prime Minister in a public address sent panic among 
migrant workers who feared being stranded with no livelihood at the destina-
tion and without a way back home. The scenes of utter despair at New Delhi’s 
busy Anand Vihar Inter-State Bus Terminal, where thousands of migrants 
thronged for days to board a bus or train home, were broadcast around the 
world. Similar scenes were seen in places like Mumbai as well, as panic took 
hold during the continued lockdown. Many migrants felt they had no choice 
but to set out on whatever mode of transport they could find. Some had no 
option but to travel by foot, with tragic consequences – there were estimates 
of at least 200 migrant deaths on the road while trying to return home (Banerji, 
2020). When Members of Parliament requested the data on job losses and 
deaths among migrants during lockdown, the government representative 
replied that they did not keep a record of this and had no data available. The 
government merely informed that they were among the over 10  million 
migrant workers who returned to their home states between March and June 
(Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, 2020) illustrating migrants’ mar-
ginalisation from policy debates.
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pressure on the Central Government to act. It was in this context that on 13 May, the 
government announced a raft of assistance measures under the moniker ‘Atmanirbhar 
Bharat’ or ‘Self-reliant India’, totalling Rs. 2  trillion (about US$ 300 billion), or 
10% of GDP (Rajan, 2020b, c). The scheme was detailed by the Finance Minister 
Fig. 12.4 Migrants returned to their home states after lockdown. (Source of data: Unstarred 
Question No. 197, Lok Sabha, 14 September 2020)
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and comprised five aid tranches; the second targeted migrant workers and small 
farmers. On 14 May, an addition Rs. 10 billion (US$ 134 million) was announced 
for distribution to the states for migrant welfare under the Prime Minister’s Citizen 
Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations (PM-CARES) fund. Each state 
would be given a minimum of 10% or 1 billion (US$ 13.4 million), with additional 
grants to be allocated based on the state’s population (50% weight) and the number 
of positive coronavirus cases it has (40% weight). Given that India has 28 states and 
nine union territories, it is unclear how this division takes place (Rajan & Mishra, 
2020). The measures for migrant workers within the ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ are 
detailed in Table 12.3 below and can be divided into short-, medium-, and long-term 
measures.
While these programmes were announced in the face of the pandemic and needed 
by migrants long before its start, the effectiveness of these schemes is yet to be 
assessed.
To address the plight of stranded migrants, the government intervened with the 
Shramik special trains and buses to help them reach their hometowns (Dutta, 2020). 
However, this service was not free and migrants were being charged exorbitant fares 
at railway stations – which became a source of political bickering. The Supreme 
Court of India intervened with an order stating that the migrants would not pay any 
fare, with Indian Railways to bear 85% of the ticket cost and state government to 
cover the remaining 15% (NDTV, 2020). At the same time, a total of 9.1 million 
migrants travelled on both trains and buses. As of 15 June 2020, almost 4450 
Shramik trains had transported more than 60 lakh (6 million) people to their destina-
tions (The Hindu, 2020).
The federal nature of the Indian system, however, allows for states to intervene 
in issues concerning migrants and workers. India’s size and unequal economic and 
social development – especially with regards to differing windows of demographic 
dividends – has led to certain states being migrant receivers and others being migrant 
senders, with states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Rajasthan as gaining states in 
terms of its working age population and Kerala and Tamil Nadu as losing states 
(Rajan & Mishra, 2020). A look at these states based on this distinction also yields 
a larger picture of Indian state responses.
12.4.2  State-Level Responses
According to the 2011 Census, Delhi, Gujarat, Kerala, and Maharashtra have been 
the major destination states for migrants in India; Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Odisha, 
Jharkhand, and Rajasthan are the sending states. Labour is a subject in the ‘concur-
rent list’ of the Indian constitution, which gives equal right for states to legislate on 
matters related to it. This federal nature of India’s response to handling the migrant 
crisis led to a variety of reactions on the part of different states. Migrant-receiving 
states had to contend with issues like providing stranded migrant workers adequate 
shelter and essential facilities, and sending states had to contend with issues of large 
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Immediate Rs. 35 billion 
(US$ 
469.1 million)
Under this intervention, 
food security was 
announced for a likely 
80 million migrant workers 
who are outside the ambit 
of the National Food 
Security Act of 2013 or 
those without state ration 
cards, who are to be 
provided with 5 kg rice 
each and 1 kg of pulses for 
all family members in the 
household for the next 
2 months.
Increasing Funds 









Short-term Rs. 400 billion 
(US$ 
5.3 billion)
Additional funds were 
announced to the Rs. 
610 billion (US$ 
8.18 billion) MGNREGS 
budget aimed at generating 
3 billion additional 
person-days of work. 
Earlier, on 26 March, a 
national average minimum 
wage was increased from 
Rs. 182 to Rs. 202 per day.
Announcement 





Medium-term Rs. 500 billion 
(US$ 
6.7 billion).
In June 2020, the central 
government announced the 
Garib Kalyan Rozgar 
Abhiyaan to be 
implemented in ‘mission 
mode’ in 125 days over 116 
districts of six states (Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh, Uttar 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
Jharkhand and Odisha) that 
received the maximum 
numbers of migrant 
workers back. It will 
expedite implementation of 
25 public infrastructure 
works and those related to 
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masses of return migrants and provide them quarantine and other testing health 
facilities. Different policies were implemented in these states, but as we see below, 
they did not go far enough to address core issues.
 Policy Responses in Receiving States
 1. Relief packages. In the early part of the migrant crisis, governments all over the 
world were scrambling to provide immediate material support to their citizens. 
This was the case in India as well – the Central Government announced several 
programmes for immediate relief, culminating in the major $300 billion package 
on 16 May 2020. However, when it came to state responses, the southern state of 
Kerala provided a template in addressing the issues of not only migrants, but also 
other vulnerable groups. It initially announced a comprehensive package of Rs. 
200 billion (US$ 2.6 billion) to cover migrant workers’ basic necessities even 
before the national lockdown and the Central Government’s assistance scheme 
were announced. Kerala’s initiative was applauded by several countries around 
the world (Isaac & Sadanandan, 2020; Rajan, 2020c, d; Vijayan, 2020). Kerala 
was the only state to announce a comprehensive package of this sort.
 2. Shelter homes and meals for stranded migrants. Kerala also took the lead in 
providing shelter and food for migrants stranded in the state. In early April, it 
was found that over 65% of all government-run shelter homes in India, housing 














Long-term The scheme ‘One Nation 
One Ration Card’ provides 
a universal ration card that 
has complete portability in 
any state and is also to be 
implemented in its full 
effect. It is likely to cover 
83% of the targeted 
population, some 
670 million beneficiaries by 
the end of 2020 and reach 










Long-term The Pradhan Mantri Awas 
Yojana (PMAY) will 
provide rental housing for 
migrant workers in cities 
that would rake in private 
funding under the Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) 
model.
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kitchens ensured that migrants did not go hungry while stranded in the state 
(Rajan, 2020a). Similarly, the Maharashtra Government had allocated Rs. 
450 million (US$ 6.03 million) to setup of shelter homes for stranded migrants 
with funds from the State Disaster Relief Fund. The government also made pro-
vision for mid-day meals for stranded migrant workers registered at construction 
sites in the cities of Mumbai, Navi Mumbai, Thane, Pune, and Nagpur (Tare, 
2020). The Government of Gujarat designatedCovid-19 as a disaster under the 
State Disaster Relief Fund, with all expenditures for stranded migrant labourers 
to be covered by the Fund (PRS Legislative Research, 2020a, b).
 3. Food security at destinations. Providing food security for a number of migrant 
workers stranded at destinations became an immediate point of concern in most 
receiving states. The highest number of Covid-19 cases was registered in 
Mumbai, which has a large population that live in slum-like housing conditions. 
The government of Maharashtra identified around 1.88 million holders of PDS 
or ration cards as being below the poverty line and were supplied wheat, rice, and 
coarse grain under the National Food Security Act at the nominal rates of Rs. 3, 
Rs. 2, and Re. 1, respectively (Ashar, 2020). Another 20,000 cardholders were 
covered under the Antyodaya scheme. About 1 to 1.5  million newly below- 
poverty- line cardholders were supplied subsidised rations through the public 
distribution system. The Government of Kerala also set up community kitchens 
for stranded migrant workers through local self-help groups that at organised 
these facilities across the state.
Providing a Social Base: The Kerala Model to Revival
Kerala, with its approach to a holistic welfare of its citizens, won praise from 
around the world for its comprehensive response to the welfare of migrant 
workers. Apart from its response in the pandemic’s immediate wake, it also 
took steps towards a post-pandemic revival of its economy and society through 
a welfare framework. For the poor and vulnerable, Kerala sought to ensure 
social security during this difficult time. Accordingly, 5.5 million people – 
elderly, differently-abled and widows  – in Kerala were paid Rs. 8500 
(US$114) each and the government also provided a sum of Rs. 1000–5000 
(US$13.42–67) to 460,000 persons registered in the various labour welfare 
funds. In addition, 15 kg of rice and a kit of pulses and condiments were dis-
tributed free to every household. Free and subsidised meals served through 
community kitchens and kudumbasree hotels set up since the lockdown were 
initiated. Moreover, Kerala is implementing two focused schemes in the after-
math of this pandemic. The first, Subhiksha Keralamis a comprehensive pro-
gramme aimed at ensuring food security and the second, Vyavasaya 
Bhadratha, will distribute Department of Industry grants totalling Rs. 34 bil-
lion (US$ 455 million) to small, medium, and micro enterprises (MSMEs).
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 Policy Responses in Sending States
The sending states also provided enormous assistance to their non-resident fellows 
who worked as migrant workers outside the state. Provision of food, arrangement of 
transportation, and monetary cash support were important assistance provided dur-
ing the lockdown. Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Odisha, and Rajasthan were prominent 
among states in providing support to the migrant workers originating from there.
In the early days of lockdown, the Uttar Pradesh government tried to ensure that 
states hosting migrants gave them adequate food and shelter. They also ensured that 
migrants who were travelling through the state were given adequate food and shelter 
as they made their way to their destinations (PRS Legislative Research, 2020c). 
Similar to Uttar Pradesh, the Government of Rajasthan (another important migrant- 
sending state) worked during the first phases of the lockdown to arrange for buses at 
inter-state borders to bring migrant workers home and also set up quarantine centres 
for them. The Government of Bihar allocated Rs. 1 billion (US$ 13.4 million) from 
the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund on 26 March 2020 to assist migrants stuck in other 
parts of the country (PRS Legislative Research, 2020c). Quarantine shelters were 
set up ad-hoc for the mass of returning migrants; however, reports of inadequate and 
unhygienic facilities led to major discontent among those who were forced to live 
there (Chakraborty and Ramashankar, 2020). The Bihar government also intro-
duced measures for alleviating the suffering of migrant labourers who returned and 
were rendered jobless by the pandemic through cash transfers of a lump sum of Rs. 
1000. Additionally the government operated 10 food centres in Delhi, which houses 
the largest number of Bihari migrants, and state-wide nodal officers were appointed 
to coordinate the relief measures.
Some state governments also took the initiative in providing employment sup-
port for migrant workers. The Odisha government, for instance, decided to pay Rs. 
1500 to construction workers registered with the Odisha Building and Construction 
Workers’ Welfare Board. It also approved local bodies such as Gram Panchayats 
(village councils) and Urban Local Bodies to oversee the welfare of returning 
migrants, registering and providing them with 14-day quarantine facilities as well as 
a cash transfer of Rs. 2000 ($26.84) as an incentive for doing so (PRS Legislative 
Research, 2020c).
The Uttar Pradesh government announced free one-month rations for 16.5 mil-
lion registered construction day-wage workers (Press Trust of India, 2020a), while 
the Odisha government has provided additional rice of 5 kg per head for 3 months 
and 1 kg of dal per card for 3 months free to 91,502 cardholders under the State 
Food Security Scheme. The Odisha State also distributed 1.016 million MT of food 
grains to beneficiaries under the National Food Security Act (NFSA) compared to 
normal monthly distributions of 194,000 MT (Press Trust of India, 2020b). In early 
April, the Odisha government extended food security coverage to all migrants who 
returned to the state regardless of whether they possessed a ration card or not.
On 16 June 2020, the Uttar Pradesh government announced it would set up the 
Uttar Pradesh Labour (Employment Exchange and Job) Commission to employ 
returning migrant workers in both the public and private sectors, with a particular 
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focus to upgrade skills and boost local economies (Varma, 2020). The Madhya 
Pradesh government followed by announcing the formation of a migrant labour 
commission along the same lines (Sharma, 2020). How these commissions address 
the issues migrant workers face on the ground, however, remains to be seen. To 
increase awareness about Covid-19 and its attendant issues, the Rajasthan govern-
ment established a helpline for stranded and moving migrant workers and a Jan 
Soochna (public information) portal to disseminate important information regard-
ing the pandemic as these migrants returned to their homes in rural areas (Patil, 2020).
As seen above, the varied state responses were, in essence, on-the-spot reactions 
to the deteriorating situation surrounding the disrupted lives and livelihoods of 
migrant workers. However, there were many overlaps in state responses as the 
migrant crisis unfolded in the wake of the national lockdown. What was sorely 
missing was active coordination among states and between the states and the centre. 
This was especially evident in logistical issues for ferrying migrant workers back 
home and tracing. While some measures were more effective than others, it remains 
to be seen if migrant workers will stay at the forefront of these states’ policies as we 
move forward. However, the knee-jerk reactions of both the central and state gov-
ernments were a testament to the lack of a framework for migrants in India. The 
pandemic provided an opportunity to address the issues by shining a harsh spot-
light on it.
12.5  Missed Opportunities for Reform: The Structures that 
Impede Migrants
The pandemic-triggered migrant crisis brought clarity to a larger issue of exclusion-
ary development in India, in both the rural and urban landscapes. Even though 
migrants form an integral part of both these landscapes, their welfare has often been 
relegated to the periphery of policy discussions. As we have shown, a number of 
migrants with temporary or seasonal jobs work in a variety of informal occupations 
across the country’s urban and rural milieus. They are the most vulnerable among 
the migrant workforce in the country and are precluded from the country’s already 
flimsy welfare mechanism (Rajan & Bhagat, 2021).
A close examination of how this has occurred brings about a clear picture of the 
issues plaguing India’s internal migrants.
12.5.1  Inadequacy of Legislation for Migrant Workers
To date, there is only one piece of legislation governing the conditions of migrant 
workers in India – the Interstate Migrant Workmen’s Act of 1979, which is appli-
cable mostly to contractor-driven migration. However, migrant workers make up a 
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large share of India’s informal workforce, whose conditions and rights are governed 
by several labour laws with no focus on migrants. Table 12.4 summarises some of 
prominent Acts and their provisions.
These laws, however, are more conspicuous for their non-implementation, leav-
ing workers bereft of legal means to ensure their rights. The urban exclusion of 
internal migrants was flagged earlier in a report by UNESCO (2013). It found that 
migrants were denied access to rights in the city (Bhagat, 2017), often working in 
informal work with inadequate social and economic security and denied basic 
access to healthcare and education for their children.
 Migrants and the Right to Amenities
In late 2015, the Government of India, through the Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Poverty Alleviation (MHUPA), formed the Working Group on Migration to exam-
ine laws covering migrant workers. The Working Group submitted its report in early 
2017 and noted the large contribution that migrants make to the Indian economy and 
society (Government of India, 2017a, b; Rajan & D’Sami, 2020). However, it also 
noted the vulnerabilities and the lack of economic and social security that they face 
Table 12.4 Major legislation on the welfare of unorganised sector and migrant workers
Plantation Labour Act, 1951 Regulates provision of labour and conditions of 
work in plantations, which have historically 
unorganised and migrant labour.
Building and Other Construction Workers 
(Regulation of Employment and Conditions 
of Service) Act, 1996 (RECS Act) and the 
Building and Other Construction Workers’ 
Welfare Cess Act, 1996 (WC Act).
Regulates the employment and conditions of 
work for registered workers and offers social 
security benefits in the construction sector, which 
includes a large number of migrant workers.
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) 
Act, 1970
Requires the employer to pay fair wages to the 
registered contractor, who then must pay wages 
to the registered workers.
Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of 
Employment and Conditions of Service) 
Act, 1970
Stipulates that the contractor is responsible for 
payment of wages, adequate health and safety 
conditions, housing facilities, and migration costs 
to the registered migrant workmen.
Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act, 1976 Renders all forms of bonded labour illegal. (This 
Act was introduced in lieu of the fact that many 
informal sectors, such as manufacture of bricks, 
employ forced labour through debt bondage. 
Many of these workers are vulnerable migrants.)
Unorganised Workers Social Security Act, 
2008
Looks to identify registered workers in the 
unorganised sector and provide social security 
benefits.
Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and 
Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014
Regulates the activities of registered street 
vendors (mostly migrants) and provides them a 
right to pursue their activities.
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throughout the country. The report made a number of recommendations, such as 
increased weightage on social protection programmes; enforcement of labour laws; 
registration of migrant workers; ensuring adequate food security by the portability 
of the public distribution system; ensuring adequate access to healthcare and educa-
tion for migrant children; increasing opportunities for skill development; ending the 
requirement for state domicile to acquire government job; and, policies aimed at 
migrants’ inclusion into the formal financial system.
The Central Government has amalgamated the various labour laws into four 
labour codes, namely: (a) Labour Code on Wages; (b) Labour Code on Occupational 
Safety and Health; (c) Labour Code on Industrial Relations; and (d) Labour Code 
on Social Security. In 2020, the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions 
Codes were passed by Parliament. These codes are a part of the rationalisation of 
labour legislation in India and subsumed 13 of the current labour laws that governed 
the health and safety conditions of establishments employing 10 or more workers. 
This included the Interstate Migrant Workmen’s Act and the Contract Labour Act 
also. This has led to the annulment or dilution of existing welfare measures for 
migrant workers in the future.
Certain state governments also sought to use the pandemic as a pretext to amend 
certain major labour laws, which were later repealed after much pushback (Press 
Trust of India, 2020c). These states had also amended the critical Industrial Disputes 
Act to raise the threshold for layoffs and retrenchment from 100 to 300 workers in 
a factory and the threshold membership for trade unions from 15% to 30%. These 
measures aimed to attract investment into the state and kick-start their economies – 
which is a flawed assumption at best.
 The Invisibilisation of Dependents
When we think of migration in India, we normally fixate on the migration to various 
destinations of men for work, but this is misleading. Migration often involves the 
whole family, and the dynamics of familial migration is a sorely under-researched 
phenomenon in the Indian context.
One major fact of internal migration in India, as mentioned above, is the over-
whelming dominance of women in its stream, amounting to some 70% of total 
migrants. While marriage has been cited as the main reason for migration in the 
past, things are changing, and more women are migrating for work and also work-
ing after migrating as a dependent (Parida & Madheswaran, 2019). However, given 
the low female labour participation rate in India, that percentage is still very small. 
A number of women migrants are still predominantly dependents and the pandemic 
caused significant hardships to them as well. What was notable, however, was their 
absence in public debate despite the images of entire families on the road home. 
Women in the labour force work mostly in the informal sector and are completely 
overlooked in any discussion. In the current context, four out of every ten women in 
the country suffered from job loss, amounting to 17 million women (Rajan et al., 
2021). This is a major part of the story that was missing from the picture presented.
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The picture is the same when examining issues of dependents like the elderly, but 
particularly of children. Migrants move to cities not only for better work opportuni-
ties for themselves, but also for better prospects for their children. The pandemic, 
however, forced hundreds of thousands of children to head back to the villages 
along with their families, uprooting them from not only their homes but also access 
to better health and education (Banerji, 2020). It is feared that a number of students 
will be forced to drop out of school because they have to return to villages, which 
suffer from inadequate educational facilities. This will lead to incalculable loss to 
their human development and the nation’s well-being.
The pandemic has raged through the country indiscriminately. The policies to 
contain its spread, however, have been extremely discriminatory  – targeting the 
most vulnerable of the population and leaving their futures in darkness for the fore-
seeable future. The question from here is how we ensure that migrants get back on 
their feet and continue to contribute to the nation.
12.6  Concluding Remarks: Away Forward to Migration 
and Inclusive Policy
The implementation of the lockdown exposed the central government’s lack of cog-
nizance of the migrant population and their issues. The food insecurity of migrant 
workers emerged as the most visible deprivation, along with shelter. The non- 
portability of PDS services across state lines also became evident (Srivastava, 
2020). We must ensure food security through portability of the ration card in the 
PDS schemes in the future. As a follow up measure, the Central Government 
announced the ‘One Nation, One Ration Card’ to ensure portability of food security 
entitlement across India. If implemented successfully next year as proposed, it will 
go along way towards providing food security for poor migrants.
In addition, the housing scheme – which is likely to take at least 1 year to finish – 
does very little or nothing to alleviate the ongoing suffering of the migrant labourer. 
With the lockdown cutting all sources of income, few support schemes have focused 
on short-term financial relief as the package fails to recognise the immediate dis-
tress of migrant workers. In light of the fact that the Indian economy is set to see a 
contraction in growth in the coming year (World Bank, 2020), certain immediate 
steps need to be taken in order to integrate migration with development 
(Rajan, 2020d).
The apathy of the central and state governments is most visible in the collection 
of reliable and real-time data on migrants in the country. Collected datasets are 
either too fractured or irregular and out dated like the Census and National Sample 
Surveys, which do an inadequate job of covering seasonal and temporary migration 
in the country. When asked in Parliament about the data on the number of migrant 
workers who suffered job losses during the pandemic and those who died during 
their journey home, the government callously replied that it had no data for either. 
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Not even a rough estimate was provided, laying bare exactly how marginalised the 
problems of migrants are in government policy. It is imperative to know the exact 
size and characteristics of the migrant population in order to come up with holistic 
and effective policies. This can be organized in numerous ways as suggested below.
The most basic way to ensure this is to have migrants voluntarily self-register at 
their destinations. These provisions exist in some laws, as mentioned earlier, but are 
ineffective. We need to have robust administrative data on the number of migrants 
in the country. This can be complemented with large scale datasets like the Census, 
the National Sample Survey, the Kerala Migration Survey (Rajan et al., 2020) and 
the Indian Human Development Survey to gain a disaggregated temporal view of 
migration.
A second initiative we could implement is issuing everyone who migrates to 
another state for work with a Migrant Smart Card, which can be swiped at bus or 
railway stations when they travel. This Smart Card would contain their socioeco-
nomic details, may be linked to the Aadhaar or Ration Card as well as details about 
their work contract and employer’s details so that they have a means of official 
restitution in times of disputes with the employers. This will identify the holder as a 
migrant worker to be given benefits as per their requirements. The use of this card 
would also provide a real-time look at migration within the country.
Finally, it is high time the Central Government invested in a pan-India migration 
survey, similar to the Kerala Migration Survey that the Government of Kerala has 
used to great effect to understand migration patterns and trends from the state over 
the years (Rajan & Zachariah, 2019; Zachariah et al., 1999, 2000). It is no coinci-
dence that Kerala handled the Covid-19 migrant crisis best. In fact, current esti-
mates based on train passenger travel data show only the tip of the iceberg.
The government missed a huge opportunity to announce at least an ex-gratia pay-
ment to every migrant worker in the form of a Rs. 25,000 cash transfer in the imme-
diate period. This would be compensation for the lost man-days of work and wages 
for migrant workers during the two-month lockdown. Cash transfers are the most 
efficient way to stimulate the economy, seen even in the case of the US, which pro-
vided a $1200 stimulus check for 3 months to taxpayers as part of a $1 trillion sta-
bilisation programme (Sullivan, 2020) Even if we were to send a sum of Rs. 25,000 
to every inter-state and inter-district migrant worker, earlier estimated at 140 mil-
lion, this would amount to a total of Rs. 3.5 trillion, which is about one-sixth of the 
package announced. This cash support would have been more far more helpful for 
returning workers to cover some of the income they lost during the lockdown period 
and would have provided some form of security to help overcome their desperation, 
making them self-reliant in the true sense of the term (Rajan, 2020c, d).
This cash could have also stimulated local economies by giving a sizeable share 
of the population the purchasing power it currently lacks. This would go a long way 
in the revival of ‘animal spirits’, as John Maynard Keynes once famously said, 
within the depressed rural economies, as immediate cash transfers will ensure 
spending that would kickstart a multiplier effect once economic normality resumes. 
On the production side, the government should ensure that proper financing and 
credit lines – among other stimuli– should open up for industries to revive once 
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again. This ensures that migrants have an incentive to return to destinations, which 
they currently will be wary of doing. Having migrants register for this cash support 
at the destinations would have also given the various governments an accurate esti-
mate of the number of stranded migrants  – something that we crucially lack at 
present.
Rural public works programmes like the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act have proved to be the most robust social security net during the crisis. Along 
with increases in the allocated budget and in person-days of work, it is also impor-
tant to increase the days of work to at least 180–200 days of work per year, or at 
least 15 days per month. This may still cover only a fraction of their earnings from 
their work at the destinations. Furthermore, this is still a conditional arrangement 
based on registration for work and not an immediate measure. However, it is a 
rights-based security net that needs to be extended to urban areas.
Migrant workers have traditionally been on the periphery of government policy-
making as they are an invisible voter pool (Rajan et al., 2019). Many cannot vote in 
their hometowns due to the nature of their work. The portability of voting rights 
could emerge an empowerment strategy for migrant workers and ensure a sustain-
able progress in the post-pandemic world.
12.7  Postscript
India has seen a very sharp rise in COVID-19 infections in the second wave that 
started in early February 2021 and peaked near the first week of May 2021, with 
cases reported to be more than 400,000 and deaths about 4000 daily. This was expo-
nentially more severe than the first wave. Although new COVID-19 cases started 
declining after first week of May 2021, it has devastated more lives and livelihoods. 
The genesis of the second wave is attributed to the lack of Covid-appropriate behav-
iour, social and political gatherings due to religious activities and elections that 
were held in between. There was also the complacency that the country had over-
come the COVID-19 health crisis. However, the government was cautious in putting 
strict lockdowns and restrictions, and transport services were allowed to be opera-
tional. The second wave, in spite of being severe and devastating, did not create a 
migration crisis as seen during the first wave with its visible and pathetic exodus of 
migrants. This is not to say that there was not a flight of migrant workers, but that it 
was slower and less visible. Unfortunately, most of the policy measures for migrants 
announced during the first wave have not taken any concrete shape and remains 
mere announcements mainly due to the fact that the second wave brought forth 
shocking inadequacies in India’s medical infrastructure such as shortage of oxygen, 
hospital beds, medicines and vaccines. This demonstrates that policy measures are 
ad-hoc, partial and short-sighted instead of being long term, holistic and integrated.
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